Ansello v. Wis. Cent., Ltd.

Decision Date09 August 2017
Docket NumberA17-0340
Citation900 N.W.2d 167
Parties Daniel M. ANSELLO, Respondent, v. WISCONSIN CENTRAL, LTD. and Discover Re Acclaim Risk Management, Relators, Essentia Health System, Intervenor.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Steven T. Moe, Petersen, Sage, Graves, Layman & Moe, P.A., Duluth, Minnesota, for respondent.

Krista L. Hiner, Larry J. Peterson, Peterson, Logren & Kilbury, P.A., Saint Paul, Minnesota, for relators.

OPINION

GILDEA, Chief Justice.

This appeal arises from the compensation judge's dismissal of respondent Daniel Ansello's request for benefits under the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act ("Minnesota Act"), Minn. Stat. ch. 176 (2016). The compensation judge concluded that the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("Longshore Act"), 33 U.S.C. § 901 - 50 (2012), provided Ansello's exclusive remedy and that the case should be dismissed in any event under the doctrine of forum non conveniens . The Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals ("WCCA") reversed. Because we agree with the WCCA that the compensation judge has jurisdiction to hear the claims Ansello brought under the Minnesota Act and that the judge abused his discretion by dismissing Ansello's claims under the doctrine of forum non conveniens , we affirm.

FACTS

At all times relevant to this appeal, Daniel Ansello was employed by Wisconsin Central, Ltd., and he lived and worked in Duluth. On January 29, 2006, Ansello suffered a low-back injury while working at the Duluth Ore Docks. At the time of his injury, Ansello was performing longshoreman work, which, as he describes it, involved loading and unloading ships at the port.

Ansello began medical treatment for his injury the day after his accident and had his first low-back surgery approximately 1 month later. Ansello was off work for about 8 months following the surgery. After returning to his longshoreman job, Ansello's back condition progressively worsened over the next few years and eventually led to a second low-back surgery on April 22, 2009. Ansello received indemnity and medical expense benefits under the Longshore Act from Wisconsin Central and its insurance carrier under the Longshore Act, Signal Mutual Indemnity Association, for all the medical treatment he received from the date of the injury through the second surgery and rehabilitation from that surgery.1

Ansello returned to work a year after his second surgery, but again his low-back symptoms worsened, and he aggravated his back in August 2014. The following month, Ansello underwent a third surgery. Signal Mutual denied payment for the third surgery based on an independent medical examiner's opinion that the surgery was not reasonable or necessary treatment. But Signal Mutual continued to pay for certain medical expenses following the third surgery, including periods of physical therapy.

On April 30, 2015, Ansello filed a request with the Minnesota Office of Administrative Hearings seeking payment of medical treatment expenses under the Minnesota Act from Wisconsin Central and its insurance carrier under the Minnesota Act, Discover Re Acclaim Risk Management (together, "relators"). Specifically, Ansello requested payment for expenses related to his third surgery, consequential treatments such as cervical and thoracic MRIs, and other out-of-pocket treatment expenses he incurred in connection with the third surgery.

The compensation judge dismissed Ansello's claims. Concluding that Ansello could not seek benefits under the Minnesota Act because the Longshore Act could fully compensate him, the judge dismissed Ansello's claims for lack of jurisdiction. The judge also invoked sua sponte the doctrine of forum non conveniens , reasoning that proceeding under the Longshore Act would provide a more convenient forum for Ansello's claims than Minnesota's workers' compensation courts.

The WCCA reversed. Ansello v. Wis. Cent., Ltd. , No. WC16-5949, 2017 WL 677232, at *5 (Minn. WCCA Feb. 10, 2017). The WCCA held that the compensation judge's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was contrary to the law. Id. The WCCA also determined that the compensation judge lacked authority to dismiss Ansello's claims under the doctrine of forum non conveniens . Id. The WCCA further held that, even if the judge had this authority, the judge misapplied the law in concluding that the Minnesota workers' compensation courts were an inconvenient forum. Id. Relators filed a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the WCCA's decision.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, relators argue that the WCCA erred in concluding that the compensation judge had jurisdiction over Ansello's claims. And they contend that the WCCA erred in reversing the compensation judge's dismissal based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens .2 To the extent these issues involve the interpretation of state or federal statutes, they present questions of law that we review de novo. See Anderson v. Frontier Commc'ns , 819 N.W.2d 143, 148 (Minn. 2012) ; Reider v. Anoka-Hennepin Sch. Dist. No. 11 , 728 N.W.2d 246, 249 (Minn. 2007). But we review the question of whether the compensation judge properly applied the doctrine of forum non conveniens for an abuse of discretion. See Bergquist v. Medtronic, Inc. , 379 N.W.2d 508, 511-12 (Minn. 1986).

