Stroud v. Tyson Foods, Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–CV–3281 DLI.,14–CV–3281 DLI.
• Citation: 91 F.Supp.3d 381
• Parties: Janesia Danielle STROUD, Plaintiff, v. TYSON FOODS, INC. and Wendy's International, LLC, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

91 F.Supp.3d 381

Janesia Danielle STROUD, Plaintiff

v.TYSON FOODS, INC. and Wendy's International, LLC, Defendants.

No. 14–CV–3281 DLI.

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed March 10, 2015.

Brian L. Ponder, Brian Ponder LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Jeffrey A. Segal, Weber Gallagher Simpson Stapleton Fires & Newby LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

DORA L. IRIZARRY, District Judge:

Plaintiff Janesia Danielle Stroud (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant action against defendants Tyson Foods, Inc. (“Tyson”) and Wendy's International, LLC (“Wendy's”) (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging a variety of state law claims arising out of injuries Plaintiff suffered from consuming a chicken nugget at a Wendy's franchise restaurant located in Valdosta, Georgia. (See Amended Complaint (“Compl.”), Dkt. Entry No. 2.) Defendants, both foreign corporations, move to dismiss this action for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (see Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss (“Defs.' Mem.”), Dkt. Entry No. 9–6), which Plaintiff opposes (see Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition (“Pl.'s Opp'n”) Dkt. Entry No. 12). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is granted and this action is dismissed.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that, on September 5, 2013, while at a Wendy's franchise restaurant located in Georgia, she swallowed “masticated chicken nuggets” and “felt a sharp pain from something sharply pointed and rough in her throat or pharynx.” (Compl. ¶ 22.) She “began to gag and choke” and “cough [ed] up hard, sharp objects.” (Id. ¶ 23.) She sought immediate medical treatment for her injuries, but continues to suffer from persistent throat pain. (Id. ¶¶ 3039, 43–50.) Plaintiff alleges that the restaurant at issue was “controlled, leased, owned, maintained, managed and/or operated by Defendants.” (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff further alleges that Tyson manufactured the chicken nuggets that caused her injuries. (Id. ¶ 21.)

Notably, in this diversity action, the complaint is void of any allegations regarding Plaintiff's domicile. According to a medical record that Defendants submitted, Plaintiff is a resident of Georgia. (See Sept. 18, 2013 South Georgia Medical Center Bill, attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Roberto Uribe (“Uribe Aff.”), Dkt. Entry No. 9–2.) Tyson is incorporated in Delaware and its principal place of business is Arkansas. (Compl. ¶¶ 3–6.) Wendy's is incorporated in Ohio and its principal place of business is Ohio. (Id. ¶¶ 9–15.)

There are no allegations regarding potential grounds for exercising personal jurisdiction over Defendants. In response to the instant motion, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants are subject to general jurisdiction as they are “engaged in business” of a “continuous and systematic” nature in New York. (Pl.'s Opp'n at 9.) Plaintiff points to a Tyson manufacturing plant located in Buffalo, New York. (Id. at 10.) According to Plaintiff, Tyson operates this plant under the name of its alter ego, Zemco Industries, Inc. (“Zemco”). (Id. at 10–11.) Zemco is incorporated in Delaware and its principal place of business is Arkansas. (See N.Y.S. Dep't of State Entity Information for Zemco, attached as Exhibit J to the Declaration of Brian L. Ponder (“Ponder Decl.”), Dkt. Entry No. 11; Ponder Decl. ¶ 34.)

Plaintiff also points to numerous franchised restaurants that Wendy's operates in New York, as well as Wendy's solicitation of applicants for a “Facilities Technician” position in Farmingdale, New York. (Pl.'s Opp'n at 12–13.) Plaintiff notes that Wendy's operates more than 6,500 restaurants globally. (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff asserts that one of Wendy's subsidiaries, Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers of New York (“Wendy's New York”), operates facilities in New York. Wendy's New York is incorporated in and has its principal place of business in Ohio. (Ponder Decl. ¶ 53; Pl.'s Opp'n at 13.)

