Graves v. Women's Professional Rodeo Ass'n, Inc., 89-1605
| Decision Date | 29 June 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-1605,89-1605 |
| Parties | 53 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 460, 54 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,047 Lance GRAVES, Appellant, v. WOMEN'S PROFESSIONAL RODEO ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Debra Armstrong-Wright, Fort Smith, Ark., for appellant.
Richard L. Spearman, Fort Smith, Ark., for appellee.
Before BOWMAN, Circuit Judge, HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and HUNTER, * District Judge.
Lance Graves has brought suit against the Women's Professional Rodeo Association (WPRA) for denying him membership on the basis of his gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a) (1982) and article II sections 2 and 3 of the Arkansas Constitution. 1 The District Court 2 granted WPRA's motion for summary judgment based on its findings that Graves does not have an employment relationship with WPRA and that WPRA is not an employer for purposes of Title VII and on the court's resultant lack of jurisdiction over the claim based on the Arkansas Constitution. Graves appeals, and we affirm.
WPRA is a nonprofit corporation organized for the principal purpose of sanctioning rodeo barrel races. As its name as well as this litigation suggests, membership in WPRA is limited to females. WPRA does not itself organize any rodeos; rather, the rodeos are staged by local organizing committees--albeit in compliance with various WPRA regulations if the rodeo is to merit WPRA's seal of approval. Nor does WPRA supervise the training of its members or the logistics of their participation in a rodeo but they, too, are governed by certain rules. Thus, it is the member's decision whether to compete in a particular rodeo as well as her burden to train for it and transport her horse and equipment to the event. Once entered, however, she is obligated to abide by WPRA rules that, for example, prohibit promotional or unkempt clothing, require participation in the absence of a valid excuse, and demand that an honest effort be made in the competition. While female nonmembers may participate in WPRA-sanctioned events, members generally are not allowed to compete in rodeos that are not endorsed by WPRA.
Although WPRA does not pay its members directly or indirectly, there are certain benefits to membership. WPRA will advance rodeo entry fees for members who have submitted their names but not their checks by the deadline. Of somewhat more significance, at least to this suit, the WPRA member who wins the most prize money from barrel racing each year is "recognized throughout the rodeo industry as the World Champion Barrel Racer for that year." Appellant's Brief at 5. The homologue world champions in all other rodeo events come from the ranks of the Professional Rodeo Cowboy Association (PRCA)--which admits both men and women as members. But PRCA does not sponsor barrel racing events, and therein lies the rub: Graves has devoted much of his life to barrel racing; he wants to barrel race professionally. Thus, he argues that WPRA has violated Title VII by excluding him from membership on the basis of his gender.
WPRA's defense has consisted of pointing out that it does not have the requisite fifteen employees to come within the ambit of Title VII's mandate, nor, in fact, is it Graves's desire to be one of the two full-time or two part-time employees that WPRA does have. Graves concedes that, if these four employees constitute WPRA's entire work force then WPRA is not an "employer" under Title VII and WPRA may exclude him on the basis of his gender. He argues, however, that WPRA's members are its employees. The sole issue on appeal then is whether the membership roster of WPRA can be construed as a list of its employees.
In relevant part, Title VII defines "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer" and "employer" as "a person ... who has fifteen or more employees ... and any agent of such a person." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(b) and (f) (1982). Due to the occasional difficulty of applying such circular definitions to irregular employment relationships, courts have fashioned analyses of their own for determining whether an employment relationship exists. Graves's argument that WPRA members merit description as employees relies primarily on his interpretations of this case law.
The District Court responded to Graves's contentions by first noting that WPRA is a voluntary organization that does not pay wages, withhold taxes, or pay insurance. While acknowledging that the organization exercises a modicum of control over its members via WPRA rules--control being one factor that has been considered by the courts to be relevant to a determination of an employment relationship--the court correctly stated that the existence of a degree of control is not the sole criterion. Because the relationship between WPRA and its members permits only of an opportunity to compete for prize money furnished by sponsors, the court found that members of WPRA are not in an employment relationship with that organization.
We find no flaw in the District Court's analysis and may affirm because we, too, find that the relationship between WPRA and its members categorically resists classification as "employment" according to the ordinary usage of that term. As noted above, the statutory definitions fail to set out any meaning for "employer" and "employee" distinct from those implied by ordinary usage--indeed the quite spartan and circular nature of the definitions seem to leave no other route. And if that were not sufficient, the legislative history explicitly provides that the dictionary definition should govern the interpretation of "employer" under Title VII. 110 Cong.Rec. 7216 (1964) (response of the subcommittee to Sen. Dirksen's memorandum); cf. Blassie v. Kroger Co., 345 F.2d 58, 68-69 (8th Cir.1965) (Blackmun, J.) ( dictionary definition of "employee" in interpreting the National Labor Management Relations Act).
The dictionary gives these definitions:
em-ploy-ee or em-ploye ... one employed by another usu. in a position below the executive level and usu. for wages
em-ploy-er ... one that employs...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Talley v. Cnty. of Fresno
...the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ( 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ; Title VII). ( Graves v. Women's Professional Rodeo Ass'n., Inc. (8th Cir. 1990) 907 F.2d 71 ( Graves ).) Graves involved a male who sought and was denied membership in the nonprofit Women's Professional R......
-
Kemether v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n
...before "jumping straight into verbal manipulation of the case law tests for an employment relationship." Graves v. Women's Professional Rodeo Ass'n, 907 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir.1990). A plaintiff who was not hired in the first instance, and is therefore neither an independent contractor nor an......
-
Haavistola v. Community Fire Co.
..."covered" employer under Title VII. Graves v. Women's Professional Rodeo Ass'n, Inc., 708 F.Supp. 233, 235 (W.D.Ark.1989), aff'd, 907 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1990). Employee status under Title VII is a question of federal law, "to be ascertained through consideration of the statutory language of ......
-
Gulino v. New York State Educ. Dept.
...in situations that plausibly approximate an employment relationship.'" O'Connor, 126 F.3d at 115 (quoting Graves v. Women's Prof'l Rodeo Assoc., 907 F.2d 71, 74 (8th Cir.1990)). Thus, "a prerequisite to considering whether an individual is [an employee] under common-law agency principles is......
-
"INFLUENCING" THE LEGISLATURE: THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION TARGETING ONLINE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF SOCIAL MEDIA INFLUENCERS.
...supra note 158, at 255-56. (161.) Freeman Peshehonoff, supra note 154, at 495-96. (162.) Graves v. Women's Professional Rodeo Ass'n, 907 F.2d 71,74 (8th Cir. 1990) ("Courts have turned to analyses such as the 'economic realities' test and 'right to control' test under Title VII only in situ......
-
A price on volunteerism: the public has a higher duty to accommodate volunteers.
...M. Webb, Inc., 397 U.S. 179, 185 (1970). (110.) Tawes, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 786, at * 12-13 (citing Graves v. Women's Prof'l Rodeo Ass'n, 907 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. (111.) Id. at * 11 (citing O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1997)). (112.) 42 U.S.C.A. [section] 12182 (West 2007). (......