Martinez v. Cate
Decision Date | 11 September 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 15-16433,15-16433 |
Citation | 903 F.3d 982 |
Parties | Daniel J. MARTINEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Matthew CATE, Respondent-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Gary P. Burcham (argued), Burcham & Zugman, San Diego, California; Lisa M. Sciandra, San Leandro, California, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Brian R. Means (argued), Deputy Attorney General; Tami M. Krenzin, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Michael P. Farrell, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Xavier Becerra, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, Sacramento, California; for Respondent-Appellee.
Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, A. Wallace Tashima and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.
Once a suspect invokes his right to counsel during custodial interrogation, the officer must immediately cease questioning and honor that right. In this habeas proceeding, we hold that the interrogating officer failed scrupulously to honor the suspect’s right and that the California Court of Appeal unreasonably applied clearly established law in concluding otherwise. Further, we have grave doubts as to whether the admission into evidence of the suspect’s improperly-obtained statements influenced the jury’s verdict. We thus reverse the district court's denial of habeas relief, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On December 8, 2005, Petitioner Daniel Martinez and Pablo Lopez had a neighborhood confrontation with Jefte and Jair Garcia that left Jefte dead from a gunshot wound
.1
There are differing accounts of the shooting, but the basic facts are as follows. Martinez and Lopez’s neighborhood included residents claiming membership in the rival Norteño and Sureño gangs. The Garcia brothers claimed Sureño membership; Martinez and Lopez allegedly claimed Norteño. On December 8, 2005, Martinez and Lopez knocked on a companion’s door and retrieved a shotgun stored there. One companion testified that Martinez asked for "the gauge," referring to the shotgun. Lopez put the gun behind his back and started to walk down the driveway with Martinez. Two companions from the house followed Lopez and Martinez. Halfway down the driveway, Martinez and Lopez started exchanging words with the Garcia brothers, who were across the street. The brothers accused Lopez and Martinez of tagging "YGL," which stands for "Young Gangster Locos," on the sidewalk outside of the brothers’ house. Jefte took his shirt off and walked to the middle of the street. Both of Lopez and Martinez’s companions thought that Jefte wanted to fight. Additionally, one of the companions testified that Jair threatened, "I’ll peel your guys’ cap back," meaning he was going to shoot at them, but there was no consensus about whether the Garcia brothers referred to having a gun. The two companions’ recollections also differed as to whether Martinez said anything to Jefte or Lopez while Jefte was shirtless in the middle of the street. One companion testified that Jair reached behind his back during the confrontation. The other companion did not hear the brothers threaten to shoot at Lopez and Martinez, and did not see a weapon on the Garcia brothers. Lopez eventually produced the shotgun from behind his back and almost immediately fired it once. Jefte was facing the weapon when he was shot. One of the companions testified that Martinez had told Lopez to "[j]ust do it" right before Lopez fired. Martinez, Lopez, and their two companions ran.
Afterwards, Martinez hid out at a nearby house and bragged that he had "shot this fool, shot this scrap."2 Two days later, the police arrested Martinez.
Detective Navarro then read Martinez his Miranda rights.
Immediately after hearing his Miranda rights, Martinez asked, "I can have an attorney?" Detective Navarro clarified whether Martinez wanted an attorney and Martinez stated, "I would like to have an attorney." Without a break, Detective Navarro asked Martinez if he already had an attorney (yes), what his attorney’s name was (Percy), whether Martinez had already spoken to Percy (no), and whether Martinez would talk "but with an attorney present?" To the last question, Martinez replied "yeah [ ] cuz [sic] I don’t know much about the law." Detective Navarro then questioned Martinez about Martinez’s father’s full name. After Martinez answered, the following interaction took place:
After Martinez expressed frustration about the situation, he asked the detective, "what did you want to talk to me about?" At which point Detective Navarro said that he wanted to talk about the shooting and asked if Martinez "want[s] the attorney," or whether Martinez did not care. Martinez and Detective Navarro went back and forth a bit, with the detective saying he wanted Martinez’s side of the story and Martinez saying he did not want to go to jail and that he would tell the truth if that "help[ed] [him] walk away."
Without an attorney present, Detective Navarro continued to interrogate Martinez. At trial, Detective Navarro testified that he asked Martinez whether Martinez felt intimidated by Jefte during the confrontation, and whether Martinez saw a gun on Jefte. Detective Navarro testified that Martinez said he did not feel threatened and did not see a gun.
Martinez did not file a pre-trial motion to suppress the statements from Detective Navarro’s interrogation. Instead, during trial, the defense objected to admission of the statements on Fifth Amendment grounds and the trial judge held a sidebar with counsel to discuss the matter. The trial judge concluded that although Martinez invoked the right to counsel, Navarro ceased interrogation. Then, in the eyes of the trial judge, Martinez reinitiated conversation and voluntarily waived his previously-asserted right to counsel. Specifically, the trial judge determined that questions about Martinez’s attorney and about Martinez’s father were not improper questions after Martinez’s invocation, but were instead part of the booking process. Further, the trial judge concluded that nothing that Detective Navarro said after Martinez’s invocation was a "threat" that "would invalidate [Martinez] changing his mind on the invocation." The trial judge did highlight Detective Navarro’s statement that he was going to book Martinez "because [he] only got one side of the story" as the most "critical" issue that "might jeopardize" admission of Martinez’s responses. Nonetheless, the judge concluded that the questions after Martinez’s invocation were valid, and that Martinez’s change of heart was voluntary. The trial judge refused to suppress the statements.
During closing argument, the prosecution cited Martinez’s responses to Detective Navarro’s questioning to rebut a self-defense instruction. The prosecution argued that Martinez’s statements that "he didn’t see a gun" and "didn’t feel threatened" were "critical" to "self-defense and dropping a murder [conviction] to manslaughter ...."
The jury convicted Martinez of second-degree murder and active gang participation but "also expressly found that Martinez ‘did act intentionally, deliberately and with premeditation.’ " Therefore, the jury did not accept Martinez’s self-defense argument. Martinez was sentenced to 40 years to life imprisonment.
On direct appeal, Martinez challenged the admission of the statements. The California Court of Appeal reviewed the interview transcript and affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Martinez’s statement was admissible. The court focused its analysis on whether Detective Navarro telling Martinez that he would need to contact his lawyer from jail rendered his waiver involuntary.
First, citing Rhode Island v. Innis , 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), the Court of Appeal found that Second, the court reasoned that "[i]t was Martinez who then turned the subject back to having an attorney present; we see nothing deceptive or coercive in Navarro’s response that he did not know if they could get hold of Martinez’s attorney." Third, the court interpreted Martinez’s "question about what he was being booked for" as a reinitiation of the conversation with Detective Navarro. Fourth, the court...
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