Weller v. Department of Social Services for City of Baltimore

• Decision Date: 24 April 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-3253,89-3253
• Citation: 901 F.2d 387
• Parties: Clifton William WELLER, III, Individually and as father and next friend of Clifton William Weller, IV, minor and Matthew Charles Weller, minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES FOR the CITY OF BALTIMORE; Juvenile Services Administration, Department of Health and Mental Hygiene for the State of Maryland; James S. Becker, Individually and in his capacity as Special Assistant City Solicitor and Attorney for the Department of Social Service of Baltimore City; Benjamin Brown, Individually and in his capacity as City Solicitor for the City of Baltimore Law Department; Ruth Massinga, Individually and in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Human Resources for the State of Maryland; Department of Human Resources for the State of Maryland; Frank Farrow, Individually and in his capacity as Executive Director of the Maryland Social Services Administration; George G. Musgrove, Individually and in his capacity as Director of the Baltimore City Department of Social Services; Dorothy Maxine Rosinski, Individually and in her capacity as Acting Chief, Child Protective Services Division, Baltimore City Department of Social Services; Dee Ann Ritterpusch, Individually and in her capacity as Social Worker and Case Worker, Child Protective Service Division, Baltimore City Department of Social Services; Beverly Williams, Individually and in her capacity as Social Worker and/or Supervisor, Child Protective Services Division, Baltimore City Department of Social Services; Carl Cobbs, Individually and in his capacity as Social Worker, Child Protective Service Division, Baltimore City Department of Social Services; Carl Smith, Individually and in his capacity as Social Worker and/or Supervisor, Child Protective Services Division, Baltimore City Department of Social Services; Michael McCausey, Individually and in his capacity as Division 1 Chief Child Protective Services Division, Baltimore City Department of Social Services; Herman Ambrose Cornish, Individually a
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 387

901 F.2d 387

Clifton William WELLER, III, Individually and as father and next friend of Clifton William Weller, IV, minor and Matthew Charles Weller, minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES FOR the CITY OF BALTIMORE;

Juvenile Services Administration, Department of Health and

Mental Hygiene for the State of Maryland; James S. Becker,

Individually and in his capacity as Special Assistant City

Solicitor and Attorney for the Department of Social Service

of Baltimore City; Benjamin Brown, Individually and in his

capacity as City Solicitor for the City of Baltimore Law

Department; Ruth Massinga, Individually and in her capacity

as Secretary of the Department of Human Resources for the

State of Maryland; Department of Human Resources for the

State of Maryland; Frank Farrow, Individually and in his

capacity as Executive Director of the Maryland Social

Services Administration; George G. Musgrove, Individually

and in his capacity as Director of the Baltimore City

Department of Social Services; Dorothy Maxine Rosinski,

Individually and in her capacity as Acting Chief, Child

Protective Services Division, Baltimore City Department of

Social Services; Dee Ann Ritterpusch, Individually and in

her capacity as Social Worker and Case Worker, Child

Protective Service Division, Baltimore City Department of

Social Services; Beverly Williams, Individually and in her

capacity as Social Worker and/or Supervisor, Child

Protective Services Division, Baltimore City Department of

Social Services; Carl Cobbs, Individually and in his

capacity as Social Worker, Child Protective Service

Division, Baltimore City Department of Social Services;

Carl Smith, Individually and in his capacity as Social

Worker and/or Supervisor, Child Protective Services

Division, Baltimore City Department of Social Services;

Michael McCausey, Individually and in his capacity as

Division 1 Chief Child Protective Services Division,

Baltimore City Department of Social Services; Herman

Ambrose Cornish, Individually and in his capacity as

Supervisor, Child Protective Services Division, Baltimore

City Department of Social Services; Marie B. Morris,

Individually and in her capacity as Extended Hours Staff

Workers, Child Protective Services Division, Baltimore City

Department of Social Services; Sheila Dennis, Individually

and in her capacity as District Supervisor, Child Protective

Services Division, Baltimore City Department of Social

Services; Alvin Parks and Bonita Winder, Individually and

in their capacity as Extended Hours Staff Workers, Child

Protective Services Division, Baltimore City Department of

Social Services; Lisa Young, Individually and in her

capacity as Screening Staff Worker, Child Protective

Services Division, Baltimore City Department of Social

Services; Giselle Meeks, Individually and in her capacity

as Social Services Administration Worker, Maryland Social

Services Administration; Richard L. Hamilton, Individually

and in his capacity as Acting Director of the Juvenile

Services Administration Department of Health and Mental

Hygiene for the State of Maryland; Marilyn Blimline,

Esquire, Individually and in her capacity as Assistant City

Solicitor and Attorney for the Department of Social Services

of Baltimore City; Betty M. Matthews; Judity Carol Weller,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 89-3253.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued Nov. 2, 1989.

