Vollrath v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.

• Decision Date: 31 May 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-1207,GEORGIA-PACIFIC,89-1207
• Citation: 899 F.2d 533
• Parties: 115 Lab.Cas. P 56,220, 5 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 321 Harley VOLLRATH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 533

899 F.2d 533

115 Lab.Cas. P 56,220, 5 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 321

Harley VOLLRATH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 89-1207.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued Jan. 25, 1990.

Decided March 30, 1990.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied May 31, 1990.

Donald J. Gasiorek and Lionel J. Postic (argued), Sommers, Schwartz, Silver & Schwartz, Southfield, Mich., for plaintiff-appellant.

Diane M. Soubly (argued), Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, Detroit, Mich., Charles S. Mishkind, Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, Grand Rapids, Mich., and Gloria J. Shanor, Georgia-Pacific Law Dept., Atlanta, Ga., for defendant-appellee.

Before KENNEDY and RYAN, Circuit Judges, and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge.

Vollrath, a former high-level management employee for appellee Georgia-Pacific Corporation, appeals the summary judgment of dismissal of his complaint alleging wrongful discharge in violation of an implied employment contract terminable only for cause. Vollrath asserts that there remain questions of material fact regarding his claim of wrongful termination. We find that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that appellee is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the District Court's order granting Georgia-Pacific's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Georgia-Pacific operates a small paper mill in Kalamazoo, Michigan. It hired appellant to work as a utility person on or around April 13, 1967. Appellant later became an electrician-millwright. In 1983, appellee promoted appellant to the position of Area Maintenance Supervisor of the Kalamazoo mill. In January 1986, appellant accepted the newly created position of Field Maintenance Representative. On April 7, 1986, he was discharged from that position.

Appellant alleges that appellee discharged him without just cause and without providing him an opportunity to return to the Area Maintenance Supervisor position, thereby breaching a contractual obligation. Appellant claims that he had a legitimate expectation of dismissal only for cause based upon representations made by the Kalamazoo plant manager. First, appellant claims that the plant manager represented to him in informal conversations that he would continue in employment as long as he continued to do his job. Second, appellant provides evidence of a memorandum given to him by the plant manager around March of 1984, which stated:

As mutually agreed upon, in the event that problems arise in Harley's performance as Maintenance Superintendent, he will be given the option to return to Area Supervisor.

Appellee maintains that Vollrath was an employee terminable at will. Further, appellee argues that Vollrath was discharged because his position was eliminated for economic reasons as part of a gradual reduction in the work force at the Kalamazoo facility.

Appellee bases its assertion that appellant was an employee at will on the fact that in 1983 appellee had prepared and distributed an Operating Policy Manual (OPM) to certain salaried supervisory employees, including appellant.

In 1985, appellee updated its OPM, further clarifying its at will policy. The 1983 OPM provides, in relevant part:

It is the policy of Georgia-Pacific that the employment and compensation of any employee can be terminated, with or without cause, at any time, at the option of the employee or at the option of the company. No employee or representative of Georgia-Pacific, other than the Chief Executive Officer or the Corporate Director--Employee Relations and Administrative Services, has any authority to enter into any agreement extending the employment of any employee for any specified period of time, or to make any agreement contrary to the foregoing.

The 1985 OPM provides in relevant part:

It is the policy of Georgia-Pacific that the employment and compensation of any employee can be terminated, with or without cause, at any time, at the option of the employee or at the option of the company. Specific procedures to be followed depend upon the circumstances of the termination. Any questions about this policy should be referred to the office of the Vice President--Human Resources.

Later, it provides:

5. Other Involuntary Discharges. There may be grounds for discharge other than those discussed above. This discussion is not meant to be inclusive or to limit in any way management's freedom to discharge an employee at any time for any reason not prohibited by law.

In reviewing the District Court's grant of summary judgment, we are required to review "de novo" the District Court's findings. Burkart v. Post-Browning, Inc., 859 F.2d 1245, 1249 (6th Cir.1988). Summary judgment is appropriate where:

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A material issue of fact exists where a reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, could return a verdict for that party. Boddy v. Dean, 821 F.2d 346, 349 (6th Cir.1987).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record demonstrating the absence of a material issue of fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Potters Medical Center v. City Hosp. Ass'n, 800 F.2d 568, 572 (6th Cir.1986). The non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. If after adequate discovery the party bearing the burden of proof fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of his or her claim, summary judgment is appropriate. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

Under Michigan law, "[e]mployers and employees remain free to provide, or not to provide, for job security. Absent a contractual provision for job security, either the employer or the employee may ordinarily terminate an employment contract at any time for any, or no, reason." Valentine v. General American Credit, Inc., 420 Mich. 256, 258-59, 362 N.W.2d 628, 629 (1984) (footnote omitted). However, where an employer adopts a policy of discharge only for cause, through either formal or informal actions, an employee has a right to rely on that policy and may not be discharged in violation of such a policy. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 598, 292 N.W.2d 880, 884-85 (1980). Therefore, in order to withstand defendant's motion for summary judgment, appellant must demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Georgia-Pacific, through formal or informal actions, adopted a policy of discharge only for cause.

Both the 1983 and the 1985 OPMs explicitly set forth Georgia-Pacific's at will policy...