Ratliff v. AT&T Servs.

Decision Date25 February 2022
Docket Number20-2483-SAC-GEB
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Kansas
PartiesDALLAS RATLIFF, Plaintiff, v. AT&T SERVICES, INC., Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Sam A Crow, U.S. District Senior Judge.

The plaintiff Dallas Ratliff (Ratliff) sues AT&T Services, Inc. (AT&T) alleging unlawful interference with and termination of her employment in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.; the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C § 2601, et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (§ 1981); and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII) 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. As set out by stipulation, Ratliff worked as a service representative in Topeka for Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, an affiliated entity of AT&T, from 1998 to 2016 when she moved to being a service representative for AT&T holding that position until the forced disposition in December 2020. In the summer of 2021, Ratliff was offered accepted a position of Premier Service Consultant Sales with AT&T Mobility Services LLC. AT&T moves for summary judgment (ECF# 51) arguing numerous legal and factual deficiencies with Ratliff's theories and proof. AT&T also has filed a motion to exclude evidence from the plaintiff's social worker. ECF# 53.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In deciding the motion, the court's role is “is not . . . to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 249. The court may grant summary judgment for lack of a genuine issue when the evidence is insufficient “for a jury to return a verdict, ” when “the evidence is merely colorable, ” or when the evidence “is not significantly probative.” Id. It follows then that a genuine issue for trial exists when “there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way.” Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998).

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden is met “by pointing out to the court a lack of evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim.” Adler, 144 F.3d at 671. The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to “go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts that would be admissible in evidence in the event of trial from which a rational fact finder could find for the nonmovant.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Such facts “must be identified by reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits incorporated therein.” Id.

The court applies this standard drawing all inferences arising from the record in the nonmovant's favor. Stinnett v. Safeway, Inc., 337 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2003). The court does not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence; these are jury functions. Id. at 1216. The Tenth Circuit has counseled the following for summary judgment proceedings in employment discrimination cases:

[I]n the context of employment discrimination, [i]t is not the purpose of a motion for summary judgment to force the judge to conduct a ‘mini trial' to determine the defendant's true state of mind.” Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 453 (10th Cir. 1995). Many of the highly fact-sensitive determinations involved in these cases “are best left for trial and are within the province of the jury.” Id.; see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ([T]he inquiry [at summary judgment is] whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury....”). Consequently, “in this Circuit . . . an employment discrimination suit will always go to the jury so long as the evidence is sufficient to allow the jury to disbelieve the employer's [explanation for the alleged misconduct].” Beaird v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 145 F.3d 1159, 1177 (10th Cir. 1998) (Tacha, J., concurring in part); see Randle, 69 F.3d at 452 ([I]f . . . inferential evidence is sufficient to allow a plaintiff to prevail at trial, it is surely sufficient to permit a plaintiff to avoid summary judgment so that the plaintiff can get to trial.”).

Lounds v. Lincare, Inc., 812 F.3d 1208, 1220-21 (10th Cir. 2015).

STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS

The court regards the following facts to be uncontroverted after full consideration of matters properly submitted by the parties. The court also reviewed and considered the plaintiff's additional statement of facts and submitted record. The following reflects only those facts relevant to the critical issues conclusive of these summary judgment proceedings.

For the relevant period, Ratliff was employed by AT&T in Topeka as a service representative working the inbound call center and she had established a net credited service date of December 26, 1998. As a member of the Communication Workers of America (“Union”), Ratliff's employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). AT&T used a system of corrective action for its service representatives that was consistent with the CBA. The system followed progressive steps from Performance Notice (active for six months), Written Reminder (active for nine months), Decision Making Leave (active for 12 months), and termination. A service representative disagreeing with a discipline step or with a performance assessment could pursue a grievance through her union.

Ratliff asserts that on December 13, 2019, she overheard another Union member, Teri Hastings, loudly talking about her. Ratliff approached Hastings asking what the problem was. Hastings denied that she was talking about Ratliff and that she intended to speak with supervisor Julie McCoy. When Ratliff later saw McCoy talking with Hastings and both going into a conference room, Ratliff sent the following instant message or “Q” to McCoy:

Ratliff (10:39:05 AM): I can join you if you would like?
McCoy (10:46:18 AM): No. need but ty [thank you].
Ratliff (10:46:35 AM): I would like to speak to you as well, so you get the whole story!
McCoy (11:07:56 AM): Ok . . . give me a min. I had to jump on this call . . . I will Q you when I am available.
Ratliff (11:12:29 AM): Sounds good!
Ratliff (11:14:02 AM): Or you know what it is okay, I am sure I will be addressed. As the one in the wrong. Telling my side won't matter. I don't have white privilege.
McCoy (11:14:24 AM): What??
Ratliff (11:14:31 AM): Right

See ECF# 52-9.

In investigatory meetings over this incident, Julie McCoy who is a Black woman told Ratliff that the “white privilege” comment had offended her, because “as two Black women we can't speak that way.” ECF# 52-4, p. 28. Ratliff responded, “I don't identify as a Black woman, I'm biracial. I am not a racist. I was asking for help.” Id. On December 17, 2019, Ratliff was “placed on a Written Reminder for Misconduct” which stated that it would “remain active for a period of nine months and . . . removed on September 17, 2020, ” based on her “compliance.” ECF# 52-8. The Written Reminder also stated that, “On December 13, 2019, you sent a Q message to a manager that contained a discriminatory statement which is an AT&T Code of Business Conduct violation and will not be tolerated.” Id. Ratliff understood from the meetings that she was being disciplined for her white privilege comment. During the investigatory meetings, Ratliff recalls her effectiveness with others being discussed but that she wasn't in trouble for that conduct. ECF# 52-4, p. 29. After the investigatory meeting, Tresa Gonzalez, who supervised Hastings but not Ratliff, issued Hastings a Performance Notice for lack of effectiveness with peers based on the conflict with Ratliff.

On February 10, 2020, Ratliff began a grievance with her Union over her Written Reminder discipline of December 17, 2019. Ratliff later accepted resolution of the grievance on October 28, 2020, and her discipline was reduced from the nine-month Written Reminder to a six-month Performance Notice. In the meantime, Gonzalez became Ratliff's supervisor in July of 2020. Gonzalez avers that “Ratliff did not lose any pay because of the Written Reminder, and she did not advance to any further steps of discipline.” ECF# 52-2, ¶ 5. And on September 24, 2020, a month before Ratliff's grievance was resolved, Gonzalez emailed Ratliff that the nine months to her Written Reminder had expired “and the step of discipline was inactive.” Id. at ¶ 6.

In March 2020, pursuant to a memorandum of understanding between AT&T and the Union, Ratliff and other service representatives began temporarily working from home due to the COVID pandemic. Ratliff testified her co-worker problems ceased with working at home. In April 2020, Ratliff requested a job accommodation through AT&T's Integrated Disability Service Center (“IDSC”) to permit her to work from home “permanently.” On May 22, 2020, IDSC sent Ratliff a letter stating her proposed accommodation of permanently working from home effective April 13, 2020, had been received and was still under review and for determination “whether it can be reasonably accommodated without creating an undue hardship.” ECF# 52-12. The letter explained that her accommodation request would be communicated with her supervisor and that she should contact her direct...

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