National Rifle Ass'n of America v. Magaw

Citation909 F. Supp. 490
Decision Date22 November 1995
Docket NumberNo. 95-CV-10045-BC.,95-CV-10045-BC.
PartiesNATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, Michigan United Conservation Clubs, Olympic Arms, Calico Light Weapons Systems, Navegar, Inc., D.C. Engineering, Inc., Ammo Dump, Glenn Duncan, Charles Duncan, James E. Flynn, James J. Fotis, Thomas L. Heritier, and Craig D. Sandler, Plaintiffs, v. John W. MAGAW and United States of America, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

M. Carol Bambery, Mich. United Conservation Clubs, Lansing, MI, James H. Warner, Michael K. McCabe, National Rifle Association, Fairfax, VA, Gerald W. Pergande, Bay City, MI, for plaintiffs.

Andrea Newmark, Dept. of Justice-Civil Division, Washington, D.C., Michael J. Hluchaniuk, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Bay City, Michigan, for defendants.

AMENDED OPINION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION

CLELAND, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Plaintiffs' complaint challenges the constitutionality of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which amends the criminal provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930. The 1994 Amendments, which went into effect on September 13, 1994, criminalize for a ten-year period most future manufacture, transfer, and possession of semiautomatic assault weapons and large capacity ammunition feeding devices. The complaint alleges that the definition of "semiautomatic assault weapon," as contained in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30), is unconstitutionally vague; that Congress exceeded the scope of its constitutional power by enacting the Amendments; that the designation of prohibited firearms is arbitrary and capricious and not rationally related to any legitimate governmental purpose; and that the interpretation of the term "firearm" for purposes of the grandfather provision of the statute by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms is arbitrary and capricious.

Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the complaint does not present a justiciable "case" or "controversy" within the meaning of Article III of the United States Constitution. Specifically, the defendants allege that the plaintiffs do not have standing because they have not alleged an actual or imminent injury, and that the matter is not ripe for adjudication because there is no pending or impending criminal prosecution of any of the plaintiffs based on the criminal provisions being challenged.

On August 9, 1995, the court heard oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment on the Question of Jurisdiction. After review of the parties' written submissions and consideration of the arguments presented at the hearing, the court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction and, accordingly, dismisses the case.

II. Background

The plaintiffs are two nonprofit gun rights corporations, two federally licensed firearms dealers, three retired police officers, two firearms manufacturers, an ammunition feeding device manufacturer, and two individuals. The defendants are John Magaw, the director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("BATF"), and the United States of America.

There is no allegation in the complaint that any plaintiff has been or is currently being prosecuted under the statute. Rather, Plaintiffs aver that they "desire" and "wish" to engage in certain possibly prohibited activities but are "restrained" and "inhibited" from doing so. Plaintiffs allege that they "are unable and unwilling, in light of the serious penalties threatened for violation of the statute, to obtain and possess the firearms and large capacity ammunition feeding devices prohibited by the statute." (para. 46). However, Plaintiffs also allege that they "will purchase, firearms, including those on the enumerated list of proscribed firearms." (para. 55). The complaint further avers, "If they are prudent, and are unwilling to risk felony penalties, they must refrain from the manufacture, transfer or possession of firearms which, in fact, may be lawful." (para. 58). Plaintiffs Olympic Arms and Calico Light Weapons Systems allege that they "involuntarily changed the names of their firearms" and "involuntarily ceased manufacturing firearms whose configuration might fit the generic criteria definition." (para. 48).

The plaintiffs have submitted affidavits supporting the allegations in the complaint. Two members of the National Rifle Association, James G. Giragosian and Stefan B. Tahmassebi submitted declarations stating that they wish to engage in certain conduct but are inhibited from doing so by a fear of prosecution and a possible felony conviction. Kevin M. Cunningham, another member of the National Rifle Association, submitted a declaration stating that he telephoned a Mr. Ed Owen of the BATF and posed to Owen a hypothetical question whether a folding stock could be installed to a Ruger Mini-14 rifle, a semiautomatic rifle which accepts a detachable magazine. According to the Cunningham declaration, Owen told Cunningham that if an individual were to install the folding stock, he "could be prosecuted for a federal felony." Phillip C. Martel, the president of Plaintiff D.C. Engineering, Inc., submitted a declaration stating, "If this ban is unconstitutional as applied to intrastate sales, we would be ready, willing and able to transfer such magazines ammunition feeding devices in intrastate commerce to fellow residents of Michigan. Our magazines are stamped with our name and location and could be stamped with date of manufacture so that it would be simple to determine if anyone did in fact transfer them out of state." Plaintiff Glenn Duncan has submitted a declaration stating that he is "unable to ascertain the meaning of the various restrictions," that if the ban is invalid, he stands ready to begin at once to fulfill his customers' requests to assemble firearms from components presented by the customers, and that the statute "has already restricted our doing business, limits us in the actions we can take today, and will restrict our actions within the immediate future."

