Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough

Decision Date14 August 1996
Docket NumberNo. 95-3252,95-3252
Citation91 F.3d 515
Parties45 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 349 Frances E. LIVINGSTONE and Joseph A. Livingstone, her husband, Appellants, v. NORTH BELLE VERNON BOROUGH; Fayette City Borough; Washington Township; Frank E. Monack, Jr., individually and in his capacity as officer of Washington Township; Officer Raymond Moody, individually and in his capacity as officer for Fayette City Borough; Officer Darhl Snyder, individually and in his capacity as an officer for North Belle Vernon Borough.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Peter M. Suwak (argued), Washington, PA, for Appellants.

Thomas P. McGinnis, Dara A. DeCourcy (argued), Zimmer Kunz, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, John W. Jordan, IV, Gaca, Matis & Hamilton, Pittsburgh, PA, for Borough of North Belle Vernon and Darhl Snyder.

Simon B. John, John & John, Uniontown, PA, for Borough of Fayette City and Raymond Moody.

Albert C. Gaudio, Monessen, PA, for Washington Township.

Timothy M. Maatta, Monessen, PA, Frank E. Monack, Jr.

Before: COWEN and SAROKIN, Circuit Judges and POLLAK, District Judge. *

OPINION OF THE COURT

LOUIS H. POLLAK, District Judge.

This is the second time that this matter has come before this court.

Appellants Frances and Joseph Livingstone commenced this civil rights suit, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in January, 1991 against defendants North Belle Vernon Borough, Fayette City Borough, Washington Township, Officer Darhl Snyder, Officer Raymond Moody, and Officer Frank E. Monack. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the Livingstones' claims were barred by an agreement said to have been made in 1990 in which the Livingstones waived any civil claims in exchange for the termination of a criminal prosecution of Frances Livingstone. (Agreements like this one, in which a criminal defendant waives potential civil claims in exchange for the dismissal of the case against her, are called "release-dismissal agreements.")

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. In Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough, 12 F.3d 1205 (3d Cir.1993) (in banc) ("Livingstone I "), this court reversed, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Livingstones had concluded the release-dismissal agreement voluntarily. 12 F.3d at 1214. In that opinion, we also observed that the agreement raised a number of other possible legal questions, including whether its enforcement would be in the public interest and whether it was invalidated by the municipalities' failure to formally ratify it.

On remand, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to the latter two questions, finding that the agreement's enforcement would be in the public interest and that no formal ratification was necessary. The district court then conducted a jury trial devoted to the single question whether the Livingstones had concluded the release-dismissal agreement voluntarily. The jury found that the Livingstones did indeed voluntarily conclude the release-dismissal agreement. Accordingly, the district court ordered that judgment be entered in favor of the defendants and against the Livingstones as to all of the Livingstones' claims. This appeal followed.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History
A. Livingstone I.

In Livingstone I, we compendiously summarized this case's elaborate factual and procedural history. It seems efficient to reproduce that summary here verbatim. (Except as noted, all footnotes and all emendations are from Livingstone I.)

This civil suit filed by Frances and Joseph Livingstone against the police officers and municipalities arose from the conduct of the police officers on the night of January 12-13, 1989, at the Livingstone home in Washington Township, Pennsylvania. During a family argument between Carrie Livingstone, age twenty-two, who was unmarried and living at her parents' home with her fourteen-month-old son, and Joseph, her father, Mr. Livingstone struck Carrie on the face, causing her lip to split and bleed. Carrie ran out of the house and to the community ambulance service across the street, where an employee called the police. When Officer Frank Monack arrived, Carrie told him that her father had struck her and that her parents were holding her son without her consent.

Monack, who was at that time an officer in the Washington Township Police Department and is now Chief of Police, radioed for assistance pursuant to an intermunicipal police cooperation agreement. Raymond Moody, who was and is the Chief of Police for the Borough of Fayette City, and Darhl Snyder, an officer in the North Belle Vernon Police Department, responded. They proceeded to the Livingstone home where Mr. Livingstone permitted them to enter for the purpose, he later testified, of discussing possible criminal charges against him arising out of the incident. Following a brief discussion, Monack and Snyder accompanied Mr. Livingstone outside, and Monack told him to go to the nearby police station to make a statement. 1 No charges were filed against Mr. Livingstone that evening or at any later time.

