Carrozza v. Voccola

Decision Date16 May 2014
Docket NumberNo. 2011–132–Appeal.,2011–132–Appeal.
Citation90 A.3d 142
PartiesFrederick CARROZZA, Sr., et al. v. Michael VOCCOLA, in his capacity as executor of the Estate of Frederick Carrozza, Jr., et al.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Lauren E. Jones, Esq., Providence, for Plaintiffs.

Alan I. Baron, Pro Hac Vice, for Defendants.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice ROBINSON, for the Court.

The counterclaim defendants, Frederick Carrozza, Sr. (Frederick Sr.) and his living children (Phillip Carrozza, Freida Carrozza, and Laurie Carrozza–Conn),1 appeal from a judgment rendered by the Newport County Superior Court on December 17, 2010. The trial justice held the counterclaim defendants liable for slander of title, finding that notices of lis pendens were maliciously filed by the counterclaim defendants on the four properties at issue in the case. The counterclaim defendants contend that the trial justice erred: (1) when he held that the counterclaimants (Michael Voccola, in his capacity as executor of the estate of Frederick Carrozza, Jr.; Angela Giguere; and Christine Giguere–Carrozza) had met the required burden of proof to establish slander of title; (2) when he awarded compensatory damages based on the difference between the highest value of the properties attained during the period of time in which they were subject to the notices of lis pendens and the value of the properties when the notices of lis pendens were removed; (3) when he ruled that prejudgment interest should run from the date on which the notices of lis pendens were filed; (4) when he awarded punitive damages in the amount of $845,000 against Frederick Sr.; and (5) when he held Phillip, Freida, and Laurie liable for slander of title despite the fact that they were not parties to this civil action at the time that the notices of lis pendens were filed in 2002.

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court in part and vacate that judgment in part.

IFacts and Travel

This case began on November 15, 2002, when Frederick Sr. filed a petition in the Superior Court seeking to impose a resulting trust on four properties, title to which had been in the name of his son, Frederick Carrozza, Jr. (Frederick Jr.), at the time of the son's death.2 For present purposes, we need not rehash all of the facts relative to the resulting trust litigation; those facts are recited in detail in our opinion affirming the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the counterclaimants, wherein this Court ruled that there was no resulting trust. See Carrozza v. Voccola, 962 A.2d 73 (R.I.2009). We once again 3 recall the words that Homer has Ulysses utter at the conclusion of Book XII of The Odyssey: “It goes against my grain to repeat a tale told once, and told so clearly.” 4 Mindful of Homer's lament, we refer the interested reader to our first Carrozza opinion. See Carrozza, 962 A.2d at 74–75.

What is of primary present significance, however, is the fact that, at the outset of the resulting trust litigation, on November 15, 2002, Frederick Sr. caused notices of lis pendens to be filed with respect to each of the properties at issue, which notices were not removed until February of 2009. The filing of the notices of lis pendens prompted the counterclaimants to file a counterclaim alleging slander of title. After this Court affirmed the granting of their motion for summary judgment with respect to the resulting trust issue, we remanded the case to the Superior Court for the resolution of the slander of title counterclaim. See Carrozza, 962 A.2d at 78–79.

On remand, the Superior Court conducted a jury-waived trial over the course of two days in June of 2010, during which several witnesses testified. Thereafter, on December 17, 2010, the trial justice rendered his decision holding the counterclaim defendants liable for slander of title, which decision is the focus of this appeal. On February 18, 2011, a hearing was held in the Superior Court on the counterclaim defendants' motion for a new trial; that motion was denied.

We shall next proceed to discuss the significant testimony and other evidence from the slander of title trial.

At trial, Paul Hogan, a real estate appraiser who was qualified as an expert, testified on behalf of the counterclaimants as to the highest value attained by each of the properties at issue between November 15, 2002, when the notices of lis pendens were filed, and February 2, 2009, when clear title to the properties was restored; he also testified as to the value of the properties at the end of that period, in February of 2009. He testified that the value of the property located at Bellevue Avenue in Newport was $1,835,000 in February of 2009 and $2,310,000 at its highest value, in September of 2005. According to Mr. Hogan's testimony, the value of the property located at Prospect Hill Street in Newport was $200,000 in February of 2009 and $250,000 at its highest value, in Septemberof 2005; he added that the value of the property located on Post Road in Warwick was $320,000 in February of 2009 and $365,000 at its highest value, in September of 2005. Finally, Mr. Hogan testified that the value of the River Farm Condominium located in West Warwick was $280,000 in February of 2009 and $340,000 at its highest value, in September of 2005. The counterclaim defendants did not object to Mr. Hogan's testimony at any point.

Attorney Voccola, the executor of the estate of Frederick Jr., testified that the notices of lis pendens prevented him from consummating a transaction at a time when he was offered two and a half million dollars to sell two of the properties at issue.5 He also stated that he did not attempt to sell the other two properties because there “was no reason to go through the motions” since he was “unable to provide a clean, marketable and insurable title” due to the notices of lis pendens.

