Funches v. Progressive Tractor & Implement Co.

• Citation: 905 F.3d 846
• Decision Date: 28 September 2018
• Docket Number: No. 17-60431,17-60431
• Parties: Harvey Lee FUNCHES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PROGRESSIVE TRACTOR AND IMPLEMENT COMPANY, L.L.C., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

905 F.3d 846

Harvey Lee FUNCHES, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.PROGRESSIVE TRACTOR AND IMPLEMENT COMPANY, L.L.C., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-60431

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED September 28, 2018

REVISED October 8, 2018

Henry Dean Andrews, Jr., Andrews Law Office, Vicksburg, MS, Bradley S. Clanton, Clanton Law Firm, P.C., Jackson, MS, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Michael Wayne Baxter, Baxter Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Ridgeland, MS, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before KING, ELROD, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Harvey Lee Funches lost his left arm when his vehicle collided with a piece of farm equipment being towed by a pickup truck as the two passed one another on a Mississippi road. The only live dispute left in this case is Funches's suit against Progressive Tractor and Implement Company, L.L.C., the company that leased the equipment to the driver of the pickup truck. In the suit, Funches alleged, inter alia , that the company was negligent in failing to warn the pickup truck's driver of the dangers associated with towing the equipment with a pickup truck instead of a tractor. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the company on the failure-to-warn claim (as well as Funches's other claims), finding that Funches failed to create a genuine factual dispute regarding the essential element of proximate cause. Funches appeals the district court's order. We AFFIRM.

I.

A.

On the afternoon of March 30, 2015, Harvey Lee Funches was traveling in his truck down a two-lane road in Warren County, Mississippi. Approaching in the opposite lane was Chase Noland, a farmer, driving a pickup truck with a farm disc¹ in tow. When the two passed one another, the farm disc collided with Funches's truck. Funches, who was traveling with his left arm either on or outside his driver-side window, had his left arm severed by the disc's blades.

Two days prior to the accident, Noland rented the disc from Progressive Tractor and Implement Company, L.L.C. ("PTI"), a Louisiana equipment dealer and the appellee in this case. At the time of the accident, Noland was en route from his farm in Start, Louisiana, to another one of his farms in Utica, Mississippi.

The disc Noland rented had a warning decal on the tongue near its hitch. The decal contains an illustration juxtaposing a pickup truck towing the disc and an agricultural tractor towing the disc. A large red X is over the truck. The decal also states:

WARNING

TOWING HAZARD

• Properly prepare machines for transport / roading.

• Transport with Ag Tractor only—MAX. road speed 20 mph [32 kph].

• Total weight of towed unit, not to exceed 1.5 times weight of tractor.

• Use caution when on turns, inclines, or hazardous road conditions to avoid loss of control.

• Attach proper size safety chain and electrical connector.

Failure to comply could result in death or serious injury.

The disc came with an operator's manual, which contained the warning present on the decal, as well as other safety information. Noland's truck weighed less than the minimum weight prescribed by the warning decal.

At his deposition, Noland said that he did not read the decal or the manual. Noland also said that if someone at PTI had advised him against hauling the disc with his pickup truck, he would not have done so. On the day Noland picked up the disc, Buie Cumpton, a PTI employee, was present and allowed Noland to drive away towing the disc with his pickup truck.

B.

Funches initially filed suit against Noland in Mississippi state court. Because the parties were of diverse citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeded the minimum amount required by federal law, Noland removed the case to federal court. After removal, Funches amended his complaint to add as defendants PTI, the disc's manufacturer, and two entities associated with Noland's farming operation. Funches has since settled his suits against the other defendants; only his claim against PTI remains. Funches sued PTI on theories of vicarious liability, breach of its rental agreement with Noland, and negligence.²

The district court granted summary judgment on each of these claims.

II.

A district court's grant of summary judgment is a question of law, which we review de novo. Davidson v. Fairchild Controls Corp. , 882 F.3d 180, 184 (5th Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is appropriate when "the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). This occurs when a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Although we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant at the summary judgment stage, a mere "scintilla of evidence" in support of plaintiff's position will not do, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), nor will "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Under the Erie doctrine, a federal court applies state substantive law and federal procedural law to diversity cases. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). The parties do not dispute that Mississippi substantive law applies to this case.