Decided April 19, 1990.

As Amended April 24, 1990.

Mercedes Casado Samborsky (argued), Joppatowne, Md., for plaintiff-appellant.

Mark Davis (argued), Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Md. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., Neal M. Janey, City Sol., William R Before CHAPMAN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

Phelan, Jr., Sp. Sol., Baltimore, Md., on brief), for defendants-appellees.

CHAPMAN, Circuit Judge:

The plaintiff/appellant, Clifton William Weller, appeals the dismissal of his suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the action sua sponte prior to service of process pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3), for lack of federal jurisdiction. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. INTRODUCTTON

Weller filed his pro se complaint ¹ in federal district court against twenty-five defendants, including agencies of Maryland, employees of the State of Maryland and the City of Baltimore, and his ex-wife and mother-in-law. The complaint predicated jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1331 and 1343. It alleged a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and attempted to raise federal questions under the Social Security Act's provisions pertaining to child welfare, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 601 et seq., as well as under the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal constitution.

The allegations arise out of the defendants' apparent transfer of custody of Weller's son, Matthew, from Weller's custody in Baltimore to Matthew's grandmother near Baltimore, and ultimately to Matthew's mother in Louisiana. ² Defendants are alleged to have interfered with Weller's custody of Matthew on two occasions: first, in March 1986, and again in July 1986. Weller alleges that the transfer of custody was wrongful because it was done without the hearing required by state law, and without other procedural safeguards. He is suing for monetary damages ³ to compensate both Matthew and himself for harm allegedly caused by the transfer in custody. ⁴

Weller's complaint, aptly termed "prolix" by the district court, was dismissed before any of the defendants were served. ⁵ On appeal, Weller contends that the district court erroneously relied on DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), and that the complaint raises federal questions, particularly under Sec. 1983, because it alleges a violation of due process.

We agree with the district court that it lacked jurisdiction over the vast majority of the claims; however, we find that the complaint does allege a violation of procedural due process, which may not be dismissed at this preliminary stage of the proceedings.

II. MISCELLANEOUS CLAIMS

Although the legal theories within Weller's pro se complaint are difficult to discern, courts traditionally view civil rights complaints, particularly those brought pro se, with "special judicial solicitude." See e.g., Harrison v. U.S. Postal Service, 840 F.2d 1149, 1152 (4th Cir.1988); Gordon v For example, although Weller cites the provisions of the Social Security Act dealing with Aid to Families With Dependent Children, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 601 et seq., there are no express allegations within the complaint to suggest any violation of those statutes. In fact, it is plain from the complaint that Weller's children were not at any time in foster care, contradicting even implied allegations of violations of the statutes. Federal jurisdiction may not be premised on the mere citation of federal statutes.

Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970, 99 S.Ct. 464, 58 L.Ed.2d 431 (1978). In truth, even a solicitous examination of the allegations reveals little on which federal subject matter jurisdiction may be based.

Weller's claim of sex-based discrimination fails for identical reasons; his complaint fails to allege anything that even remotely suggests a factual basis for the claim. While pro se complaints may "represent the work of an untutored hand requiring special judicial solicitude," a district court is not required to recognize "obscure or extravagant claims defying the most concerted efforts to unravel them." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088, 106 S.Ct. 1475, 89 L.Ed.2d 729 (1986). The "special judicial solicitude" with which a district court should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate. Only those questions which are squarely presented to a court may properly be addressed.

III. DUE PROCESS CLAIMS

Plaintiff attempts to characterize the majority of his claims as alleging violations of both substantive and procedural due process. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV. In order to rely on the due process clause, Weller must have a protectible interest. In this case, Weller clearly does have a protectible liberty interest in the care and custody of his children. However, other asserted liberty interests are not among those protected by the due process clause. As discussed below, with one exception, Weller's claims lack substance and legal support.

A. Substantive Due Process

The substantive component of the Due Process Clause "bar[s] certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 106 S.Ct. 662, 665, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). Although Weller relies on this component of due process, we believe this reliance to be misplaced. ⁶ "Because '[d]ue process of law, as a historic and generative principle, precludes defining,' there are no precise standards for determining what governmental actions are proscribed by substantive due process." Fitzgerald v. Williamson, 787 F.2d 403, 408 (8th Cir.1986) (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173, 72 S.Ct. 205, 210, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952)). In this case, we do not believe that the defendants' alleged conduct rises to the level of a substantive due process violation. It does not shock the conscience to hear that defendants removed a child in emergency action from the custody of a parent suspected of abusing him, based upon some evidence of child abuse. ⁷ Likewise, defendants' further conduct, in transferring custody of Matthew not to a stranger, but to If Weller is seeking relief on the basis that the State harmed Matthew by failing to protect him from his mother or grandmother, no...