In his bench decision after the trial concluded, the trial justice stated that, although he considered most of Frederick Sr.'s testimony to be a “knowing fabrication,” he had observed a “shining moment of truth” when, in response to having been asked why he had initiated a lawsuit against Frederick Jr., his response was as follows: “Because it was my money. I thought I could get it back.” Frederick Sr. further indicated in his testimony that he wanted to get the properties back because he did not have any additional properties to provide to his other three children. The trial justice referred to these statements made by Frederick Sr. as “telling and determinative” with respect to his eventual ruling. Specifically, the trial justice found Frederick Sr.'s testimony to reflect a clear indication that he had not filed suit “to establish and recover property rightfully his, rather he filed suit to collect a debt that he believed arose in 1998 when [Frederick Jr.] sold” a fifth property (located on Malbone Road in Newport) which was not a subject of this dispute.6

After the trial had concluded, the trial justice found in favor of the counterclaimants and held that Frederick Sr., as well as his three living children ( see infra ), were liable for slander of title. The counterclaimants were awarded compensatory damages of $630,000; in addition, they were awarded prejudgment interest from the date the suit was filed in 2002, expenses of $24,080.40, and attorneys' fees of $151,267.7 Frederick Sr. alone was found liable for punitive damages in the amount of $845,000. The trial justice based his calculation of compensatory damages upon the diminution in the value of the properties during the period of time when the notices of lis pendens were in place, which was measured by the difference between the highest value of the four properties at issue during that period of time (which occurred in September of 2005) and the value of the properties when clear title was restored in February of 2009. He stated that over that period “each of the properties lost substantial value.”

Frederick Sr.'s living children were not parties to the lawsuit in 2002 at the time the notices of lis pendens were filed. The trial justice determined that, thereafter, Phillip “voluntarily” joined the case, whereas Freida and Laurie were joined as necessary parties.8 The trial justice relied on Rule 15(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure 9 in holding that the First Amended Miscellaneous Petition (filed on December 23, 2004), which added Frederick Sr.'s living children as plaintiffs (later to become counterclaim defendants), related back to the filing of the notices of lis pendens by Frederick Sr. in 2002. Accordingly, the trial justice found that Frederick Sr.'s living children were also liable for slander of title along with their father; the basis for that ruling was the trial justice's determination that Phillip, Freida, and Laurie [were] not unwilling participants in the lawsuit.” He reasoned that they had “clearly stood with their hands outstretched, waiting for a decision of this [c]ourt that would place [Frederick Jr.'s] property in those outstretched hands.”

After judgment had been entered, the counterclaim defendants filed a timely notice of appeal. The counterclaim defendants also filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied.10

IIIssues on Appeal

On appeal, the counterclaim defendants raise several issues. First, the counterclaim defendants contend that the trial justice misconceived Frederick Sr.'s testimony regarding his reasons for bringing the lawsuit and overlooked evidence in the course of finding that the counterclaimants had proven their slander of title claim. Second, the counterclaim defendants argue that the trial justice erred in basing the amount of compensatory damages upon the diminution of the property values between 2005 and 2009 because, according to the counterclaim defendants, there was no evidence that the counterclaimants had a buyer for any of the properties or that...

To continue reading

Request your trial
30 cases
  • King v. Huntress, Inc.
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • July 2, 2014
    ...a party fails to properly brief an issue for this Court's review, it “constitutes a waiver of that issue”); see also Carrozza v. Voccola, 90 A.3d 142, 149 n. 10 (R.I.2014). 4. “[M]aintenance and cure” are defined as “[c]ompensation provided to a sailor who becomes sick or injured while a me......
  • King v. Huntress, Inc.
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • July 2, 2014
    ...a party fails to properly brief an issue for this Court's review, it "constitutes a waiver of that issue"); see also Carrozza v. Voccola, 90 A.3d 142, 149 n. 10 (R.I. 2014). 4. "[M]aintenance and cure" are defined as "[c]ompensation provided to a sailor who becomes sick or injured while a m......
  • Town of N. Kingstown v. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • January 9, 2015
    ...(R.I.2005). Additionally, we “afford deference to a trial justice's ‘resolution of mixed questions of law and fact.’ ” Carrozza v. Voccola, 90 A.3d 142, 151 (R.I.2014) (quoting Nye v. Brousseau, 992 A.2d 1002, 1008 (R.I.2010) ). However, “[t]his Court reviews questions of law and statutory ......
  • McKenna v. Fed. Props. of R.I., Inc., C.A. No. PC-2013-4415
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Superior Court
    • May 16, 2018
    ...that the uttering or publishing wasmalicious [;] and (3) that the [defendant] suffered a pecuniary loss as a result.'" Carrozza v. Voccola, 90 A.3d 142, 151-52 (R.I. 2014) (quoting Beauregard v. Gouin, 66 A.3d 489, 494 (R.I. 2013)). "'The malice required [for a slander of title claim] is no......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT