J & M Sec., LLC v. Aziz
| Decision Date | 04 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 109169,ED 109169 |
| Citation | 626 S.W.3d 863 |
| Parties | J & M SECURITIES, LLC, Appellant, v. Hani S. AZIZ and Sanaa A. Kahalah-Aziz, Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
For Appellant: Nelson L. Mitten, Abby N. Schneider, 7700 Bonhomme Ave., 7th Fl., Clayton, MO 63105, Lucas G. Guard, 910 S. Kirkwood Rd. #100, Kirkwood, MO 63122.
For Respondents: David N. Damick, 211 N. Broadway, Ste. 2420B, St. Louis, MO 63102, Jesse W. Ullom, 16090 Swingley Ridge Rd., Ste. 620, Chesterfield, MO 63017.
J & M Securities, LLC ("Appellant") appeals the entry of summary judgment in favor of Hani S. Aziz and Sanaa A. Kahalah-Aziz ("Respondents") as to Appellant's petition for damages arising out of a residential lease agreement. According to Appellant, the trial court erred in concluding the claim was time-barred because it improperly applied the five-year statute of limitations set forth in section 516.120(1)1 instead of the ten-year statute of limitations established by section 516.110(1). The judgment is affirmed.
On July 2, 2007, Respondents entered into a residential lease agreement with The Century Group, Inc. ("Century"). The lease provided, in relevant part:
On July 28, 2008, Respondents terminated the lease and vacated the premises. The following week, Century mailed Respondents a "statement of damages," which asserted Respondents owed Century $633.00 for expenses arising from repairs, maintenance and cleaning completed after Respondents vacated the premises. Respondents denied they ever received the statement, and they did not pay the requested amount.
Century later assigned its claim to Appellant, which filed this action on January 15, 2017—more than eight years after Respondents terminated the lease—seeking the principal amount of $633.00 plus prejudgment interest and attorney's fees. Respondents sought summary judgment on the basis that the action was barred by the five-year statute of limitations set forth in section 516.120(1). The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Respondents, and this appeal follows.
"Summary judgment is only proper if the moving party establishes that there is no genuine issue as to the material facts and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Goerlitz v. City of Maryville , 333 S.W.3d 450, 452 (Mo. banc 2011). In considering an appeal from the trial court's entry of summary judgment, we "review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered." ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp. , 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). "The facts contained in affidavits or otherwise in support of a party's motion are accepted as true unless contradicted by the non-moving party's response to the summary judgment motion." Green v. Fotoohighiam , 606 S.W.3d 113, 115 (Mo. banc 2020) (quoting Goerlitz , 333 S.W.3d at 452-53 ). Review on appeal "is essentially de novo." ITT , 854 S.W.2d at 376. "The propriety of summary judgment is purely an issue of law." Id.
Appellant contends the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Respondents because it improperly applied the five-year statute of limitations in section 516.120(1) instead of the ten-year statute of limitations in section 516.110(1). According to Appellant, its petition was timely filed because the ten-year statute of limitations applies in that Appellant was not seeking damages for breach of contract but was instead seeking to enforce a promise for the payment of money.
Missouri has two statutes of limitations generally relating to contract actions. See Hughes Dev. Co. v. Omega Realty Co. , 951 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Mo. banc 1997). Section 516.120(1), the primary statute of limitations for contract disputes, provides that "[a]ll actions upon contracts, obligations or liabilities, express or implied" must be brought within five years. Section 516.110(1) provides an exception: "An action upon any writing, whether sealed or unsealed, for the payment of money or property" must be brought within ten years. See Rolwing v. Nestle Holdings, Inc. , 437 S.W.3d 180, 182 (Mo. banc 2014). In other words, section 516.110(1) ’s ten-year limitation period "applies when a plaintiff files suit to enforce a written promise to pay money." Id. at 183. "The plain language of section 516.120(1), however, applies generally to all breach of contract actions, including written contracts containing a promise for the payment of money or property." Id. at 182.
"[T]he essence of a promise to pay money is that it is an acknowledgment of an indebtedness, an admission of a debt due and unpaid." DiGregorio Food Prods., Inc. v. Racanelli , 609 S.W.3d 478, 481 (Mo. banc 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Martin v. Potashnick , 358 Mo. 833, 217 S.W.2d 379, 381 (1949) ). "[T]he promise to pay money must arise from the writing's explicit language; extrinsic evidence cannot supply the promise." Id. Stated another way, "once it is shown that the writing is for the payment of money and that the writing contains a promise to pay money, the exact amount to be paid or other detail of the obligation may be shown by extrinsic evidence—but not the promise itself."
Cmty. Title Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co. , 977 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Mo. banc 1998).
Resolution of this case turns on whether the lease provisions relating to repairs, maintenance and cleaning actually contain a written promise to pay money—"an...
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