Magnin v. Teledyne Continental Motors

• Decision Date: 15 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-6384,95-6384
• Citation: 91 F.3d 1424
• Parties: Oliver Dominique Gerard Marin Anthille MAGNIN, as personal representative of the estate of Dr. Dominique Jean Louis Lachiver, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TELEDYNE CONTINENTAL MOTORS, a Division of Teledyne Industries, Inc.; Teledyne Industries, Inc.; and J.B. Smith, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1424

91 F.3d 1424

Oliver Dominique Gerard Marin Anthille MAGNIN, as personal representative of the estate of Dr. Dominique Jean Louis Lachiver, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TELEDYNE CONTINENTAL MOTORS, a Division of Teledyne Industries, Inc.; Teledyne Industries, Inc.; and J.B. Smith, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 95-6384.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Aug. 15, 1996.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 25, 1996.

James J. Thompson, Jr., Bruce J. McKee, Hare, Wynn, Newell & Newton, Birmingham, AL, for appellant.

Patrick H. Sims, Mobile, AL, Matthew Haberkorn, Kirtland & Packard, Los Angeles, CA, for appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama.

Before CARNES, Circuit Judge, and FAY and GIBSON ^*, Senior Circuit Judges.

CARNES, Circuit Judge:

On November 12, 1992, Dr. Dominique Jean Louis Lachiver, a French citizen, died in the crash of a private plane he was piloting in France. This appeal is an outgrowth of a products liability and wrongful death action brought by Oliver Dominique Gerard Marin Anthille Magnin, the French personal representative of Lachiver's estate. The complaint was filed in Alabama state court against two defendants: Teledyne Industries, Inc., the manufacturer of the airplane's engine; and J.B. Smith, a Teledyne employee and Alabama citizen.

The complaint alleged that Lachiver's fatal crash was proximately caused by Teledyne's and Smith's negligent inspection and wrongful certification of the aircraft's engine as airworthy, and it expressly described Smith as "a designated manufacturing inspection representative (DMIR) that certified engines 'airworthy' or safe for exportation and installation on aircraft." After describing the alleged defect in the aircraft engine, the complaint stated that, "Smith, as the DMIR (Designated Manufacturing Inspection Representative) signed the 'Export Certificate of Airworthiness' for the aforesaid aircraft engine so that it was allowed to be exported in the defective condition set out hereinabove." The complaint asserted against both Smith and Teledyne a claim of negligence in failing "to properly inspect or detect the defects associated with the engine," and breach of express or implied warranty claims in connection with issuance of the Expert Certificate of Airworthiness certifying that the aircraft engine was airworthy and safe for export.

The defendants removed the case to federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), the Federal Officer Removal Statute. In their petition for removal, the defendants characterized the complaint as alleging that Smith was liable for damages, because he was a DMIR who issued an Export Certificate of Airworthiness for an allegedly defective engine. The removal petition further stated that Smith's duties and responsibilities in connection with the inspection and certification of Teledyne aircraft engines arose solely because he had been designated by the Director of the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") as a DMIR, and as such he was a representative of the FAA with authority to perform its inspection and certification functions. The defendants contended in their petition that removal was proper because, "Smith was acting on behalf of the FAA, under the authority granted to him by the FAA, and within the limits prescribed by the FAA, when he did the act for which he is being sued." After the case was removed to federal court, Magnin moved to remand it to state court. The district court denied that remand motion.

Thereafter, the defendants moved to dismiss the case altogether on the basis of forum non conveniens. The district court granted that motion, subject to certain conditions designed to protect Magnin, and dismissed the case. Magnin filed this appeal. He contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to remand. Alternatively, he contends that if removal jurisdiction does exist, the district court erred in dismissing the case on the basis of forum non conveniens. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

I. DISCUSSION

A. Removal Jurisdiction

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), the Federal Officer Removal Statute, allows removal of any civil or criminal action against "[a]ny officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or person acting under him, for any act under color of such office." The right of removal "is made absolute whenever a suit in a state court is for any act 'under color' of federal office, regardless of whether the suit could originally have been brought in a federal court." Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406, 89 S.Ct. 1813, 1816, 23 L.Ed.2d 396 (1969). If the statutory prerequisites are satisfied, section 1442(a)(1) provides an independent federal jurisdictional basis.

