Iron Eyes v. Henry

• Citation: 907 F.2d 810
• Decision Date: 03 July 1990
• Docket Number: No. 88-2586,88-2586
• Parties: Robert IRON EYES, Appellant, v. Dan HENRY (Assistant Superintendent) individually and official capacities; Joe Rosenberg (Captain) individually and official capacities; Charles E. Harris (Major) individually and official capacities; Dennis Dowd, in his individual and official capacities, Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Page 810

907 F.2d 810

Robert IRON EYES, Appellant, v. Dan HENRY (Assistant Superintendent) individually and official capacities; Joe Rosenberg (Captain) individually and official capacities; Charles E. Harris (Major) individually and official capacities; Dennis Dowd, in his individual and official capacities, Appellees.

No. 88-2586.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 12, 1989.

Decided July 3, 1990.

H. Todd Iveson, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.

Erwin O. Switzer, III, St. Louis, Mo., for appellees.

Before JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge, HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and MAGILL, Circuit Judge.

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

Robert Iron Eyes appeals from the district court's ¹ order dismissing his complaint for damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982). Iron Eyes is a Sioux Indian and was an inmate at Missouri's Farmington Correctional Center. ² He challenges a prison grooming regulation which requires all prisoners to wear their hair above their collars. Iron Eyes has had his hair cut twice under this rule. After a non-jury trial, the district court entered an order denying him all relief and dismissing his complaint with prejudice. This appeal followed. We affirm the district court.

I.

Iron Eyes was born on the Standing Rock Reservation in Fort Yates, North Dakota, and is an enrolled member of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe. He was raised in the ways of the Sioux culture and has followed the traditional practices of Sioux religion since his youth. Iron Eyes identifies his religion as the pipe religion. Among the tenets of his religion are the pipe ceremony, the sun dance, the ghost dance, and the use of a sweat lodge. These last two tenets are prohibited at Farmington. Iron Eyes also follows other traditional practices of his religion, including the wearing of long hair.

This case revolves around Iron Eyes' desire to grow his hair longer than is allowed under the prison regulation. He believes that his hair is a gift from the Great Spirit, and he considers cutting his hair, except to symbolize grief for the loss of a loved one, to be an offense to the Creator. Iron Eyes has had his hair cut five times during his twenty-seven years. The first three times he cut his hair by choice, in mourning for the loss of a loved one, consistent with the Sioux religion. The last two times his hair has been forcibly cut because of a Missouri prison grooming regulation. ³ These last two instances gave rise to the lawsuit currently before us.

Iron Eyes' most recent incarceration began in October, 1987. ⁴ During an earlier one-year term at Farmington, no attempt was made to cut his hair. At the start of his second term, however, Iron Eyes was directed to cut his hair by a Corrections Supervisor, Captain Joe Rosenberg. Iron Eyes protested, arguing that his religious beliefs, as a Native American, required him to wear long hair. Captain Rosenberg then requested that Iron Eyes' record be reviewed for proof of his heritage. According to Captain Rosenberg, this search uncovered no indication that Iron Eyes was a Native American.

Nothing further was done concerning Iron Eyes until December of 1987. At that time he was again ordered to have his hair cut to conform with the requirements of the grooming regulation. When he refused, he was removed to disciplinary segregation and, while shackled and handcuffed, his hair was cut by a prison barber. On March 3, 1988, Iron Eyes instituted this action by filing a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Ten months passed before Iron Eyes' hair again became an issue. On September 22, 1988, he was again ordered to have his hair cut to conform with the grooming regulation. Four days later he obtained a temporary restraining order barring prison officials from cutting his hair.