III.

A.

Before we consider Funches's negligence claim, we must first determine which Mississippi law should apply. Although both parties appear to present their arguments under the rubric of the common law, they cite frequently to the Mississippi Products Liability Act ("MPLA"), and the facts of this case raise the possibility that the MPLA applies.

The Mississippi legislature enacted the MPLA in 1993. The preamble of the original act stated that it was applicable to "any action for damages caused by a product except for damage to the product itself." H.B. 1270, 1993 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 1993). The MPLA contemplates several types of claims. Relevant here, the MPLA allows for an action alleging that "[t]he product was defective because it failed to contain adequate warnings or instructions." Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63(a)(i)(2).

Despite the preamble's capacious language, Mississippi courts have interpreted the MPLA narrowly. First, seizing on the original MPLA's frequent references to "manufacturer or seller," Mississippi courts interpreted the MPLA to exclude suits against "mere designers," and required such suits to proceed under the common law. Lawson v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc. , 75 So.3d 1024, 1029 (Miss. 2011). Additionally, after the Mississippi Supreme Court allowed a common law claim of breach of implied warranty to proceed against drug manufacturers despite the MPLA providing for no such action, scholars commented that the court had interpreted the act as "supplement[ing] , rather than supplant[ing], [Mississippi's] common law products liability jurisprudence." Mississippi Law of Torts § 15.3 (2d ed. 2017) (citing Bennett v. Madakasira , 821 So.2d 794, 808 (Miss. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by

Hutzel v. City of Jackson , 33 So.3d 1116 (Miss. 2010) ).

The Mississippi legislature responded to these narrowing constructions by amending the MPLA in 2014. See H.B. 680, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2014). The amendment made two significant changes. First, it added the word "designer" to each of the Act's references to "manufacturer or seller," thereby bringing a case like Lawson into the MPLA's ambit. Id. Second, the legislature amended the preamble to clarify that the MPLA applies to "any action for damages caused by a product, including, but not limited to, any action based on a theory of strict liability in tort, negligence or breach of implied warranty, except for commercial damage to the product itself." Id. (emphasis added to reflect language inserted by 2014 amendment).

Following the enactment of the 2014 amendments, the Mississippi Supreme Court clarified that "[t]he MPLA provides the exclusive remedy 'in any action for damages caused by a product' against a product manufacturer[,] [designer,] or seller." Elliott v. El Paso Corp. , 181 So.3d 263, 270 (Miss. 2015) (quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63(a) ); id. at 270 n.31 (referencing the 2014 MPLA amendment adding "designers"). However, the Mississippi Supreme Court cabined the scope of the MPLA in that same case. Although it found that the MPLA governed claims against manufacturers, sellers, and designers, the court did not apply the MPLA to the plaintiff's claims against a common carrier that transported the allegedly defective product. See id. at 271. Instead, the court held that those claims were governed by the common law. Id. The upshot of Elliott appears to be as follows: although the MPLA supplies the exclusive remedy for products liability claims against manufacturers, designers, and sellers of a product, its scope remains limited to those three categories.

In the case at bar, the only remaining defendant is PTI, the lessor of the disc. Accordingly, the applicability of the MPLA hinges on whether PTI, as a lessor, is equivalent to a "seller" of the disc. Mississippi courts have not opined as to whether a lessor is a seller under the MPLA. Mississippi law requires that we interpret words in its statutes "according to their common and ordinary acceptation and meaning; but technical words and phrases according to their technical meaning." Miss. Code Ann. § 1-3-65. In interpreting the word "manufacturer" as used in the MPLA, the Mississippi Supreme Court looked to "its common and popular meaning" and consulted dictionaries to do so. Lawson , 75 So.3d at 1028. Thus, we consider the "common and ordinary acceptation and meaning" of the word "seller."

Dictionaries prove somewhat unhelpful to this endeavor. See, e.g. , Seller , Am. Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2018) ("One that...