900 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1990), 89-6582, Latham v. Hopkins
|Citation:||900 F.2d 253|
|Party Name:||Raymond R. LATHAM, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Arnold J. HOPKINS, Commissioner, Department of Corrections; Joseph J. Curran, Attorney General, State of Maryland, Respondents-Appellees.|
|Case Date:||February 02, 1990|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit|
This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA4 Rule 36 regarding use of unpublished opinions)
Submitted: July 31, 1989.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Paul V. Niemeyer, District Judge. (C/A No. 87-2785-PN)
Raymond R. Latham, appellant pro se.
John Joseph Curran, Jr., Patricia DuVall Storch, Valerie Johnson Smith, Office of the Attorney General, for appellees.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED.
Before K.K. HALL, SPROUSE and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges.
Raymond R. Latham seeks to appeal the district court's order refusing habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Latham alleged that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel resulting in the entry of an involuntary guilty plea, that the plea agreement was violated, and that his sentence was imposed in violation of due process and amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm in part and remand in part.
Latham's ineffective counsel argument is based on the following allegations: his attorney agreed to interview the alleged victims, three boys between ages 11 and 13, and Latham's "star witness," his daughter, but then failed to do so; such interviews would have revealed that the enforcement officers had coerced the boys into giving the statements against Latham; not having that information available at the time of his hearing, Latham chose to enter a guilty plea rather than subject the already-traumatized children to the further trauma of testifying and being cross-examined; [*] therefore his plea was involuntary. Latham also alleges that he was led to believe his attorney had secured an agreement which would give him a sentence concurrent with a prior sentence, that as there was no such agreement his plea was involuntary, and that his attorney failed to advise him that he could ask to withdraw his plea when he learned that a consecutive sentence...
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