Parkman v. W&T Offshore, Inc.

• Decision Date: 07 July 2021
• Docket Number: C.A. NO.: 3:20-CV-883-JWD-EWD
• Citation: 547 F.Supp.3d 536
• Parties: Jason PARKMAN v. W&T OFFSHORE, INC., et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana

547 F.Supp.3d 536

Jason PARKMAN

v.W&T OFFSHORE, INC., et al.

C.A. NO.: 3:20-CV-883-JWD-EWD

United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana.

Signed July 7, 2021

Roland Thomas Christensen, Micajah D. Boatright, Pro Hac Vice, Arnold & Itkin, LLP, Houston, TX, Michael Paul Fruge ’, Richard J. Ward, III, Tony Clayton, Clayton, Fruge & Ward, Port Allen, LA, for Jason Parkman.

Mark John Spansel, Matthew C. Guy, Gerard Joseph Gaudet, Adams and Reese LLP, New Orleans, LA, Kellen James Mathews, Adams and Reese, Baton Rouge, LA, Meghan E. Hausler, Pro Hac Vice, Michelle Hartmann, Pro Hac Vice, Baker and McKenzie LLP, Dallas, TX, for Helmerich & Payne, Inc., Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co., Helmerich & Payne Offshore, LLC.

George B. Jurgens, III, King, Krebs & Jurgens, Robert R. Johnston, Constance Colley Waguespack, Gillis W.P. Klotz, Kristin Kay Robbins, Pusateri, Johnston, Guillot & Greenbaum, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for W&T Offshore, Inc.

Bret C. Beyer, Sr., Megan Elizabeth Reaux, Hill & Beyer, PLC, Lafayette, LA, for Baker Hughes Energy Services LLC, Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations LLC.

Kerry J. Miller, Daniel John Dysart, Rebekka C. Veith, Fishman Haygood, LLP, New Orleans, LA, for Halliburton Company, Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.

RULING ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS BY HELMERICH & PAYNE INTERNATIONAL DRILLING CO., HELMERICH & PAYNE OFFSHORE, LLC, AND HELMERICH & PAYNE, INC.

JOHN W. deGRAVELLES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court are three related motions to dismiss: the first is Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co.’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Claims for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 18) brought by Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co. ("H&P IDC"). It is opposed by plaintiff Jason Parkman ("Parkman" or "Plaintiff"). H&P IDC filed a reply. (Doc. 36.) The second is Helmerich & Payne Offshore, LLC's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Claims for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 19) brought by Helmerich & Payne Offshore LLC ("H&P Offshore"). Plaintiff opposes it (Doc. 29) and H&P Offshore filed a reply. (Doc. 37.) The third is Helmerich & Payne, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(2) and Alternatively Rule 12(b)(6) (Doc. 24) brought by Helmerich & Payne, Inc. ("H&P Inc."). Plaintiff opposes (Doc. 32) and H&P Inc. filed a reply. (Doc. 39.)

In Plaintiff's Petition (Doc. 1-1 at 4, et seq. ), all three defendants are referred to collectively as the "H&P Defendants" (Id. at 8, ¶ 21, n.3). Except as to the allegations regarding agents for service of process, Plaintiff makes no distinction among them. Therefore, where the arguments of the movers are the same, the Court will refer to movers collectively as "H&P" or "H&P Defendants."¹ The Court has carefully considered the law, facts in the record, and the arguments and submissions of the parties and is prepared to rule. For the following reasons, the H&P Motions are GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a tort suit in state court on November 20, 2020 against various defendants including the H&P Defendants. (Doc. 1-1 at 4.) On December 29, 2020, the case was removed to this court. (Doc. 1.) "Plaintiff has not filed a motion to remand." (Doc. 38 at 1.)

Plaintiff alleges that on August 25, 2018, he sustained serious injuries while working for H&P on an H&P "offshore drilling rig" off the coast of Louisiana. (Doc. 1-1 at 4, ¶ 1; 7-8, ¶¶ 18, 21 (Petition); Doc. 1-1 at 16, ¶ 1 (affidavit of Plaintiff attached to Petition).)² Plaintiff "brings his claim under Louisiana law under the OCSLA."³ (Doc. 1-1 at 5, ¶ 2.)

However, Plaintiff "pleads in the alternative that his claims should be brought under the Jones Act⁴ and general maritime law because whether Plaintiff is a Jones Act seaman is a factual issue for the jury to decide." (Id. ) Without explanation or elaboration, Plaintiff alleges that "[a]t all relevant times Plaintiff was assigned to and contributing to the mission of the vessel in question. The vessel in question was in navigation at all relevant times. Plaintiff spent more than one third of his time working offshore on the same vessel or vessels under common control." (Id. at 8, ¶ 25.) Plaintiff does not name or otherwise identify the "vessel in question", does not give its location (other than to say it was in navigable waters), and does not state Plaintiff's position aboard the vessel or how he contributed to its mission.

