United States v. Johnson
Decision Date | 25 October 2012 |
Docket Number | No. CR 01–3046–MWB.,CR 01–3046–MWB. |
Citation | 900 F.Supp.2d 949 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Angela JOHNSON, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Alfred E. Willett, Terpstra, Epping & Willett, Cedar Rapids, IA, Dean A. Stowers, Rosenberg, Stowers & Morse, Robert R. Rigg, Drake University Legal Clinic, Des Moines, IA, Patrick J. Berrigan, Watson & Dameron, LLP, Kansas City, MO, for Defendant.
This capital case is before me on defendant Angela Johnson's first set of motions in anticipation of a resentencing hearing before a new jury, i.e., a “penalty retrial,” pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 848(i)(1)(B) (2005) and the requirements of 21 U.S.C. § 848(g)-( o ) (2005). I previously granted, in part, Johnson's § 2255 Motion by vacating her four death sentences and one life sentence for murders in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE murder), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(e), a provision of the Anti–Drug Abuse Act (ADAA). See Johnson v. United States, 860 F.Supp.2d 663 (N.D.Iowa 2012). The prosecution then opted for a “penalty retrial,” to determine the penalty for Johnson's convictions, rather than withdraw its notice of intent to seek the death penalty, filed pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 848(h) (2005), and allow the court to set a hearing to impose sentences of life imprisonment without parole, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 848(p) (2005). Pursuant to a Scheduling Order (docket no. 858), I set the penalty “retrial” for June 3, 2013, and, inter alia, set a deadline of September 14, 2012, for Johnson to file any facial or as applied challenges to the use of the death penalty in this case.
Johnson filed five motions on the September 14, 2012, deadline: (1) her Omnibus Motion To Dismiss The “Special Findings” From The Second Superseding Indictment And To Strike Notice Of Intent To Seek The Death Penalty (docket no. 864); (2) her Motion To Dismiss Particular Aggravating Factors From The Second Superseding Indictment, And To Strike Particular Aggravating Factors From The Second Notice Of Intent To Seek The Death Penalty, And For Other Relief (docket no. 865); (3) her Motion To Compel Discovery Of Evidence In Support Of United States Attorney's Reasons Not To Seek The Death Penalty, Or, In The Alternative, For In–Camera Review Of The Death Penalty Evaluation Form (docket no. 867); (4) her Motion To Preclude Capital Sentencing Hearing (docket no. 868); and (5) her Motion For Discovery To Support Motion To Strike Death Penalty Based Upon Influence Of Arbitrary Factor[s] Of Race And Gender Of Victim[s] (docket no. 869). I will consider each of these motions in turn, but not in the order in which they appear on the docket. Instead, I will begin with the fourth motion, because, if a capital sentencing hearing must be precluded, any further proceedings will be very different in nature from what is currently anticipated. I will then consider the two motions to dismiss, and, finally, the two discovery motions.
In her Motion To Preclude Capital Sentencing Hearing (docket no. 868), Johnson argues that, in 2006, Congress repealed the provision of the Anti–Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) for determining the penalty in capital cases under that Act, 21 U.S.C. § 848(i), pursuant to the U.S.A. Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–177, § 221, 120 Stat. 192, 231 (2006). She contends that the repealed provision was merely “procedural,” so that it was not “saved” by the Savings Statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109; that the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA), 18 U.S.C. § 3591 et seq., which now provides uniform procedures for determining the penalty for nearly all federal capital offenses, does not permit the empaneling of a new jury to consider the penalty in her ADAA case; and that application of the FDPA procedures would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The prosecution contends that all of the provisions for determining the penalty in ADAA capital cases are saved by the Savings Statute, because the penalty provided in § 848(e) cannot be fully preserved without also preserving the mechanisms for enforcing it in § 848(g)-(r). In reply, Johnson reiterates her contention that the Savings Statute applies to substance, not procedures, and that the repealed portions of § 848 were procedural. She also argues that cases to the contrary were “wrongly decided.”
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that “the general savings statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109, requires [courts] to apply the penalties in place at the time the crime was committed.” United States v. Smith, 632 F.3d 1043, 1047–49 (8th Cir.2011) (...
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