The plaintiffs have also submitted a transcript of proceedings in a federal criminal prosecution, United States of America v. Corcoran, No. 88-11 (W.D.Pa. proceedings conducted April 5, 1988). It appears from a review of the portion of the trial transcript submitted by Plaintiffs that Corcoran was being prosecuted for unlawfully transferring a machine gun. The court dismissed several of the counts against the defendant, finding that the BATF was prosecuting Corcoran for transferring a weapon without an auto sear, which BATF argued was a machine gun within the meaning of statutes regulating the transfer of machine guns because it could fire more than one bullet with a single pull of the trigger, though BATF had previously ruled that a weapon without an auto sear is not a machine gun. The plaintiffs have submitted other documents relating to the Corcoran case, as well as transcripts on hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee and a Report of the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Though the evidentiary value of some of Plaintiffs' submissions to the questions of standing and ripeness is limited, the court has nevertheless reviewed them.

III. Standard

Defendants bring their motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; Rule 12(b)(6), failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and Rule 56, for summary judgment.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) authorizes a defendant to move for dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A motion under Rule 12(b)(1) may be used to attack two different types of defects. The first is the pleader's failure to allege facts in the complaint sufficient to show subject matter jurisdiction. The second is the court's actual lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, a defect that may exist despite the formal sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1350. This motion falls into the second category. Defendants allege that there is no justiciable case or controversy within the meaning of Article III of the United States Constitution. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff, the non-moving party in this case. "Where subject matter jurisdiction is challenged pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction in order to survive the motion." Moir v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing Rogers v. Stratton Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir.1986)). When deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to the allegations in the complaint. Rather, "the court is empowered to resolve factual disputes when subject matter jurisdiction is challenged." Id. The Sixth Circuit has also ruled that where defendants move for dismissal based on both Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the court is bound to consider the 12(b)(1) motion first, since the Rule 12(b)(6) challenge becomes moot if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Id. (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946). The same rationale would, of course, apply to Defendants' Rule 56 motion. Accordingly, the court analyzes Defendants' motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).

IV. Discussion

Defendants' motion raises two issues: standing and ripeness. Standing is concerned with who is a proper party to litigate a particular matter, while ripeness determines when that litigation may occur. Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, § 2.4 (1989). There is considerable overlap between the two doctrines where, as here, the argument that the plaintiffs lack standing rests on an allegation that no—or insufficient —injury has occurred. In such a situation, the...

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4 cases
  • Olympic Arms v. Magaw
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan
    • March 31, 2000
    ...§ 921(a)(31). B. Procedural History This court dismissed plaintiffs' case based on standing and ripeness issues. National Rifle Ass'n v. Magaw, 909 F.Supp. 490 (E.D.Mich.1995); see also (Def. Br. at 3; Def. Mot. at 1.) Plaintiffs appealed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in ......
  • National Rifle Ass'n of America v. Magaw
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • November 21, 1997
    ...The district court granted defendants' motion and dismissed the action on standing and ripeness grounds. National Rifle Ass'n of America v. Magaw, 909 F.Supp. 490 (E.D. Mich. 1995). Eleven plaintiffs-appellants (hereinafter, "plaintiffs") filed a timely notice of appeal. For the following r......
  • Navegar, Inc. v. U.S.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • January 3, 1997
    ...challenge to the Act brought by an individual holder of a federal license to sell firearms) 1; but see National Rifle Ass'n v. Magaw, 909 F.Supp. 490 (E.D.Mich.1995) (dismissing preenforcement challenges to the Act, including one by Intratec), appeal pending, No. 95-2150 (6th Cir.). It also......
  • Olympic Arms, et al. v. Buckles
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • August 6, 2002
    ...the commerce clause. The district court initially dismissed the action for lack of standing and lack of ripeness. National Rifle Ass'n v. Magaw, 909 F.Supp. 490 (E.D.Mich.1995). On appeal, we affirmed in part and reversed in part, sustaining dismissal of the individual and organizational pl......

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