The purpose of section 1442(a)(1) is to "permit[ ] the removal of those actions commenced in state court that expose a federal official to potential civil liability or criminal penalty for an act performed ... under color of office." Murray v. Murray, 621 F.2d 103, 107 (5th Cir.1980). In Willingham, the Supreme Court noted that "the removal statute is an incident of federal supremacy, and that one of its purposes was to provide a federal forum for cases where federal officials must raise defenses arising from their official duties." 395 U.S. at 405, 89 S.Ct. at 1815. "[T]he test for removal should be broader, not narrower, than the test for official immunity." Id.

Proper removal of an action under section 1442(a)(1) has historically required the satisfaction of two separate requirements. First, the defendant must advance a "colorable defense arising out of [his] duty to enforce federal law." Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 133, 109 S.Ct. 959, 966-67, 103 L.Ed.2d 99 (1989) (quoting Willingham, 395 U.S. at 406-07, 89 S.Ct. at 1816). That defense need only be plausible; its ultimate validity is not to be determined at the time of removal. Id. at 129, 109 S.Ct. at 964. However, absent the assertion of a federal defense, a state court action against a federal officer is not removable. Id.

Second, the defendant must establish that there is a "causal connection between what the officer has done under asserted official authority" and the action against him. Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 33, 46 S.Ct. 185, 190, 70 L.Ed. 449 (1926) (interpreting predecessor statute); see also Willingham, 395 U.S. at 409, 89 S.Ct. at 1817. However, the Supreme Court has held that, in a civil suit such as this, it is sufficient for the defendant to show that his relationship to the plaintiff "derived solely from [his] official duties." Willingham, 395 U.S. at 409, 89 S.Ct. at 1817. In such a case, the causal connection requirement "consists, simply enough, of the undisputed fact that [the defendant was] on duty, at [his] place of federal employment, at all the relevant times." Id. If the question raised by the plaintiff is whether the defendant was engaged in "some kind of frolic," or acting in contravention of his official duties, the parties will have the opportunity to present their versions of the facts to a federal court. Id.

In this case, the complaint specifically named Smith as a DMIR. A DMIR is an authorized agent of the FAA. In creating the office of Federal Aviation Administrator and defining the powers and duties of that office, Congress authorized the Administrator to delegate some of those duties. 49 U.S.C. § 1355 (repealed in 1994 and replaced by 49 U.S.C. § 44702(d)). In particular, the Administrator may:

delegate to any properly qualified private person ... any work, business, or function respecting (1) the examination, inspection and testing necessary to the issuance of certificates under subchapter VI of this chapter, and (2) the issuance of such certificates in accordance with standard established by him.

Id. The Administrator has made such delegations to DMIRs around the country, one of whom is Smith.

Magnin's complaint alleged that Smith proximately caused the fatal crash by signing the export certificate. Smith signed that export certificate only in his capacity as an agent of the FAA, i.e., as a DMIR, and the complaint itself pleads that connection. The defendants removed the case to federal court, contending that Smith's connection with the wrong allegedly done was in his official capacity as a DMIR.

The removal petition avers that "[i]n his capacity as a designated manufacturing inspection representative (DMIR), and in executing the airworthiness certificate, Mr. Smith was acting under an officer or agency of the United States and was acting under color of such office within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)." It further states: "Smith's actions as DMIR were performed in accordance with the Certificate of Designation ... and Certificate of Authority.... Smith was acting on behalf of the FAA, under the authority granted to him by the FAA, and within the limits prescribed by the FAA, when he did the act for which he is being sued." (emphasis added.)

Smith's removal petition demonstrates that the exercise of federal jurisdiction is proper. At least part of Smith's defense is that he acted within the scope of his federal duties, that what he did was required of him by federal law, and that he did all federal law required. That defense raises a federal question, which justifies removal. The extent to which federal law imposes certain requirements upon Smith as a DMIR, and whether it may afford him any corresponding protection as a DMIR from tort liability, are issues of federal law.

To assert that a federal statute does not impose certain obligations whose alleged existence forms the basis of a civil suit is to rely on the statute in just the same way as asserting that the statute does impose other obligations that may shield the federal officer against civil suits. Both are equally defensive and equally based in federal law.

Mesa, 489 U.S. at 130, 109 S.Ct. at 965. Removal jurisdiction lies because, at least in respect of...