Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Downey
Decision Date | 20 January 1937 |
Docket Number | 15062. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Parties | CHICAGO, I. & L. RY. CO. v. DOWNEY et al. |
Cope Judson Hanley, of Rensselaer, C. C. Hine, of Chicago, Ill and E. M. Hawkins, of Fowler, for appellant.
Tinkham & Tinkham, of Hammond, for appellees.
This is an action by appellant against appellees to recover property damage alleged to have been sustained by reason of one of appellant's trains being derailed in a collision with a trailer being operated by appellees along a highway, which trailer had become stalled upon the crossing of appellant's railway tracks and a highway designated as state highway detour No. 41. The cause was submitted to the court for trial, with the intervention of a jury, upon appellant's first paragraph of complaint and appellees' answer in general denial, resulting in a verdict and judgment in favor of appellees and against the appellant. A motion for a new trial was filed, which motion was overruled, and the appellant now prosecutes this appeal assigning as error the overruling of the motion for a new trial, which motion recites (1) that the verdict of the jury is not sustained by sufficient evidence; (2) that the verdict of the jury is contrary to law; (3) that the court erred in the submission of the adjoining counties upon granting a change of venue; (4) that the court erred in the rejection and admission of certain evidence; and (5) that the court erred in giving and refusing to give certain instructions.
The appellant complains of the rejection of certain offered testimony of S. L. Johnson, a witness for appellant, wherein appellant sought to prove the volume of traffic using the crossing before the highway was made into a state detour (at least three months before the accident in question) upon the theory that the increase of traffic, due to the highway being used as a state detour, required a different kind of crossing and the kind of a crossing which appellant was not required under the law to maintain. There was no error in the rejection of this testimony, inasmuch as this evidence was immaterial, for the reason that the standard by which the duty of the appellant company in maintaining its crossing is measured is based upon the use being made of the highway at the time of the accident. Furthermore, the exclusion of this evidence was harmless, inasmuch as it was shown that appellant had ample time and opportunity to construct a crossing to meet the requirements of the increase in traffic.
Appellant complains of error of the court in permitting appellees' witness Eder to testify to a conversation had with a Mr. McCullen without showing that Mr. McCullen was an employee of appellant or had any authority to bind the appellant company. It appears from the evidence of the witness Bergerner that Mr. McCullen was connected with the Monon Railroad (appellant company) in 1928; that he was roadmaster over that part of the railroad including the crossing in question; and that the witness knew these facts, as he had worked with McCullen as roadmaster. This evidence was sufficient to establish the competency of the conversation, and there was no error in its admission.
The appellant particularly relies upon the error of the court in the giving of instruction No. 3 on the court's own motion, each of the instructions Nos. 18, 20, 27, and 31 tendered by appellees, and the refusal to give each of the instructions Nos. 17 and 18 tendered by appellant. All of these instructions presented the question of whether there was any duty upon appellant to maintain the crossing and the approaches thereto in question, when the highway had been designated as a state detour by the State Highway Commission of Indiana. The appellant concedes that it was its duty to maintain the crossing and the approaches thereto prior to the enactment of section 8312.6, Burns' Supp. 1929, section 8690, Baldwin's Ind.St.1934, Acts 1927, c. 32, p. 87, but contends that said act of 1927 (section 8312.6, Burns' Supp.1929, section 8690, Baldwin's 1934) repealed by implication section 8697, Burns' 1926, section 8783, Baldwin's 1934, Acts 1905, § 35, c. 167, p. 521, also section 12947, Burns' 1926, section 14116, Baldwin's Ind.St.1934, 1 Rev.St.1852, § 22, c. 83, p. 409, and also section 12931, Burns' 1926, section 14099, Baldwin's Ind.St.1934, 1 Rev.St.1852, clause 5 of section 13, c. 83, p. 409, as amended, and that said section 8312.6 Burns' Supp.1929, section 8690, Baldwin's Ind.St.1934, imposes upon the State Highway Commission the duty to maintain the railway crossings and the approaches thereto intersecting highways used as state detours.
Section 8312.6, Burns' Supp.1929, Acts 1927, c. 32, p. 87, section 36-142, Burns' 1933, section 8690, Baldwin's Ind.St.1934, including the title, reads:
(Title) "An Act requiring the state highway commission to keep county and township highways used as detours in a safe and adequate condition to accommodate the traffic using such detours, and to place such highways in as good condition when discontinued as detours as when they were designated, providing for the establishment of run arounds, and providing the manner of paying the expenses incurred in carrying out the provisions of this act."
(Burns' Ann.St.Supp.1929, § 8312.6; Baldwin's Ind.St.1934, § 8690)
Section 8697, Burns' 1926, section 8783, Baldwin's Ind.St.1934, Acts 1905, § 35, c. 167, p. 521, section 36-1701, Burns' 1933, including the title, reads:
(Title) "An Act concerning highways."
Section 12947, Burns' 1926, section 14116, Baldwin's 1934, 1 Rev.St.1852, § 22, c. 83, p. 409, section 55-617, Burns' 1933, including the title, reads:
(Title) "An Act to provide for the incorporation of railroad companies."
Section 12931, Burns' 1926, section 14099, Baldwin's 1934 Acts 1852, ...
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