9 F. 337 (E.D.Mo. 1881), O'Neil v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co.
| Docket Number | . |
| Date | 02 November 1881 |
| Citation | 9 F. 337 |
| Parties | O'NEIL v. ST. LOUIS, IRON MOUNTAIN & SOUTHERN RY. CO. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Page 337
The plaintiff avers in his petition that, at the time of the accident therein referred to, he was a brakeman in the employment of defendant; that while, in the performance of his duties as such, he was coupling a car, used and operated by defendant at the time, to a certain engine of the defendant, his hand and arm were caught between the car and engine, and crushed and lacerated so that it was necessary to amputate it between the elbow and wrist, and that it was amputated; that said injuries were caused by the defective, unsuitable, and dangerous apparatus and appliances for coupling said engine and car together; that the dead-woods on said car and engine were insufficient and unstable, and dangerous apparatus and appliances for coupling said engine and car together; that the dead-woods on said car and engine were insufficient and unstable, and dangerous to plaintiff whilst coupling, by reason of their not keeping said car and engine apart and allowing the draw-heads of the engine and car to interlap, thereby catching and crushing plaintiff's arm and hand as aforesaid; that plaintiff was ignorant of the dangerous condition of the appliances for coupling said engine and car together, and that neither defendant nor its agents informed him thereof; and that his injuries were caused by the negligence of defendant in supplying him with unsuitable, defective, and dangerous appliances with which to work in the discharge of his duty, and without any negligence on his part.
The case came on for trial October 13, 1881. It was tried before a jury, Treat D.J., presiding. The testimony of witnesses produced on behalf of the plaintiff tended to prove the allegations of the petition.
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The defendant proved that the car in question did not belong to it, but was a foreign car. At the close of the evidence defendant asked the court to instruct the jury that, under the evidence and pleadings in the case, plaintiff could not recover; but the instruction was refused.
TREAT, D.J.
thereupon charged the jury as follows:
Gentlemen of the jury: It is proper, in the consideration of this case, that you should bear in mind the difference in law between the obligations of an employer to an employee, and the obligations of a railroad to a stranger. In the latter case the utmost degree of diligence is required-- extraordinary diligence. The case before you involves a few propositions of law in the light of which you should consider the testimony; these propositions being, in the first,lace, that an employee who undertakes work, though the same may be of a dangerous character, is supposed to be competent to the discharge of that duty, assuming for himself all ordinary risks connected therewith; second, that the employer, to-wit, the railroad company, as in this case, must furnish him with reasonably and adequately safe appliances for the performance of his duties. Railroads, as in the case before you, are bound to receive cars from other roads, to handle them, and to haul them, and a brakeman or other employee of the defendant road is supposed to know that cars of different construction, and, possibly, of different modes of coupling, will be used in the conduct of the business of the railroad company; and the brakeman or other employee, though those cars coming onto the road may be more or less dangerous than the ordinary cars, is supposed to be competent to attend to his business, notwithing such cars are used. In other words, this is not a question of comparison between freight cars of the Iron Mountain Railroad, owned by itself, and other cars that it may haul over its road in connection with its respective trains. Behind that rests the main inquiry: Did this defendant road-- no matter whether the car was a foreign car-- put into its train a car which was not reasonably and adequately safe for the purpose for which it was used, in connection with the duties which the servants had to perform? In other words, though there might be differences in the construction of foreign cars, as compared with the cars belonging to the Iron Mountain Railroad itself; though there might be different degrees of danger connected with the handling of the different cars; yet this defendant was bound that no car, whether its own or a foreign car, should be otherwise than reasonably and adequately safe for its employees to handle and to manage in the ordinary conduct of their business. Consequently the strain in this case seems to be this: Was this car of which you have heard not adequately safe to be put into the train, whereby an employee,-- a brakeman, for instance,-- in undertaking to make the coupling, could not, by the exercise of ordinary care and skill on his part, escape accident? Of course, every one engaging in a particular business, employed therefor, is presumed-- is bound in law-- at his own hazard to exercise ordinary care and diligence with respect to the employment in which he is engaged. He is presumed to be competent therefor; yet, on the other hand, his employer-- as a railroad, for instance-- is bound on its part to furnish him with reasonably safe and adequate appliances, whereby, in the exercise of
Page 339
ordinary care, he would not encounter accidents of the nature described to you. The case, then, may be narrowed down to this: the plaintiff is entitled to recover, if, exercising ordinary care and diligence in the nature of the employment in which he was engaged, he, through the unreasonably inadequate and unsafe character of the car mentioned, incurred this accident.
If, through this neglect of the defendant company in furnishing such inadequately safe contrivances, without any negligence on his part, he incurred this danger, he is entitled to recover, and the measure of his compensation will be such as in your judgment he ought to receive in consequence of the injury, taking into consideration the nature and extent thereof, where there are no other special damages alleged in the case. On the other hand, if the damage was caused simply by his own negligence or failure to exercise ordinary care in the employment, the nature of which has been described, he cannot recover. If I have made myself understood, this company had the right to haul over its road cars not belonging to it-- foreign cars, as they are called. These cars might differ in construction, and might differ in the degree of danger attending their handling or management; yet, if the accident occurs from their being not reasonably safe or adequate, under any circumstances, for the business for which they are employed, and the accident occurs without the negligence of the employee, the company must respond thereto. If, on the other hand, the employee, through his own negligence, meets with an accident growing out of his handling or attempting to handle cars that are reasonably and adequately safe, then the accident is at his own cost, for which there would be no redress. Determine then, gentlemen,-- First, was this car reasonably and adequately safe for the employees in the handling of the same. If not, did the plaintiff, through carelessness or negligence, contribute to the accident which he sustained? If the car was not adequately safe, and he was not negligent in performing the duty assigned him, he is entitled to recover. If, on the other hand, the car was adequately safe, and the accident occurred to him through his failure to exercise the proper degree of care in the work in which he was employed, he cannot recover. It is a compound question always, gentlemen,--First, the neglect of the defendant; secondly, the contributory neglect of the plaintiff. Of course, it devolves on the defendant, in cases of this character, if the plaintiff has made out that the car was not adequately safe in respect of the management thereof-- I say, it is the duty of the defendant to show that plaintiff's negligence contributed to the accident.
The jury brought in a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant made a motion for a new trial, and in arrest of judgment, upon which the following opinion was delivered:
T. S. Rudd and A. R. Taylor, for plaintiff.
Thoroughman & Pike, for defendant.
TREAT, D.J.
The plaintiff sued the defendant for damages caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant. A trial was had, and verdict rendered for plaintiff. The defendant has filed motions for new trial and in arrest. The plaintiff was an employee of the defendant, and the accident occurred while he was engaged in the scope of
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his employment, viz., as brakeman, in coupling cars on a freight train. The evidence at the trial was conflicting. It seems that the defendant railway, in the discharge of its duties, was accustomed to receive, couple, and haul on its trains cars belonging to other railroads whose bumpers or dead-woods and coupling appliances were different from its own; but that 'a foreign car' of the P.R.R., of peculiar construction as to its dead-wood and couplings, was seldom received placed in defendant's trains. 'Foreign cars,' sent forward by the P.R.R. road, differing from defendant's cars, yet differing from those of the P.R.R., were frequently hauled over the defendant road as part of the latter's trains. It was evident from the testimony that different degrees of danger to operatives existed when one or the other of such foreign cars was used, and the testimony was in conflict as to which the foreign car was, which was introduced into the train in question.
At the close of the evidence defendant demurred, on the ground that the case, as fully presented, did not establish plaintiff's right to recover. It is admitted that, even at the close of evidence offered on both sides, the court can instruct the jury that the plaintiff cannot recover; yet if there is conflicting...
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