Smith v. Potter

• Decision Date: 15 June 1881
• Citation: 9 N.W. 273,46 Mich. 258
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: SMITH v. POTTER.

9 N.W. 273

46 Mich. 258

SMITH v. POTTER.

Supreme Court of Michigan

June 15, 1881

A brakeman in coupling freight cars had his arm crushed by a loosened dead-wood on a car which had come from another road. It was the business of inspectors employed on both roads to see that cars transferred were in proper condition, and there was no claim or showing that they were not competent. Held that the inspector was a fellow servant of the brakeman and that the risk of error on his part was one of the risks of the brakeman's employment, and that the brakeman could not recover against the company for the injury. Whether an action for a railway injury lies against the receiver of the company in whose employment it was incurred, quaere. The statutory requirement that every railroad shall impartially and diligently receive and forward the cars of other roads does not apply to cars unfit for passage, but means that no needless delays or hindrances shall be interposed, and that all precautions against the use of improper cars shall be adopted with reference to reasonable dispatch. The court will take notice as part of the general knowledge of the business community that the railroads of the country conduct inspections under a system which all persons so employed as to be interested are presumed to understand. Conductors and brakemen are fellow servants whose acts are not independent in such a sense as to separate them from each other in the line of dangers. Actions by employes against their employer for injuries caused by fellow servants are based on the actual negligence of the defendant or of some representative who is held in law to personate him; and where the business requires the employment of many servants beyond the possible constant supervision of either the employer or of such representative, there can be no negligence without the failure to use such precautions in choosing agents and guarding against perils as diligent prudence and foresight require. When a master has done all that can be reasonably required of him to prevent risks to his servants, he has done all that he owes them.

The court will take notice as part of the general knowledge of the business community that railroads conduct inspections under a system which all persons so employed as to be interested are presumed to understand.

Hanchett & Stark, for plaintiff in error.

Wisner & Draper, for defendant in error.

CAMPBELL, J.

Plaintiff who was a brakeman on the railroad of which defendant was receiver, sues for an injury which he received by having an arm crushed while coupling cars. The accident is shown to have happened while plaintiff was attempting to couple two cars which had been brought loaded to Monroe by another road and the occasion of it is said to have been the loosening and leaning down of the dead-woods of one car, which was rather lower than the other, whereby as the two came together the dead-woods of the lower car went partially under those of the higher one and caught plaintiff's arm. The accident happened at night, when plaintiff's train was somewhat behind time and hurried.

It appeared that at Monroe, as at other railroad junctions, the various roads had their own inspectors to examine cars brought in by or to be attached to their trains, and that this car was not reported as dangerous by either of the inspectors, of the road that brought it to Monroe or of the road on which plaintiff was employed. The circuit court for the county of Saginaw, after hearing all the evidence directed a verdict for defendant. No argument was made on the right to sue defendant as receiver, and the case has been treated as presenting no questions but those relating to negligence and its effect. And the only question under this head seems to be whether plaintiff as a person under employment can sue his employer, for the negligence of the persons who are claimed to have been in fault for not making a thorough inspection. While there may be other matters that may be open to remark, we do not think that we can properly consider, as against the plaintiff, any other question. The case has been very thoroughly presented, but after careful reflection we cannot see any principles involved in it which have not been so fully passed upon by our provious decisions as to render renewed discussions superfluous.

The statutes of this state make...