The complaint lacks any allegations regarding Zemco's or Wendy's New York's involvement with or connection to the alleged tainted chicken nuggets. Neither Zemco nor Wendy's New York are named as defendants in this action.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss Legal Standard

“A plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating personal jurisdiction over a person or entity against whom it seeks to bring suit.” Penguin Gr. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir.2010). “[T]o survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that jurisdiction exists.” Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491, 495 (2d Cir.2006). To make a prima facie showing that jurisdiction exists, a Plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) proper service of process upon the defendant; (2) a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendant; and (3) that exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant is in accordance with constitutional due process principles. See Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 59–60 (2d Cir.2012). “In considering a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the pleadings and affidavits are to be construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the non-moving party, and all doubts are to be resolved in plaintiff's favor.” HomeoPet LLC v. Speed Lab., Inc., 2014 WL 2600136, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 11, 2014) (citing DiStefano v. Carozzi N. Am., Inc., 286 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir.2001) ). “However, the Court will neither ‘draw argumentative inferences in the plaintiff's favor,’ nor ‘accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’ ” Id. (quoting Licci, 673 F.3d at 59 ).

II. Application

Defendants do not challenge service of process. Thus, the Court turns to the second and third elements of Plaintiff's prima facie case. With respect to the statutory basis for jurisdiction, “[t]he breadth of a federal court's personal jurisdiction is determined by the law of the state in which the district court is located.” Thomas, 470 F.3d at 495 ; CutCo Indus., Inc. v. Naughton, 806 F.2d 361, 365 (2d Cir.1986) (“Personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a diversity action is determined by the law of the forum in which the court sits.”). This Court is located in New York State; therefore, New York law provides the relevant statutory bases for jurisdiction. See HomeoPet, 2014 WL 2600136 at *5 (explaining that New York provides two statutory bases for jurisdiction over defendants in diversity actions in this district).

Under New York law, “[f]or a plaintiff to demonstrate personal jurisdiction over a defendant ... the plaintiff must show either that the defendant was present and doing business in New York within the meaning of C.P.L.R. § 301,” known as general jurisdiction, “or that the defendant committed acts within the scope of New York's long-arm statute, C.P.L.R. § 302,” known as specific jurisdiction. Reich v. Lopez, 38 F.Supp.3d 436, 454 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (internal alterations and quotations omitted) (quoting Schultz v. Safra Nat'l Bank of New York, 377 Fed.Appx. 101, 102 (2d Cir.2010) ). “General, all-purpose jurisdiction permits a court to hear ‘any and all claims' against an entity”; whereas, “[s]pecific jurisdiction ... permits adjudicatory authority only over issues that ‘aris[e] out of or relate [e] to the [entity's] contacts with the forum.” Gucci Am., Inc. v. Bank of China, 768 F.3d 122, 134 (2d Cir.2014) (alteration in original).

A. General Jurisdiction

Under Section 301, a corporation “is subject to general personal jurisdiction in New York if it is ‘doing business' in the state.” Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 226 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir.2000). “[A] corporation is ‘doing business' and is therefore ‘present’ in New York and subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to any cause of action, related or unrelated to the New York contacts, if it does business in New York ‘not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence and continuity.’ ” Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd.,

763 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir.1985) (quoting Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 267, 115 N.E. 915 (1917) ); accord Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 95. Thus, to establish jurisdiction over a foreign corporate defendant under Section 301, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant “engaged in ‘continuous, permanent, and substantial activity in New York.' ” Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 95 (quoting Landoil Res. Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir.1990) ).

Remarkably, none of the parties discussed the impact of the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Daimler AG v. Bauman on this Court's analysis of general jurisdiction. In Daimler, the Supreme Court addressed, for the first time, the specific issue of whether “a foreign corporation may be subjected to a court's general jurisdiction based on the contacts of its in-state subsidiary” as a matter of constitutional due process. Daimler AG v. Bauman, –––U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 746, 759, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014). The Court concluded that general jurisdiction exists only where a corporation is “essentially at home.” Id. at 761–62. The Court identified two “paradigm bases” for asserting general jurisdiction over a corporation, its place of incorporation and its principal place of business. Id. at 759–60. “Those affiliations have the virtue of being unique—that is, each ordinarily indicates only one place—as well as easily ascertainable.” Id. at 760. Since Daimler, the Second Circuit has explained that a corporation may be subject to “general jurisdiction in a state only where its contacts are so ‘continuous and systematic,’ judged against the corporation's national and global activities, that it is ‘essentially at home’ in that state.” Gucci, 768 F.3d at 135 (quoting Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 761–62 ); see also Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A., 750 F.3d 221, 225 (2d Cir.2014) (per curiam) (“The natural result of general jurisdiction's ‘at home’ requirement is that ‘only a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a...