M.H. v. Cnty. of Alameda

Decision Date17 April 2013
Docket NumberCase No. 11–cv–02868 JST.
Citation90 F.Supp.3d 889
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of California
PartiesM.H., et al., Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, et al., Defendants.

John L. Burris, Benjamin Nisenbaum, Law Offices of John L. Burris, Genevieve Kathryn Guertin, Gina N. Altomare, Julia Sherwin, Michael J. Haddad, Haddad and Sherwin, Oakland, CA, for Plaintiffs.

J. Randall Andrada, Aileen Pang, Valerie Lu Ly, Andrada & Associates Professional Corporation, Oakland, CA, Matthew M. Grigg, Law Offices of Nancy E. Hudgins, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER REGARDING MOTION TO DISMISS

JON S. TIGAR, District Judge.

Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint filed by Defendants Corizon Health, Sancho, and Orr. ECF No. 46.

I. FACTS

The Court accepts the following allegations as true for the purpose of resolving this motion. Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir.1996).

This case arises from the death of Plaintiffs' decedent, Martin Harrison, while he was in the custody of the Alameda County Sheriffs' Department. On August 13, 2010, Mr. Harrison was arrested on a warrant for failure to appear and taken to Santa Rita Jail, in Alameda County. ECF No. 46 ¶ 25. While he was being admitted, Mr. Harrison told the jail nursing staff, including Defendant Zelda Sancho, L.V.N., that he drank alcohol every day, that his last drink had been that day, and that he had a history of alcohol withdrawal. ¶ 27. Nurse Sancho wrote in her assessment note that Mr. Harrison had a history of alcohol withdrawal and further noted the acronym “CIWA,” which stands for Clinical Institute Withdrawal Assessment, a standard protocol for identifying people at risk for severe alcohol withdrawal. CIWA includes a treatment protocol for the safe detoxification of alcoholics. Id. Jail staff never implemented the protocol for Mr. Harrison. ¶ 28.

Defendant Corizon Health, Inc. (“Corizon”), formerly known as Prison Health Services, Inc., provides the healthcare services at Santa Rita Jail. ¶ 15. The County of Alameda contracted with Corizon to provide healthcare services in all its jails. Id. Defendant Dr. Harold Orr, M.D., is Corizon's medical director. He is responsible for overseeing the provision of medical care in Alameda County jail facilities. Id.

Neither Nurse Sancho nor anyone else completed a CIWA screening questionnaire for Mr. Harrison, checked his blood alcohol levels, performed lab tests on hi m, or administered medication to hi m. ¶ 28. The completion of a CIWA questionnaire was required by Corizon policy, procedure, and training. Id.

Left untreated, severe alcohol withdrawal can become a life-threatening medical emergency. Id. On August 15, 2013, two days after his arrest, Mr. Harrison issued a “sick call” slip requesting medical care, but no one came. ¶ 29. By sometime before dawn the next morning, Mr. Harrison was suffering from severe alcohol withdrawal—also known as delirium tremens —a life-threatening medical emergency. ¶ 30. Outwardly, he exhibited bizarre behavior and incoherent mumbling, and he suffered from hallucinations, severe anxiety, and disorientation to time and place. Id.

Around 3:30 a.m., after observing this behavior, Defendant and Alameda County Sheriff's Deputy Matthew Ahlf moved Mr. Harrison to an isolation cell in Housing Unit 33 of the Santa Rita Jail. Id. Deputy Ahlf did not request mental health or medical care for Mr. Harrison, in contravention of jail policies, procedure, and training.

Mr. Harrison stayed in that cell for twelve hours, until 3:30 p.m., before anyone requested medical care. Id. At that time, a sheriff's deputy left a message for the jail's mental health workers stating that Mr. Harrison was exhibiting “bizarre behavior and statements, not oriented to place, believed he was in his apartment and women there ... mumbling incoherently.... Saw a nurse but not receiving any meds.” ¶ 31.

Defendant and Alameda County social worker Megan Hast, A.S.W., picked up the message half an hour later. She reviewed M r. Harrison's chart, saw that he had a history of alcohol withdrawal, and saw the CIWA indication. ¶ 32. By 4:30 p.m., another half hour later, Ms. Hast called Housing Unit 33 and learned that the deputy would be leaving at 5:00 p.m. By the time she arrived, the deputy had gone. She glanced inside Mr. Harrison's cell, saw him standing at the toilet, and left without speaking to him. ¶ 34.

