Espinal v. Northwest Airlines

• Citation: 90 F.3d 1452
• Decision Date: 24 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 94-16231,94-16231
• Parties: 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2933, 5 A.D. Cases 1580, 8 NDLR P 205, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5454, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8903 John ESPINAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORTHWEST AIRLINES; Larry Nunan; Joel Krueger; Susan Jordan, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Page 1452

90 F.3d 1452

152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2933, 5 A.D. Cases

1580, 8 NDLR P 205,

96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5454,

96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8903

John ESPINAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORTHWEST AIRLINES; Larry Nunan; Joel Krueger; Susan Jordan, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 94-16231.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted May 17, 1996.

Decided July 24, 1996.

Cindy O'Hara, Davis, Reno & Courtney, San Francisco, California, for plaintiff-appellant.

William G. Harris, Arnelle, Hastie, McGee, Willis & Greene, San Francisco, California, for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Barbara A. Caulfield, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-93-2524 BAC.

Before: LEAVY, T.G. NELSON and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-appellant John Espinal ("Espinal") appeals from the district court's dismissal of his claims based on preemption under the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"). 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. Defendant-appellee Northwest Airlines ("Northwest") terminated Espinal when it discovered he had diabetes. Espinal, who was employed pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"), filed suit in state court alleging claims for disability discrimination and breach of contract and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Following removal, the district court dismissed all of Espinal's claims, finding that the entire action was preempted under the RLA. Two weeks after the district court ruled, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of RLA preemption. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994). In this appeal, we must reexamine the district court's decision and our RLA-preemption precedent in light of Norris.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that Espinal's disability discrimination claims are not preempted, and therefore reverse as to those claims. We affirm with respect to his contractual claims.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Espinal is a career airline ramp service worker, or equipment service employee ("ESE"). Among other duties, ESEs are responsible for loading, fueling and towing aircraft. These duties necessarily involve the operation of heavy machinery.

In June, 1991, Northwest offered Espinal a part-time ESE position, provided that he pass a physical exam. Allegedly, on June 8, 1991, Espinal received notice that he had passed the physical examination, and should begin his training program. Based on this assurance of employment, Espinal resigned his job at DynAir in Hawaii, and moved to San Francisco to begin working for Northwest.

Once in San Francisco, Espinal signed an employment contract, which expressly provided that his employment was governed by a CBA. It provides that all disputes concerning discharge must be resolved by an internal grievance process. The CBA also provides that continued employment is dependent upon medical fitness. A separate document prepared by Northwest provides the minimum medical requirements of an ESE: "It is recommended that any condition that might cause momentary or intermittent loss of consciousness or attention should be evaluated and would be expected to be a basis for exclusion from this position."

While still in training, a Northwest official contacted Espinal and informed him that his blood sugar level was above normal. Espinal's doctor sent a letter to Northwest explaining that he was a Type II diabetic, meaning that his condition was controlled by diet and exercise, not insulin. Northwest did not respond, and so Espinal continued with his training program.

Espinal successfully completed his training program and began working for Northwest as a probationary employee. Under the CBA, probationary employees could be fired without cause. On July 2, 1991, Northwest rescinded its offer of employment claiming that Espinal had failed the pre-placement physical examination. Espinal then went to a diabetes specialist, who wrote to Northwest that Espinal's diabetes did not represent a hazard: "There is no medical reason why he is unsafe around heavy equipment or airplanes." Again, Northwest did not respond.

Espinal thereafter filed suit against Northwest, Larry Nunan, Joel Krueger and Susan Jordan in San Francisco Superior Court. ¹ The first amended complaint alleges four causes of action: (1) disability discrimination under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), Cal. Gov't Code § 12900 et seq.; (2) breach of contract; (3) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (4) violation of public policy. Northwest removed the action to federal court asserting federal question jurisdiction based on the RLA and the Federal Aviation Act ("FAA"), 49 U.S.C.App. § 1301 et seq.

