Wineland v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp.

• Decision Date: 04 March 2021
• Docket Number: Cause No. C19-0793RSL
• Citation: 523 F.Supp.3d 1245
• Parties: Charlotte WINELAND, Individually, and Susan Wineland, as Personal Representative of the Estate of John Dale Wineland, deceased, Plaintiffs, v. AIR & LIQUID SYSTEMS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington

523 F.Supp.3d 1245

Charlotte WINELAND, Individually, and Susan Wineland, as Personal Representative of the Estate of John Dale Wineland, deceased, Plaintiffs,

v.AIR & LIQUID SYSTEMS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.

Cause No. C19-0793RSL

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, at Seattle.

Signed March 4, 2021

Alexandra B. Caggiano, Brian Weinstein, Phillip Alexander Chu, Dylan J. Johnson, Weinstein Caggiano PLLC, Seattle, WA, Andrew Seitz, Pro Hac Vice, Ron G. Archer, Pro Hac Vice, Scott L. Frost, Frost Law Firm PC, San Pedro, CA, Sharon J. Arkin, Pro Hac Vice, The Arkin Law Firm, Brookings, OR, for Plaintiffs.

Daniel Michael Finer, Pro Hac Vice, Knight Anderson, Pro Hac Vice, Tucker Ellis LLP, Cleveland, OH, Megan Uhle, Williams Kastner Greene & Markley, Portland, OR, Nicole R. MacKenzie, Ryan W. Vollans, Williams Kastner & Gibbs, Seattle, WA, for Defendant Carrier Corporation.

Christopher S. Marks, Tanenbaum Keale LLP, Seattle, WA, for Defendants CBS Corporation, General Electric Company.

Ryan J. Groshong, G. William Shaw, K&L Gates LLP, Seattle, WA, for Defendant Crane Co.

Kevin J. Craig, Mark B. Tuvim, Trevor J. Mohr, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, Seattle, WA, for Defendants Ingersoll Rand Company, Milwaukee Valve Company Inc.

Andrew Smith Russell, Pro Hac Vice, Pierce Davis & Perritano, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Allen Eraut, Rizzo Mattingly Bosworth PC, Portland, OR, for Defendant Warren Pumps LLC.

Christine E. Dinsdale, Soha & Lang PS, Seattle, WA, for Defendant Flowserve Corporation.

Christine E. Dinsdale, Rachel A. Rubin, Soha & Lang PS, Seattle, WA, for Defendant Alfa Laval Inc.

Kevin J. Craig, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, Timothy Kost Thorson, Carney Badley Spellman PS, Seattle, WA, for Defendant Cleaver-Brooks Inc.

Christopher S. Marks, Alice Coles Serko, Malika Johnson, Tanenbaum Keale LLP, Seattle, WA, for Defendant Electrolux Home Products Inc.

Claude Bosworth, Shaun Mary Morgan, Rizzo Mattingly Bosworth PC, Portland, OR, for Defendant Gardner Denver Inc.

Michael Edward Ricketts, Gordon Thomas Honeywell, Seattle, WA, for Defendant IMO Industries Inc.

Rachel Tallon Reynolds, Randy J. Aliment, Taryn M. Basauri, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Seattle, WA, for Defendants Invensys Systems Inc., Robertshaw Controls Co.

Dana C. Kopij, Tyler J. Hermsen, Williams Kastner & Gibbs, Seattle, WA, for Defendant The Nash Engineering Company.

Alice Coles Serko, Christopher S. Marks, Malika Johnson, Tanenbaum Keale LLP, Seattle, WA, D. David Steele, Pro Hac Vice, George D. Yaron, Pro Hac Vice, Yaron & Associates, Oakland, CA, for Defendant Puget Sound Commerce Center Inc.

J. Scott Wood, Kyle A. Jones, Foley & Mansfield, Seattle, WA, for Defendant Tate Andale Inc.

Brian Bernard Smith, James D. Hicks, Foley & Mansfield, Seattle, WA, for Defendant The WM Powell Company.

ORDER GRANTING PUGET SOUND COMMERCE CENTER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. # 302)

Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on "Defendant Puget Sound Commerce Center, Inc. FKA Todd Shipyards Corporation's Amended Motion for Summary Judgment/Partial Summary Judgment [ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ]." Dkt. # 302.¹ Plaintiffs allege that their decedent, John Dale Wineland, worked at Todd Shipyards in 1974, where he was negligently exposed to asbestos, including asbestos-containing insulation supplied by Todd Shipyards. Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Wineland's mesothelioma

and death were caused by this exposure. Todd Shipyards seeks dismissal of both the negligence and strict liability claims asserted against it because, under either maritime or Washington law, there is no triable issue of fact.

Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact that would preclude the entry of judgment as a matter of law. The party seeking summary dismissal of the case "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion" ( Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ) and "citing to particular parts of materials in the record" that show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact ( Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ). Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, it is entitled to summary judgment if the non-moving party fails to designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The Court will "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party ... and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Colony Cove Props., LLC v. City of Carson , 888 F.3d 445, 450 (9th Cir. 2018). Although the Court must reserve for the trier of fact genuine issues regarding credibility, the weight of the evidence, and legitimate inferences, the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position will be insufficient" to avoid judgment. City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp. , 750 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 2014) ; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Factual disputes whose resolution would not affect the outcome of the suit are irrelevant to the consideration of a motion for summary judgment. S. Cal. Darts Ass'n v. Zaffina , 762 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 2014). In other words, summary judgment should be granted where the nonmoving party fails to offer evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could return a verdict in its favor. Singh v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp. , 925 F.3d 1053, 1071 (9th Cir. 2019).

Having reviewed the memoranda, declarations, and exhibits submitted by the parties² and having heard the arguments of counsel, the Court finds as follows:

A. Maritime Law Applies

At oral argument, plaintiffs conceded that maritime law applies in this case. The Court agrees.

[A] party seeking to invoke federal admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) over a tort claim must satisfy conditions both of location and of connection with maritime activity. A court applying the location test must determine whether the tort occurred on navigable water or whether injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water. [ 46 U.S.C. § 30101.] The connection test raises two issues. A court, first, must "assess the general features of the type of incident involved," [ Sisson v. Ruby , 497 U.S. 358, 363, 110 S.Ct. 2892, 111 L.Ed.2d 292 (1990) ], to determine whether the incident has "a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce," [ Id. at 364, 110 S.Ct. 2892, n. 2 ]. Second, a court must determine whether "the general character" of the "activity giving rise to the incident" shows a "substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity." [ Id. at 365, 364, 110 S.Ct. 2892, and n. 2 ].

Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. , 513 U.S. 527, 534, 115 S.Ct. 1043, 130 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1995). The locality test requires an inquiry into the precise location where the injuries were suffered and/or whether the injuries were caused by a vessel on navigable water. For purposes of plaintiffs’ claims against Todd Shipyards, the injury-causing events occurred aboard the USS TUSCALOOSA when it was being repaired at Todd Shipyards in 1974. The vessel spent some time at pierside and some time in drydock during the overhaul. "In assessing whether work was on ‘navigable waters’ (i.e. , was sea-based) it is important to note that work performed aboard a ship that is docked at the shipyard is sea-based work, performed on navigable waters." Dumas v. ABB Grp., Inc. , 46 F. Supp.3d 477, 482 (D. Del. 2014). It is also "well-settled that vessels in drydock are still considered to be in ‘navigable waters’ for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction." Cabasug v. Crane Co. , 956 F. Supp.2d 1178, 1187, n. 11 (D. Hawaii 2013). Because asbestos-related disease has a long latency period and often involves years of work on or around ships, intermittent episodes of land-based exposure do not affect the analysis: "the locality test is satisfied as long as some portion of the asbestos exposure occurred on a vessel on navigable waters." Id. at 1187 (quoting Conner v. Alfa Laval, Inc. , 799 F. Supp.2d 455, 466 (E.D. Pa. 2011) ).

With regards to the connection test, courts have found that asbestos-related injuries suffered by workers on Navy ships have the potential to disrupt maritime commerce. Dumas , 46 F. Supp.3d at 483 ; Cabasug , 956 F. Supp.2d at 1188 ; Conner , 799 F. Supp.2d at 467-68. In making this determination, the Court considers whether the features of the incident, based on a mid-level description of the events, could hypothetically disrupt commercial shipping. Grubart , 513 U.S. at 538-39, 115 S.Ct. 1043 ; Christensen v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. , 279 F.3d 807, 815 n.31 (9th Cir. 2002). Mr. Wineland worked predominantly on Navy ships on navigable waters, and he was exposed to asbestos in that capacity. The general features of the incident - injury to seaman on navigable waters - has the potential to impact maritime commerce and has a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.

Both the location and connection tests are satisfied in this case: maritime law therefore governs the analysis of plaintiffs’ negligence and strict liability claims. Nevertheless, "state law may supplement maritime law when maritime law is silent or where a local matter is at issue, but state law may not be applied where it would conflict with [federal] maritime law." Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. , 40 F.3d 622, 627 (3d Cir. 1994), aff'd , 516 U.S. 199, 116 S.Ct. 619, 133 L.Ed.2d 578 (1996) (citations omitted). With regards to the issue of causation, the parties’ memoranda make clear that Washington and maritime law diverge regarding the showing that must be made in order to satisfy that element of plaintiffs’ claims. Maritime law, unaffected by state law, therefore governs that issue.

B. Negligence -...