An hour later, at 6:00 p.m., Ms. Hast again called Housing Unit 33 and spoke with Deputy Ahlf. He told her that he moved Mr. Harrison to an isolation cell that morning because of his bizarre behavior, which Ms. Hast recognized as consistent with symptoms of severe alcohol withdrawal. ¶ 35.

Shortly after 6:00 p.m., Mr. Harrison broke a food tray in his cell, blocked his toilet, and made a mess of his cell. ¶ 37. Deputy Ahlf responded first. He entered the cell alone, taser in one hand and handcuffs in the other. ¶ 38. According to Deputy Ahlf, as he was cuffing Mr. Harrison, Mr. Harrison “tensed,” causing the deputy to push Mr. Harrison to the back of the cell. ¶ 38–39. From the back of the cell, Deputy Ahlf says Mr. Harrison turned and slowly began to walk toward hi m. The deputy tased him for two cycles, or ten seconds, causing Mr. Harrison to run for the door, slip on the wet floor (he was in his socks), and fall. ¶¶ 37, 39. Deputy Ahlf pounced on Harrison. Deputy Ahlf and at least nine other sheriff's deputies1 then severely beat, punched, kicked, stomped, tased, and brutalized Mr. Harrison. ¶ 39–40. The deputies tased Mr. Harrison for at least twenty-seven more seconds over five separate sessions. ¶ 40. Mr. Harrison never struck or kicked any of his attackers. Id. He was transferred to the jail infirmary, and then to the Valley Care Medical Center, by which time he had suffered anoxic brain damage, severe acidosis, several cardiac arrests, and respiratory failure. ¶¶ 41, 49. He died two days later. ¶ 41. Prior to these events, Mr. Harrison had been a healthy man of fifty, despite his history of alcohol abuse. ¶ 41.

The Alameda County Sheriff's Department Coroner's Bureau performed an autopsy the next day. The Bureau determined that Mr. Harrison died from anoxic encephalopathy due to cardiac arrest following excessive physical exertion, multiple blunt injuries, and tasering. ¶ 50. The coroner's investigator's report found that the manner of death “could not be determined.” ¶ 51.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. Harrison's minor son, M.H., filed suit on June 10, 2011. Through amendment to the original and first amended complaints, M.H. added two sons and two daughters of Mr. Harrison's as Plaintiffs and Corizon, Dr. Orr, and Nurse Sancho, as Defendants.

Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint on November 19, 2012. ECF No. 46. They allege, as Mr. Harrison's children and co-successors-in-interest, claims against Alameda County, Sheriff Gregory Ahern, the ten sheriff's deputies, Ms. Hast, Corizon, Dr. Orr, and Nurse Sancho for assault and battery, negligence, and violation of Mr. Harrison's civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, California's Bane Act, and California Government Code Section 845.6.

The Alameda County Defendants, including Ms. Hast, who is employed by the County, answered on December 4, 2012. ECF No. 46. Defendants Orr and Corizon moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on December 18, 2012. ECF No. 50.

Plaintiffs responded to the first motion to dismiss by the deadline set by stipulation between the parties, on January 31, 2013. ECF No. 60. By stipulation, the reply brief was due February 14, 2013. On February 12, 2012, this case was reassigned to this Court. The reassignment order vacated all hearing dates and trial dates set before January 1, 2014, but did not affect any briefing deadlines or other case deadlines. ECF No. 62. That order required moving parties to re-notice their motions for hearing.

Defendants Orr and Corizon Health did not file a reply on February 14, nor did they renotice their first motion to dismiss for hearing. Instead, they filed a second motion to dismiss on February 21, 2013, joined by Defendant Sancho, who thereby made her first appearance in the case. ECF No. 63. Plaintiffs served Defendant Sancho on November 28, 2011. ECF No. 49.

Plaintiffs responded to the second motion to dismiss on March 7, 2013, ECF No. 67, and Defendants Orr, Sancho, and Corizon replied on March 14, 2013, ECF No. 68.

III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standards on Motions to Dismiss

On a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts the material facts alleged in the complaint, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts, as true. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir.2001). However, “the tenet that a court must accept a complaint's allegations as true is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Plausibility does not mean probability, but it requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. In the Ninth Circuit, [i]f there are two alternative explanations, one advanced by defendant and the other advanced by plaintiff, both of which are plausible, plaintiff's complaint survives a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6). Plaintiff's complaint may be dismissed only when defendant's plausible alternative explanation is so convincing that plaintiff's explanation is im plausible.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir.2011) (original emphasis).

B. Defendants' Unauthorized Filing of a Second Motion to Dismiss

The Corizon Defendants filed a second motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended...

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