State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Young

• Decision Date: 09 September 1881
• Citation: 29 Minn. 474,9 N.W. 737
• Parties: STATE OF MINNESOTA EX REL. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL v YOUNG AND OTHERS.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

29 Minn. 474

9 N.W. 737

STATE OF MINNESOTA EX REL. THE ATTORNEY GENERALvYOUNG AND OTHERS.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed September 9, 1881.

Prohibition to the tribunal organized under the provisions of an act of the legislature entitled “An act providing for the adjustment of the Minnesota state railroad bonds,” approved March 2, 1881, (chapter 102, Gen. Laws 1881.)

W. J. Hahn, Atty. Gen., Thomas Wilson, Daniel Buck, and D. A. Secombe, for the relator.

Gordon E. Cole, John M. Gilman, and John B. Sanborn, contra.

GILFILLAN, C. J.

April 15, 1858, the people of Minnesota adopted an amendment to the constitution providing for the loan to certain railroad companies of bonds of the state, to be denominated “Minnesota State Railroad Bonds,” to the amount of $5,000,000. They were to be payable to the order of the company to whom issued, transferable by the indorsement of the president of the company, and redeemable at any time after 10 and before the expiration of 25 years from the date thereof, and were to bear interest at the rate of 7 per cent. per annum. The faith and credit of the state were, in express terms, pledged for the payment of the interest and the redemption of the principal thereof. The amendment contained provisions for each company, securing the state, and making provision for punctual payment and redemption of the bonds, principal and interest, in such manner as to exonerate the treasury of the state from any advances of money for that purpose. These provisions for security operated only as between the state and the companies to whom the bonds were to be issued, and were not intended to affect the relations between the state and those who might become holders of the bonds by indorsement, as in the amendment provided. To those persons the promise of the state to pay was to be absolute, creating between the state and them the relation of debtor and creditors. This was so decided, and it was the principal point involved and decided in Chamberlain v. St. P. & S. C. R. Co. 92 U. S. 299. A large amount of the bonds were issued pursuant to the amendment, when the companies having abandoned further performance of the conditions on which the bonds were to be issued, the further issue of the bonds was suspended. It is assumed that some if not all of the bonds issued were passed by indorsement to third persons, so as to become operative as contracts of the state to pay. For the purpose of this decision it is assumed that such bonds were legally issued, for no question of their validity nor any equity of the state against them is made in the proceeding.

After the default of the companies to perform the conditions in the amendment imposed on them, and after it had become manifest that all intention to proceed with such performance was definitively abandoned by the companies, the people of the state, on November 6, 1860, by a large vote, adopted two amendments to the constitution proposed to them by the legislature, one of them expunging from the constitution the amendment of April 15, 1858, “excepting and reserving to the state, nevertheless, all rights, remedies, and forfeiture accruing under said amendment.” The other amendment was in these words: “But no law levying a tax or making other provisions for the payment of interest or principal of the bonds denominated ‘Minnesota State Railroad Bonds' shall take effect or be in force until such law shall have been submitted to a vote of the people of the state and adopted by a majority of the electors of the state voting upon the same.” March 2, 1881, the legislature passed an act, the general purpose of which was to adjust, with the consent of the holders, the bonds outstanding, by taking them up and issuing in lieu of them new bonds of the state for 50 per cent. of the amount which appeared by their terms to be due upon them. A notable feature of this act is that section 4 proposes the issue of the new bonds without submission to the vote of the people, and section 5 proposes it to be submitted to a vote of the people, the bonds to be issued only upon their approval, and it is left to the judges of the supreme court, or, in case they should decline to act, to an equal number of judges of the district court, to determine whether the legislature have power without submitting it to the people to make the contemplated adjustment; the bonds to be issued pursuant to section 4, or the proposition to be submitted to the people pursuant to section 5, according as the judges should determine the question submitted to them. The judges of the supreme court declined to act, and the governor called the respondents, judges of the district court, to act in their stead. The attorney general, on behalf of the state, now applies to this court for the writ of prohibition to restrain the respondents from proceeding in the matter.

The writ of prohibition issues usually to courts to keep them within the limits of their jurisdiction. But it may also issue to an officer to prevent the unlawful execise of judicial or quasi judicial power; and, the other reasons for it existing, we see none why it should not issue to a person, or body of persons, not being in law a court nor strictly officers; as, if the legislature should assume in an unconstitutional manner to create a court of justice, and the person or persons appointed as its judge or judges should enter upon the exercise of the judicial functions thus attempted to be conferred, the same reasons might exist for arresting their action as exist in the case of a court exceeding its jurisdiction. The exercise of unauthorized judicial or quasi judicial power is regarded as a contempt of the sovereign which may result in injury to the state or citizens.

Three things are essential to justify the writ: First, that the court, officer, or person is about to exercise judicial or quasi judicial power; second, that the exercise of such power by such court, officer, or person is unauthorized by law; third, that it will result in injury for which there is no other adequate remedy.

The act of March 2, 1881, does not attempt to confer on the respondents judicial power in the strict sense of the term. It submits to their decision a judicial question, and although their decision upon it could not have the authoritative and binding force of a decision by a court of justice, yet the act provides for carrying it into effect as though it were binding, thus giving it a quasi judicial operation. That injury to the state and to the citizens will result, is apparent from the fact that such result will be the issue of invalid obligations of the state to the amount of millions of dollars, and except this writ there is no judicial remedy for the threatened evil. If the act is void, and so confers no authority on the respondents, the writ must issue.

Before proceeding to a consideration of the main questions involved in the case, we take pleasure in acknowledging the signal assistance which the acquirements of the counsel on both sides have rendered to the court. The discussion took a very wide range, and occupied an unusual time, though not more than was profitably employed, and disclosed the most thorough and minute research and investigation. It has rarely been the good fortune of any court to have a cause before it so ably and exhaustively presented by counsel as this has been. The basis of the application is the proposition that the act of March 2, 1881, is unconstitutional and void. It is claimed to be unconstitutional for various reasons, only two of which, on account of their superior importance, we think it necessary to consider. We state them in the order of their importance. They are-First, becasue it is contrary to the amendment to the constitution of November 6, 1860, to the effect that no law levying a tax, or making other provision for payment of the bonds, shall take effect till approved by a vote of the electors of the state; second, because it is an attempt to delegate to the judges legislative power, inasmuch as it leaves it for them to determine whether section 4 or section 5 of this act shall be law. In answer to the first of these positions the respondents urge that the amendment of 1860, referred to, is itself void, because repugnant to the constitution of the United States. A more important and difficult question has rarely, if ever, come before a court in this country. Courts always regard it as a matter of great delicacy to pass on the validity of an act of the legislature. It is much more so when the validity of a constitution adopted by the people of the state is called in question. Yet when a law of a state is alleged to be contrary to some clause in the constitution of the United States, it is immmaterial whether it was passed by the legislature, or by the people in framing a constitution for themselves. The constitution of the United States is in some particulars a limitation or restraint upon the sovereign power of a state, and operates equally upon an attempt to exercise the prohibited power, whether by the legislature or the people. In both cases the attempt at exercising it stands upon the same footing, and must be judged upon the same principles.

One of the limitations imposed by the federal constitution is upon the power which it is assumed a state would otherwise have to legislate with respect to contracts. This it does by the clause which declares that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. It may be doubted that any other single provision of that constitution has had so beneficial and conservative an operation as this inhibition against improvident and unjust legislation, which might affect the life of business throughout the country. By it the great principle was established that contracts shall be inviolable. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122.

Probably no provision of the constitution has been more frequently before the courts, or more thoroughly and learnedly...