Sweeten v. State

• Decision Date: 18 March 1914
• Parties: SWEETEN v. STATE.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

90 A. 180

122 Md. 634

SWEETEN

v. STATE.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 18, 1914.

Stockbridge, J., dissenting.

Appeal from Criminal Court of Baltimore City.

"To be officially reported."

Frank B. Sweeten was convicted of violating the Hours of Labor Law, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRISCOE, BURKE, THOMAS, PATTISON, URNER, STOCKBRIDGE, and CONSTABLE, JJ.

George M. Brady, of Baltimore (William Milnes Maloy and T. Howard Embert, both of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant. Edgar Allan Poe, Atty. Gen., for the State.

CONSTABLE, J. The appellant was tried under an indictment based upon chapter 94 of the Acts of Assembly of 1910, and which Is as follows:

"Sec. 2. That eight hours shall constitute a day's work for all laborers, workmen or mechanics who may be employed by or on behalf of the mayor and city council of Baltimore, except in cases of extraordinary emergency, which may arise in time of war or in eases where it may be necessary to work more than eight hours per calendar day for the protection of property or human life; provided, that in all such cases the laborer, workman or mechanic so employed and working to exceed eight hours per calendar day shall be paid on the basis of eight hours constituting a day's work; provided further, that the rate of per diem wages paid to laborers, workmen or mechanics employed directly by the mayor and city council of Baltimore shall not be less than two dollars per diem; provided further, that not less than the current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed shall be paid to laborers, workmen or mechanics employed by contractors or subcontractors in the execution of any contract or contracts, in any public work within the city of Baltimore.

"Sec. 3. That all contracts hereafter made by or on behalf of the mayor and city council of Baltimore with any person or persons or corporation, for the performance of any work with the city of Baltimore, shall be deemed and considered as made upon the basis of eight hours constituting a day's work, and it shall be unlawful for any such person or persons or corporation to require or permit any laborer, workman or mechanic to work more than eight hours per calendar day in doing such work, except in the cases and upon the conditions provided in section 2 of this act."

The indictment contains 30 counts, each of the odd numbered being exactly alike, except as to the name of the workman employed by the appellant, and each of the even numbered alike in a similar manner. The odd numbered counts are upon the theory that the appellant, a contractor engaged upon public work for the mayor and city council within Baltimore City, worked the employés, therein named, more than eight hours in a calendar day without the existence of an extraordinary emergency. The theory upon which the even numbered counts are based is that the contractor worked his employés, therein named, more than eight hours in a calendar day in a case of extraordinary emergency, but paid them less than the rate of per diem wages current in the locality based upon eight hours constituting a day's work. The defendant demurred to all of the counts. The demurrer was overruled, and the defendant filed a special plea, to which the state demurred. This demurrer being sustained, the case was tried upon an agreed statement of facts.

It appears from that statement that the parties stipulated, for the purposes of the case, that Baltimore City was a municipal corporation with authority to contract for the installing of a sewerage system; that on the 15th day of April, 1912, the appellant entered into a contract with the mayor and city council to build certain sewers; that in said work the appellant employed workmen and permitted them to work more than eight hours per calendar day, there being no extraordinary emergency; that the agreement with said workmen provided pay at 19 cents per hour, the current rate of wages for similar work in that locality being $1.90 per day of ten hours; that the appellant required his said workmen to work for ten hours in order to be entitled to $1.90 per day; that, if the appellant had been compelled to pay his workmen at the rate of $1.90 per day for eight hours' work, his compensation would have been reduced at least $100; that the workmen were not required to work more than eight hours in any one day, but did so voluntarily in order to earn $1.90 in one calendar day; that it was not the intention of the workmen that they should receive the same compensation for eight hours' work as was paid for ten hours' work to laborers doing the same kind of work for persons having contracts with private persons; that the workmen were hired without the knowledge of the city, and neither the city nor its officers had any supervision over them; that the labor performed by said workmen was healthful, out-of-door work, not hazardous or dangerous. The statement also stipulated in the same manner for those laborers who worked more than eight hours in cases of extraordinary emergencies. The defendant being found guilty and judgment having been entered thereon, this appeal was taken.

The appellant contends that the act is unconstitutional in several respects, but the main objection urged is that it is in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution and of similar provisions of the Maryland Constitution. In support of his contention, he cites numerous state decisions, wherein statutes similar in effect to the one before us have been held unconstitutional, and especially relies upon the text found in Dillon on Municipal Corporations. It must be conceded that those authorities are in direct conflict with the validity of the present statute. But there are, on the other hand, many other decisions holding the contrary view. Among the latter is a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, 24 Sup. Ct. 124, 48 L. Ed. 148. In that case, the court, in plain and unequivocal language, held the eight-hour law of Kansas to be valid. An examination of the Kansas statute shows it to be practically identical with the one now under consideration, with the exception that it applied to laborers and mechanics employed by or on behalf of the state, or by or on behalf of any county, city, township, or other municipality therein, whereas the Maryland statute is limited in its application...