U.S. v. Bruno

Decision Date19 June 1990
Docket NumberNo. 89-3521,89-3521
Citation903 F.2d 393
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Vincent BRUNO, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Dwight Doskey, Cherbonnier & Doskey, Harvey, La., for defendant-appellant.

James B. Letten, John Volz, U.S. Atty., U.S. Dept. of Justice, New Orleans, La., Sara Criscitelli, Deborah Watson, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for petitioner-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before CLARK, Chief Judge, and WISDOM, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

WISDOM, Circuit Judge:

I

The petitioner/appellant, Vincent Bruno, was convicted in 1986 of two counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1343 and of one count of conspiracy to commit fraud and bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371. 1 Bruno was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment on the conspiracy count, and to concurrent terms of three years' probation on each of the two wire fraud counts. Additionally, Bruno was fined $1,000 for each of the three counts of conviction, for a total fine of $3,000. Bruno has completed his prison term for the conspiracy count but has not yet completed his three years probation for the substantive wire fraud counts.

Two theories of wire fraud were included in the jury instruction at Bruno's trial. One of those theories was the "intangible rights" or "right to honest government" theory of wire fraud that the Supreme Court rejected in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987). The Court in McNally held that the federal wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1341 et seq., applies only to schemes to defraud victims of property rights and does not apply to schemes that defraud citizens of their right to honest government. 2

Bruno petitioned for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255 to vacate his convictions for wire fraud and conspiracy on the grounds that those convictions had been invalidated by McNally. The district court denied that petition. Bruno now appeals from that denial.

II

The government agrees with the petitioner, Bruno, that, since the jury instruction regarding wire fraud included the "intangible rights" theory rejected in McNally, the petitioner's wire-fraud convictions must be reversed. 3 We agree as well and reverse Bruno's convictions for wire fraud.

Bruno contends that McNally requires reversal not only of his wire fraud convictions but also of his conspiracy conviction. The government disagrees, arguing that the intangible rights theory of wire fraud could not have infected the conspiracy conviction because neither the prosecutor in presenting the case nor the court in instructing the jury made any direct or indirect reference to an intangible rights theory of wire fraud when discussing the conspiracy charge. The conspiracy count in the indictment did not refer to the intangible rights theory but, rather, charged: 1) conspiracy to defraud two individuals (the Langfords) of money in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1343, and 2) conspiracy to use interstate commerce to commit an act of bribery of a public official in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1952. 4 Thus, the intangible rights theory of wire fraud was no part of the conspiracy charge as stated in the indictment. Nonetheless, the conspiracy conviction can now be upheld by this court only if it was not infected in any way at trial by the intangible rights theory. 5 A review of the record reveals that the intangible rights theory was connected to the conspiracy charge by the prosecutor in opening arguments when she stated that "[with respect to Count One of the indictment, [the] defendants are charged with ... conspiring to commit wire fraud on the Langfords and on the State of Louisiana ...". Trial Tr. at 51 (emphasis added). The prosecutor's reference at the start of trial to committing wire fraud on the State of Louisiana connected the intangible rights theory of wire fraud to the conspiracy charge against Bruno. No subsequent statements or instructions by the parties or the court cured that error. We therefore find that there is at least some possibility that the jury based its conspiracy conviction on conspiracy to commit the intangible-rights version of wire fraud. Because there is a possibility that the jury based its conspiracy conviction on the invalid intangible-rights theory of wire fraud, that conviction is subject to reversal. 6

Because Bruno has already served his sentence on the conspiracy count, his only avenue of relief with regard to that count would be a writ of error coram nobis pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1651. 7 See United States v. Morgan 346 U.S. 502, 512-13, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954); Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 111 (5th Cir.1957). This court has held that, to be entitled to coram nobis relief, a petitioner must establish both that he is suffering civil disabilities as a consequence of the criminal conviction and that the error involved in his conviction is "of the most fundamental character"--that is, error that has resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice. United States v. Marcello, 876 F.2d at 1154; United States v. Hay, 702 F.2d 572 (5th Cir.1983); Puente v. United States, 676 F.2d 141, 145 n. 2 (5th Cir.1982).

Because the intangible rights theory of wire fraud, which, under McNally, is not a criminal violation, may have infected the jury's decision to convict on the conspiracy charge, it is possible that the jury convicted for conspiracy to commit a noncriminal act. Such a conviction would constitute a "complete miscarriage of justice" such as is required for coram nobis relief.

Regarding the other requirement for coram nobis relief, that the petitioner is suffering civil disabilities as a consequence of the criminal conviction, the district court stated that, "because the [district] court denies Bruno's motion on other grounds, the court does not determine whether Bruno has shown 'adverse collateral consequences' necessary for issuance of this writ". Since the appellant brought this case under the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255, rather than as a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, there is no record regarding the question of adverse collateral consequences. The petitioner asserts that he is being substantially harmed by continuing disabilities under Louisiana law as a result of his criminal conviction. We remand this case for a determination regarding the...

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  • U.S. v. Shaid, 88-2716
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • 5 Agosto 1991
    ...under Sec. 2255 in which such convictions were set aside without requiring a showing of cause or prejudice. E.g., United States v. Bruno, 903 F.2d 393, 394 (5th Cir.1990); Callanan v. United States, 881 F.2d 229, 231 (6th Cir.1989). McNally and the other cases, precisely on point, stand fir......
  • U.S. v. Shaid, 88-2716
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • 24 Octubre 1990
    ...881 F.2d 229, 231-32 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1816, 108 L.Ed.2d 946 (1990); see also United States v. Bruno, 903 F.2d 393 (5th Cir.1990) (applying, although not specifically stating, the rule); United States v. Bush, 888 F.2d 1145, 1145-46 (7th Cir.1989); Unite......
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    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Virginia)
    • 27 Marzo 2019
    ...568, 577 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Thomas v. U.S. Disciplinary Barracks , 625 F.3d 667, 670 n.3 (10th Cir. 2010) and United States v. Bruno , 903 F.2d 393, 396 (5th Cir. 1990) ). In particular, the Fourth Circuit has held that a petitioner seeking a writ of coram nobis "must show that (1) a ......
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    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • 8 Febrero 2013
    ...for obtaining relief through coram nobis is more stringent than the standard applicable on direct appeal”); United States v. Bruno, 903 F.2d 393, 396 (5th Cir.1990) (describing an error “of the most fundamental character” as one “that has resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice”). In ......
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