Monack and Snyder then reentered the Livingstone household, this time in search of Carrie's son and admittedly without a warrant or court order. 2 Mrs. Livingstone had retreated to the back bedroom with her grandson, and had locked and barricaded the door. When she refused to open the door, Monack picked the lock and then tried to push the door open. From the partially opened door, Mrs. Livingstone hit him with a fishing rod and scratched him. Monack and Snyder broke the door down to enter the room, and then Monack told Mrs. Livingstone she was under arrest.

Mrs. Livingstone testified that both men struck her, causing her to lose consciousness and sustain bruises, lacerations, lost teeth, and head injuries. According to defendants, they used force only for the purpose of getting handcuffs on her after she struck the officer, and a stun gun to subdue her because she was screaming and kicking. Snyder held her down while Monack used the gun. Mrs. Livingstone claims that Monack then said "you want a thrill, I'll give you a thrill" and applied the stun gun between her legs. A medical examination conducted at the hospital that night notes a burn in the vulval area.

The officers removed Mrs. Livingstone, handcuffed, from the house. She states that they dragged her outside and dropped her several times, banging her head, and then left her lying in cold muddy water for hours. The officers claim that her thrashing caused them all to fall, and that she refused to get up.

On January 13, 1989, the morning after the altercation, Mrs. Livingstone was charged by Monack, on behalf of the Washington Township Police Department, with disorderly conduct, aggravated assault, terroristic threats, resisting arrest, and interference with custody. At a preliminary hearing on April 18, 1989, Mrs. Livingstone was held over for a jury trial on all but the terroristic threats charge, and the aggravated assault charge was reduced to simple assault.

The trial in Fayette County Court of Common Pleas began on February 13, 1990, with attorney Thomas R. Ceraso representing Frances Livingstone and Jack R. Heneks, Jr., an Assistant District Attorney, representing the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Carrie Livingstone testified for the prosecution, followed by Monack, Snyder, Moody, Police Chief Robert Matthews of Washington Township, and Evelyn Rehe of the community ambulance service. The Commonwealth rested, and Mrs. Livingstone demurred to all of the charges. The demurrer was granted on the charge of interference with custody on the ground that there were no facts showing danger to the child, but was denied as to the other charges.

Thereafter, Joseph Livingstone and his son, James, testified for the defense. Before Mrs. Livingstone was to take the stand (and presumably would have testified about her claims with regard to police use of a stun gun on her private parts), the trial judge, Judge Cicchetti of the Court of Common Pleas, met with Heneks and Ceraso to discuss whether the matter could be resolved. 3 After settlement negotiations, a conference was held in camera with Judge Cicchetti. Present were Moody, Monack, Matthews (now deceased), the Livingstones, Ceraso, and Heneks.

Ceraso summarized the arrangement by stating that the defense would move for a judgment of acquittal after James Livingstone finished his testimony; that expenses for the physical damage to the Livingstone house and for Mrs. Livingstone's reasonable medical care would be paid; and that once those bills were paid, the Livingstones would release any civil claims. Ceraso stated on the record:

there will be an agreement on the part of my client, Mrs. Livingston[e], and also her husband, Joe Livingston[e], who is present, that upon payment of reasonable medical bills that w[e]re associated with the incident that occurred, based on my forwarding those to Washington Township with confirmation, together with bills reflecting damage incurred at the household of Mr. and Mrs. Livingston[e], that Washington Township will cause the same to be paid. At the time of final payment of those bills, there will be a full and complete release signed with reference to any civil action on the part of Mr. and Mrs. Livingston[e]. It's also my understanding that at that time there will also be a release signed by Washington Township, or any of its proper officials, or any member of the police force necessary to release Mr. and Mrs. Livingston[e] from any liability....

App. at 1109.

In response to the judge's inquiry, the parties voiced an expression of assent. The court asked whether "you all think this is in the best interest for everyone" and Matthews, Monack, and Heneks said they did. App. at 1112. When they returned to the courtroom, Ceraso moved for a judgment of acquittal...

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