On October 13, 1988, Iron Eyes filed a second amended complaint which prayed for injunctive relief to prevent any further cutting of his hair and compensatory and punitive damages for the hair cutting incident in December of 1987. Until this preliminary injunction hearing, Iron Eyes had not attempted to gain permission to wear his hair long under the exception for Native Americans in the grooming regulation. See Div. Rul. 116.050(3)(A). After the hearing, Iron Eyes provided Farmington officials with written proof that he was an enrolled member in the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe. Dennis Dowd, Superintendent of Farmington, then forwarded this information, pursuant to Rule 116.050(3)(A), to the Zone Director of the Division of Adult Institutions, who denied Iron Eyes permission to wear his hair long under the exception to the regulation. Following this denial, a bench trial was held, after which the district court entered an order in favor of the Farmington officials. Iron Eyes then requested a temporary injunction, pending appeal, which the district court denied. Soon thereafter, he filed a similar motion with this court. While this motion was pending before us, Iron Eyes was once again given the choice of disciplinary segregation or cutting his hair. Again, he complied with the officials' order rather than face further punishment. Iron Eyes appeals the district court's judgment. ⁵

II.

Initially we recognize "that issues of prison management are, both by reason of separation of powers and highly practical considerations of judicial competence, peculiarly ill-suited to judicial resolution, and that, accordingly, courts should be loath to substitute their judgment for that of prison officials and administrators." Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450, 1453 (D.C.Cir.1989). See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2262, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). Nevertheless, because prison inmates "do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison," Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1877, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), "federal courts must take cognizance of the valid constitutional claims of prison inmates." Turner, 482 U.S. at 84, 107 S.Ct. at 2259. Valid constitutional claims include actions based on an inmate's free exercise rights under the first amendment. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2804, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974).

To support his position, Iron Eyes relies primarily on Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir.1975), in which we held that a prison hair regulation impermissibly infringed upon a Native American's first amendment right to freely exercise his religious beliefs because "[t]he proof at trial established that the legitimate institutional needs of the penitentiary can be served by viable, less restrictive means which will not unduly burden the administrator's task." Id. at 362. While Teterud has not been expressly overruled, we have limited it to its facts. See Butler-Bey v. Frey, 811 F.2d 449, 451 (8th Cir.1987) (upholding a prison ban on fezes because of the risks of concealed contraband); Hill v. Blackwell, 774 F.2d 338, 347-48 (8th Cir.1985) (upholding a prison regulation on beard length). Further, the least restrictive means test we applied in Teterud has been rejected by the Supreme Court. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2405, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987); Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. at 2261.

A prisoner's free exercise claim is currently "judged under a 'reasonableness' test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights." O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349, 107 S.Ct. at 2404. The specific standard of review for such a claim was set out by the Court in Turner: "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. at 2261. These penological objectives include rehabilitation, deterrence, and security. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 348, 107 S.Ct. at 2404. In Turner the Court discussed several factors for determining the reasonableness of the regulation at issue: (1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate, neutral governmental interest used to justify it; (2) whether there exist alternative means for prisoners to exercise the constitutional right at issue; (3) the impact that would be caused by accommodation of the right on prison staff, inmates, and allocation of prison resources; and (4) whether any alterative exists that would fully accommodate the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91, 107 S.Ct. at 2261-63.

III.

Before the Turner factors are applied to a prisoner's free exercise claim, the inmate must first establish the existence of a sincerely held religious belief, and that the challenged regulation infringes upon that belief. See Hill, 774 F.2d at 342-43. On appeal, Farmington officials contend that Iron Eyes did not sincerely hold a religious belief against the cutting of his hair. To support this position, they argue first that Iron Eyes' belief was not sincerely held, and second that wearing long hair is not an essential tenet of his religion. The district court considered both the sincerity of Iron Eyes' belief and the basis for that belief, and held that his need to wear his hair long was religious in nature and sincerely held. The court noted that Iron Eyes had maintained Sioux religious beliefs throughout his life, and that he had participated in religious ceremonies whenever possible. The court also recognized the importance of wearing long hair to Native Americans, citing Teterud, 522 F.2d at 360 n. 6. The court's determination that Iron Eyes' desire to abstain from cutting his hair was based on a sincerely held religious belief is factual in nature and thus is subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. See Butler-Bey, 811 F.2d at 450. From our review of the record, we cannot conclude that this determination is clearly...