I.

We turn first to the question of whether the WCCA erred in concluding that the compensation judge has jurisdiction over the claims Ansello brought under the Minnesota Act. In essence, relators argue that the compensation judge lacked jurisdiction over these claims because the Longshore Act provides coverage for the claims. In other words, relators contend that Ansello may pursue benefits under the Minnesota Act only for injuries that the Longshore Act does not cover. Because Ansello obtained coverage for his back-injury expenses through his second surgery under the Longshore Act, relators argue, the Longshore Act is the only relief available to Ansello for coverage of the expenses from his third surgery. Relators contend, in effect, that Ansello elected his remedy and is bound by his election. Precedent from the United States Supreme Court and from our court compels us to reject these arguments.

The principal case addressing the intersection between the Longshore Act and state workers compensation law is Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania , 447 U.S. 715, 100 S.Ct. 2432, 65 L.Ed.2d 458 (1980). In that case, the Court affirmed that there is concurrent jurisdiction between the Longshore Act and state workers' compensation laws for injuries covered under more than one law. Id. at 722, 100 S.Ct. 2432. The Court concluded that "a state may apply its workers' compensation scheme to land-based injuries that fall within the coverage of the [Longshore Act]." Id. at 716, 100 S.Ct. 2432 ; see also Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co. , 370 U.S. 114, 131, 82 S.Ct. 1196, 8 L.Ed.2d 368 (1962) (holding that accepting payment under a state scheme is not an election that precludes recovery under the federal scheme). Moreover, the Court noted that "there is no danger of double recovery under concurrent jurisdiction since employers' awards under one compensation scheme would be credited against any recovery under the second scheme." Sun Ship , 447 U.S. at 725 n.8, 100 S.Ct. 2432 (citing Calbeck , 370 U.S. at 131, 82 S.Ct. 1196 ).

We reached a similar conclusion in Jacobson v. Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Ry. , 458 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1990). In Jacobson , we relied on Sun Ship to conclude that an employee could be eligible to receive both Longshore Act and Minnesota Act benefits. Id. at 110-11 (concluding that, because Longshore Act benefits are concurrent, the Longshore Act does not fall within the provision of the Minnesota Act denying benefits to persons covered by the Federal Employers' Liability Act or "other comparable law").

Relators' argument that Ansello is limited to receiving benefits under the Longshore Act cannot be squared with Sun Ship or Jacobson . These cases confirm that the extension of coverage under the Longshore Act "supplements, rather than supplants, state compensation law." Sun Ship , 447 U.S. at 720, 100 S.Ct. 2432 ; see Jacobson , 458 N.W.2d at 110 ("The Sun Ship court described [Longshore Act] benefits as supplementing state compensation systems rather than supplanting them.").

In urging us to reach the opposite conclusion, relators contend that even if the language in Sun Ship and Jacobson is broad, the cases themselves involved employees that moved between federal and state remedies only to seek unique benefits. This observation is true of Jacobson , in which the employee turned from the Longshore Act to the Minnesota Act to claim permanent partial disability benefits that were not available under the Longshore Act. 458 N.W.2d at 108. Even in that context, however, we suggested that an injured employee could seek benefits under both the state and federal schemes.

We stated that, under federal law, "depending on the facts of the particular injury, an employee could be eligible for receipt of both [Longshore Act] and state benefits." Id . at 110. And we acknowledged in a footnote that although we had not specifically addressed the issue of concurrent state and Longshore Act benefits, we had allowed successive awards from other states. Id. at 110 n.5 ; see Pierce v. Robert D. Pierce, Ltd. , 363 N.W.2d 761, 762-63 (Minn. 1985) (allowing an employee to receive benefits in Minnesota after receiving similar benefits for treatment of the same injury from a former employer in Alaska).

Moreover, Sun Ship provides no indication that the employees in that case sought unique benefits under the state act. 447 U.S. at 716, 100 S.Ct. 2432. To the contrary, Sun Ship specifically contemplates that an employee might pursue benefits for the same injury under both state and federal law. Id. at 724, 100 S.Ct. 2432 ("[W]orkers who commence their actions under state law will generally be able to make up the difference between state and federal benefit levels by seeking relief under the Longshore[ ] Act.")...

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