Victoria's Secret Direct, LLC v. United States

Decision Date01 May 2013
Docket NumberCourt No. 07–00347.,Slip Op. 13–55.
PartiesVICTORIA'S SECRET DIRECT, LLC, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant.
CourtU.S. Court of International Trade

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Frances P. Hadfield, Alan R. Klestadt and Robert B. Silverman, Grunfeld, Desiderio, Lebowitz, Silverman & Klestadt LLP, of New York, NY.

Beverly A. Farrell, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice (Justin R. Miller and Karen V. Goff), of New York, NY, for defendant United States. With her on the briefs were Tony West, Assistant Attorney General and Barbara S. Williams, Attorney in Charge, International Trade Field Office. Of counsel on the briefs was Michael W. Heydrich, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, International Trade Litigation, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, of New York, NY.

OPINION

STANCEU, Judge:

Plaintiff Victoria's Secret Direct, LLC (Victoria's Secret) brought this action to contest the tariff classification that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs” or “CBP”) applied to a women's garment made of predominantly-cotton knitted fabric and containing an interior fabric insert marketed as a “shelf bra.” The garment, Victoria's Secret style number 194–423, was marketed under the description “Bra Top” and imported by Victoria's Secret in July 2006. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 16 (Nov. 21, 2007), ECF No. 5. It is worn on the upper body, has narrow straps, and has no shoulder or neck coverage. Id. ¶¶ 24, 30, 31. Defendant United States maintains that the Bra Top is properly classified as a “tank top” or similar article, as Customs determined upon liquidation. Answer ¶ 9 (Mar. 24, 2008), ECF No. 8. Plaintiff claims classification of the Bra Top as a “brassiere” or similar article or, in the alternative, under a residual provision for other garments of cotton, knitted or crocheted.

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law stated herein, determined following a bench trial, the court concludes that the subject merchandise is properly classified according to plaintiff's alternative claim.

I. Background

Victoria's Secret entered a shipment of Bra Tops on July 19, 2006 at the Port of Seattle, Washington on entry number 113–3588476–0. Summons (Sept. 17, 2007), ECF No. 1; Compl. ¶ 2. The commercial invoice described the merchandise as “ladies knit sleeveless basic tank pack with shelf bra tank top (95 pct cotton 5 pct spandex).” Joint Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶ 4 (Nov. 29, 2011), ECF No. 53 (“JPO”). Upon liquidating the entry on June 1, 2007, Customs classified the merchandise in subheading 6109.10.00, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) (2006) (“T-shirts, singlets, tank tops and similar garments, knitted or crocheted:Of cotton”), at 16.5% ad val.1 Answer ¶ 9. Victoria's Secret timely protested the determination of classification on June 29, 2007 (protest no. 3001–07–100282). Summons 1. Customs denied the protest on July 19, 2007 without issuing an official ruling. Id. On September 17, 2007, Victoria's Secret timely filed its summons, id., and on November 21, 2007, Victoria's Secret filed its complaint, claiming classification in subheading 6212.90.00, HTSUS (“Brassieres, girdles, corsets, braces, suspenders, garters and similar articles and parts thereof, whether or not knitted or crocheted: Other”) at 6.6% ad val, Compl. ¶¶ 11–26. In the alternative, plaintiff claims classification in subheading 6114.20.00, HTSUS (“Other garments, knitted or crocheted: Of cotton”), at 10.8% ad val. Id. ¶¶ 28–34.

Due to the presence of common issues of fact, the court directed that this case be tried jointly with Lerner New York, Inc. v. United States, Court No. 07–00361.2 The parties submitted identical post-trial briefing in the Victoria's Secret and Lerner actions. Pls.' Post–Trial Br. (Feb. 22, 2012), ECF No. 68 (“Pl.'s Mem.”); Def.'s Post–Trial Mem. of Law (Feb. 22, 2012), ECF No. 67 (“Def.'s Mem.”). Plaintiff responded to defendant's post-trial brief on March 23, 2012. Resp. to Def.'s Post–Trial Br. (Mar. 23, 2012), ECF No. 71 (“Pl.'s Resp.”).3