Plaintiff alleges that the H&P Defendants collectively were negligent and grossly negligent in causing Plaintiff's injuries (id. at 10-11, ¶ 35), and in the alternative, "[t]he dangerous nature and manner of work being performed made it substantially certain that Plaintiff would be injured ... [but] proceeded nevertheless." (Id. at 11, ¶ 36.) Plaintiff alleges in the further alternative that the H&P Defendants, as his Jones Act employers, owe maintenance and cure and punitive damages. (Id. at ¶ 38.)

Plaintiff alleges that following his accident, "H&P's insurer began voluntarily paying" him LHWCA benefits "starting within a month of the incident" and which were still being paid to him at the time he signed his affidavit on November 20, 2020. (Doc. 1-1 at 17.)

II. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

A. H&P IDC's Motion to Dismiss

H&P IDC argues that because this accident occurred on a fixed platform on the Outer Continental Shelf, it is governed by OCSLA. (Doc. 18 at 1-2.) As such, Plaintiff's exclusive remedy against H&P IDC is workers’ compensation under LHWCA and Plaintiff has no tort cause of action including under Louisiana law, for "substantial certainty," or under the Jones Act and general maritime law. (Id. at 2 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) ).)

In his opposition, Plaintiff concedes that his claim is covered by LHWCA and that he has "received LHWCA benefits since his paralyzing accident." (Doc. 28 at 4.) He insists that "[h]e raised Jones Act liability as an alternative theory only" and his "primary reason for asserting alternative theories of liability in this case was to ensure a consistent result" in Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 30) where he argued that his receipt of LHWCA benefits interrupted prescription as to the non-H&P Defendants. (Id. )

In its reply, H&P IDC argues that "[s]imply put, Plaintiff concedes H&P IDC's motion should be granted and his claims against H&P IDC should be dismissed." (Doc. 36 at 2.)

B. H&P Offshore's Motion to Dismiss

H&P Offshore argues that because it "was not formed as an entity until October 17, 2018," it did not exist at the time of the accident and therefore could not possibly have been at fault in any way for the accident. (Doc. 19-1 at 8-9, pointing the Court to H&P's Certificate of Formation (Doc. 19-2) and excerpts from its 2019 Form 10-K filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Doc. 19-3).) Furthermore, because Plaintiff failed to allege H&P Offshore's possible successor liability as the successor to H&P IDC, H&P Offshore cannot be liable under this theory. (Id. at 9-10.) Furthermore, since H&P IDC, as Plaintiff's LHWCA employer, cannot be liable to Plaintiff because of its immunity from a tort suit, neither can H&P Offshore as successor to H&P IDC. (Id. at 10 (citing Parker v. McDermott, Inc., No. 89-4269, 1990 WL 223011 (E.D. La. Dec. 18, 1990) ).)

Plaintiff responds that H&P Offshore's assertion that it did not exist at the time of the subject accident rests on documents not properly before the Court in this Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. (Doc. 29 at 3.) Insofar as H&P Offshore's claim that it cannot be liable as a successor to H&P IDC since the latter is immune as Plaintiff's LHWCA employer, Plaintiff agrees that his claims are "covered by LHWCA" (id. at 4) but insists that this "determination must be applied throughout the case to all issues – including prescription" where LHWCA payments "serve as an interruption of Louisiana's prescription for third-party tort claims" (id. at 5) (citations omitted).

H&P Offshore replies that the documents supporting its contention that it did not exist at the time of the accident can be considered by the Court in this 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss since they are the kind of which the Court can take judicial notice, i.e. documents "the accuracy of which cannot reasonably be questioned." (Doc. 37 at 2 (citations omitted).) H&P Offshore concludes by stating that, given Plaintiff's acknowledgement that LHWCA applies, "Plaintiff concedes H&P Offshore's motion should be granted and his claims against H&P Offshore should be dismissed on this basis." (Id. at 3.)

C. H&P Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss

H&P Inc. argues this Court lacks both general and specific personal jurisdiction over it since its affiliations are not so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially "at home" in Louisiana and further, it did not "engage[ ] in specific actions within Louisiana that justifies specific jurisdiction" in this case. (Doc. 24 at 1.) The fact that H&P Inc. may be a parent corporation to the other H&P Defendants does not give this Court jurisdiction over it. (Doc. 24-1 at 2 (citation omitted).) H&P Inc.’s Rule 12(b)(2) motion is supported by the affidavit of Robert Mackey which states that H&P Inc. did not own Rig 107 and did not employ Plaintiff. (Id. at 3.) H&P Inc. argues that it has had no systematic and continuous contacts with Louisiana which would support general jurisdiction (id. at 6-7), nor does H&P Inc. have any contacts with the forum related to Plaintiff's accident (id. at 7-9). In the alternative, H&P Inc. adopts the same arguments made by H&P IDC in its motion, namely that Plaintiff's exclusive remedy against the H&P Defendants is for workers’ compensation under the LHWCA. (Id. at 10.)

In his opposition, Plaintiff states that "[g]eneral personal jurisdiction is not an issue here." (Doc. 32 at 5.) As to specific jurisdiction, however, Plaintiff argues that H&P Inc.’s contention that it was not involved in the accident "is wholly untested – no discovery has taken place." (I...