US v. Sage

Citation906 F. Supp. 84
Decision Date03 October 1995
Docket NumberNo. 3:95cr108 (DJS).,3:95cr108 (DJS).
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. Samuel D. SAGE.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Terence S. Ward, Federal Public Defender's Office, Hartford, CT, for Samuel D. Sage.

Christopher F. Droney, Denise Derby, John H. Durham, U.S. Attorney's Office, New Haven, CT, for U.S.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SQUATRITO, District Judge.

This matter is now before the court on Defendant Samuel D. Sage's ("Sage") August 14, 1995 motion to dismiss the information filed against him for an alleged violation of the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 ("CSRA"), 18 U.S.C. § 228. The Defendant claims three bases for dismissal: (1) the CSRA is an unconstitutional exercise of the commerce power under Article I § 8, U.S. Constitution; (2) the CSRA violates the Tenth Amendment and offends principles of federalism and comity; and (3) the CSRA is void for vagueness.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 13, 1995 the government filed a one-count information charging the Defendant with willful failure to pay child support as previously ordered by the Superior Court of the State of Connecticut. The information states that "from on or about September 23, 1991, through the date of this information, in the District of Connecticut and elsewhere, the defendant, SAMUEL D. SAGE, who resides in a different state, willfully and unlawfully failed to pay legal child support obligations as ordered by the Superior Court for the State of Connecticut, for his two minor children ... which amount is in excess of $5,000,00." This district issued a warrant for the Defendant's arrest, which was effected in Ohio.

For the reasons stated below, Sage's motion to dismiss is denied.

II. DISCUSSION
A. PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

In determining the validity of a statute, the court must presume constitutionality. See Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 468 U.S. 1323, 105 S.Ct. 11, 82 L.Ed.2d 908 (1984); see also United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32, 83 S.Ct. 594, 597, 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963). In areas of social and economic policy, it is not for the courts to judge the propriety of the Legislature's decisions.

"The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted."

FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, ___, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993) (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S.Ct. 939, 943, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979)). This principle applies even if such decisions may broaden the federal government's role. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2418, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992). "That Congress' predictive judgments are entitled to substantial deference does not mean, however, that they are insulated from meaningful judicial review altogether." Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 2471, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994).

B. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

The Defendant relies on the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, United States v. Lopez, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), for his contention that the CSRA1 is unconstitutional.

In Lopez the Defendant possessed a handgun on the grounds of a Texas high school. Following his arrest, the Defendant was charged with and convicted of violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which prohibits the possession of a firearm "at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A). On appeal the Defendant challenged his conviction on the grounds that Congress had exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting the statute. The Fifth Circuit agreed and reversed his conviction. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir.1993). The Supreme Court affirmed.

Much of the Lopez opinion is devoted to a review of the history of the Commerce Clause and its operation as a restraint on legislative authority. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the long-recognized proposition that

The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.

United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118, 61 S.Ct. 451, 459, 85 L.Ed. 609 (1941). The Court, however, also echoed the warning that

the scope of the interstate commerce power "must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized government."

Lopez, ___ U.S. at ___ - ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1628-29 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37, 57 S.Ct. 615, 624, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937)). Given the important interests at stake in the outcome of the analysis of any given reach of congressional authority, the Court noted its traditional duty to "undertake to decide whether a rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce." Lopez, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1629 (citing cases).

The Court also affirmed the existence of three broad categories of activity that Congress could regulate under the Commerce Clause: (1) the use of the channels of interstate commerce; (2) "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities"; and (3) activities which have "a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." Id. at ___ - ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1629-30 (citations omitted).

Turning to the statute at issue the Court found that Congress' power to enact 922(q) had to be found under Category Three. Id. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1629. Reviewing the statute under that category, the Court held that the law did not regulate an activity that substantially affected interstate commerce. Specifically, the Court observed: (1) 922(q) "by its terms has nothing to do with `commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms," id. at ___ - ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1630-31;2 (2) Congress had failed to make findings on § 922(q)'s effects on interstate commerce, id.;3 and (3) the language of 922(q) contained no jurisdictional element "which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce." Id. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1631.

Contrary to the Defendant's contentions, Lopez does not mandate a finding that the CSRA is unconstitutional. Rather, the court holds that the CSRA is constitutionally sound under Category Three.

1. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing the CSRA, the court's role is narrow: the court must defer to a congressional determination that the regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce if there is any rational basis for such a finding. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2360, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981); See Lopez, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1630. A rational basis exists when the relationship between the activity and interstate commerce is not so tenuous as to defeat all limitations on congressional power pursuant to its authority under the Commerce Clause. Id. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1632. Once a rational basis exists, the court must then decide whether the means chosen is reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276, 101 S.Ct. at 2360.

Recognizing this circuit's determination that federal "power to regulate interstate commerce is extraordinarily far-reaching," S.S.C. Corp. v. Town of Smithtown, 66 F.3d 502, 508 (2d Cir.1995) (Cabranes, J.), this court turns to the CSRA and an analysis of its regulation of economic activity, its legislative history, and its interstate commerce nexus.

2. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

According to Lopez, the possession of a firearm in a school zone was not "economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce." Lopez, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1634. A regulated activity, however, need not be commercial in order to be economic. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125, 63 S.Ct. 82, 89, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942) ("Even if an activity is local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce...."). Because the payments regulated by the CSRA have a substantial effect on the national economy, the court determines in this case they are "economic."

The Supreme Court has consistently held that the Commerce Clause power is expansive enough to include activity which is solely intrastate. See, e.g., Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276-80, 101 S.Ct. at 2360-62; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-301, 85 S.Ct. 377, 381-382, 13 L.Ed.2d 290 (1964). Although activity with only a "relatively trivial impact" on commerce is still not a sufficient basis for broad regulation, see Lopez, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1629 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197, n. 27, 88 S.Ct. 2017, 2024 n. 27, 20 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1968)), as long as the activity aggregated bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances under a statute are irrelevant in a...

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