II. Discussion

The court exercises jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Section 201 of the Customs Courts Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a).4 In cases contesting the denial of a protest, the court makes its findings of fact de novo based upon the record made before the Court, 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a), and “the merchandise itself is often a potent witness.” Simod Am. Corp. v. United States, 872 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed.Cir.1989) (citations omitted). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the government's classification of the subject merchandise was incorrect but does not bear the burden of establishing the correct classification; instead, it is the court's independent duty to arrive at “the correct result, by whatever procedure is best suited to the case at hand.” Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 733 F.2d 873, 878 (Fed.Cir.1984). In making this determination, the court “must consider whether the government's classification is correct, both independently and in comparison with the importer's alternative.” Id. While [t]he proper scope and meaning of a tariff classification term is a question of law[,] ... determining whether the goods at issue fall within a particular tariff term as properly construed is a question of fact.” Franklin v. United States, 289 F.3d 753, 757 (Fed.Cir.2002) (citations omitted).

On questions of law, a Customs' classification decision may be accorded a “respect proportional to its ‘power to persuade.’ United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944)). But when Customs has summarily denied a protest of the classification without issuing an official ruling, the court considers the parties' arguments without deference. Hartog Foods v. United States, 291 F.3d 789, 791 (Fed.Cir.2002). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1), a trial begins with a statutory presumption of correctness for the factual components of a Customs classification decision. To overcome the presumption, the party challenging that decision must produce a preponderance of evidence on a disputed factual question. See Universal Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 488, 492 (Fed.Cir.1997).

Classification under the HTSUS is determined according to the General Rules of Interpretation (“GRIs”) and, if applicable, the Additional U.S. Rules of Interpretation (“ARIs”). GRI 1 requires that tariff classification, in the first instance, “be determined according to the terms of the headings and any relative section or chapter notes.” GRI 1, HTSUS. The chapter and section notes of the HTSUS are not optional interpretive rules but statutory law. Libas, Ltd. v. United States, 193 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed.Cir.1999). Once imported merchandise is determined to be classifiable under a particular heading, a court must look to the subheadings to find the correct classification of the merchandise in question. Orlando Food Corp. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1437, 1440 (Fed.Cir.1998) (citations omitted).

Tariff acts are construed to carry out the intent of Congress, which is initially determined by looking at the language of the statute itself. Rubie's Costume Co. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citations omitted). When “a tariff term is not defined in either the HTSUS or its legislative history, the term's correct meaning is its common or dictionary meaning in the absence of evidence to the contrary.” Russell Stadelman & Co. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1044, 1048 (Fed.Cir.2001) (citations omitted). In the absence of a showing of a commercial designation, the common meaning and commercial meaning of a tariff term are presumed to be the same. Id. at 1048–49;see also Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 195 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed.Cir.1999). In order to define tariff terms, the court may “consult lexicographic and scientific authorities, dictionaries, and other reliable information” or may rely on its “own understanding of the terms used.” Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. United States, 182 F.3d 1333, 1337–38 (Fed.Cir.1999) (citation omitted). Although “not legally binding,” the Explanatory Notes (“ENs”) to the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (“Harmonized System” or “HS”), maintained by the World Customs Organization, “may be consulted for guidance and are generally indicative of the proper interpretation of a tariff provision.” Degussa Corp. v. United States, 508 F.3d 1044, 1047 (Fed.Cir.2007) (citing Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 436 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed.Cir.2006)). Where a tariff term has various definitions or meanings and has broad and narrow interpretations, the court must determine which definition best expresses the congressional intent. Richards Medical Co. v. United States, 910 F.2d 828, 830 (Fed.Cir.1990).

In this action, plaintiff claims classification of the Bra Top in subheading 6212.90.00, HTSUS ([b]rassieres, girdles, corsets ... and similar articles), at 6.6% ad val., and in the alternative, in subheading 6114.20.00, HTSUS, a residual provision for knitted cotton garments, at 10.8% ad val. The government advocates classification in subheading 6109.10.00, HTSUS at 16.5% ad val., arguing that the Bra Top falls within the scope of heading 6109 (“T-shirts, singlets, tank tops and similar garments, knitted or crocheted”).

Based on the factual findings and conclusions of law set forth below, the court determines that the Bra Top is properly classified in subheading 6114.20.00, HTSUS. The court rejects defendant's classification because the Bra Top is not described by any term within the article description for heading 6109, HTSUS. The court rejects plaintiff's primary classification claim because the Bra Top does not answer to the article description of heading 6212 HTSUS (“Brassieres, girdles, corsets, braces, suspenders, garters and similar articles and parts...

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