Northwest then filed a motion to dismiss the action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), contending it was preempted by the RLA and the FAA. ² The district court granted Northwest's motion, treating it as a motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that Espinal's discharge was a minor dispute under the RLA, which had to be resolved by the internal grievance process of the CBA. ³

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a court's decision regarding preemption de novo. Jimeno v. Mobil Oil Corp., 66 F.3d 1514, 1523 (9th Cir.1995). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1261, 134 L.Ed.2d 209 (1996).

DISCUSSION

I. General Background: Preemption Under the RLA.

Congress enacted the RLA, which was extended to cover the airline industry in 1936, "to promote stability in labor-management relations by providing a comprehensive framework for resolving labor disputes." Norris, 512 U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2243 (citing Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562, 107 S.Ct. 1410, 1414, 94 L.Ed.2d 563 (1987)). In order to realize this goal, the RLA provides for mandatory arbitration of two classes of disputes. Id. (citing 45 U.S.C. § 151a). The first class, "major" disputes, involve disputes over "the formation of collective bargaining agreements or efforts to secure them." Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2244 (quoting Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 302, 109 S.Ct. 2477, 2480, 105 L.Ed.2d 250 (1989)). The other class of disputes, "minor" disputes, "involve controversies over the meaning of an existing collective bargaining agreement in a particular fact situation." Id. (quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 33, 77 S.Ct. 635, 637, 1 L.Ed.2d 622 (1957)).

Before Norris, this circuit considered the scope of minor disputes under the RLA to be quite expansive. See Felt v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 60 F.3d 1416, 1420 (9th Cir.1995) (noting post-Norris, that Ninth Circuit had previously applied an expansive definition of minor disputes). In holding that Espinal's claims were preempted by the RLA, the district court relied on our pre-Norris definition of minor disputes. ⁴ Norris, however, substantially narrowed the scope of RLA preemption, and implicitly overruled more expansive definitions. See id. (refusing to follow pre-Norris Ninth Circuit case law in Title VII case); Taggart v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 F.3d 269, 272 (8th Cir.1994) ("We think Norris narrowed the scope of federal pre-emption under the RLA."); Westbrook v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 35 F.3d 316, 317-18 (7th Cir.1994) (Norris overrules prior preemption standard).

Norris held that Congress intended the RLA to preempt only those disputes "involving the interpretation or application of existing labor agreements." 512 U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2245. That is, the RLA preempts only those minor disputes "that are grounded in the collective-bargaining agreement." Id. Those claims or causes of action involving rights and obligations that exist independently of the CBA are not preempted. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2246.

To determine whether the claim is preempted by the RLA, courts should apply the preemption test used in cases under the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2249 (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985)). In RLA cases then, as in LMRA cases, courts must look to the source of the right asserted by the plaintiff. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2247. Where a plaintiff contends that an employer's actions violated rights protected by the CBA, there is a minor dispute subject to RLA preemption. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2246.

By contrast, where a plaintiff contends that an employer's actions violated a state-law obligation, wholly independent of its obligations under the CBA, there is no preemption. Id. The RLA will preempt a state law claim, only if it "is dependent on the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement." Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2249 (citing Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988)).

II. Disability Discrimination Claims: FEHA and Violation of Public Policy. ⁵

Turning to the parties specific arguments, Espinal contends that his discrimination claims are not preempted by the RLA, because they exist independently of the CBA. He is correct.

In a case factually similar to the one at bench, we considered whether a disability discrimination claim brought under California's FEHA was preempted under the LMRA. Jimeno, 66 F.3d at 1522-28. In Jimeno, Mobil terminated the plaintiff following a determination that he was an "unfit" worker due to a degenerative disc disease. Id. at 1519. The plaintiff brought a FEHA claim, alleging that Mobil failed to accommodate his disability. Id. To determine whether the asserted state-law right was independent of the CBA, Jimeno undertook the following three-part analysis: (1) Does the CBA contain...