Flour Bluff Independent School District v. Katherine M. by Lesa T.
| Decision Date | 30 July 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-40720,95-40720 |
| Parties | 111 Ed. Law Rep. 637 FLOUR BLUFF INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KATHERINE M. by Next Friend LESA T., Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Shirley A. Selz, Deborah Sue Travis, Gary, Thomasson, Hall & Marks, Corpus Christi, TX, for plaintiff-appellant.
Christopher L. Jonas, Corpus Christi, TX, Mark S. Partin, Advocacy, Incorporated, Austin, TX, for defendant-appellee.
Eric W. Schulze, Walsh, Anderson, Underwood, Schulze & Aldridge, Austin, TX, for Texas Association of School Administrators, Texas Association of School Boards and Texas Council of School Attorneys, amicus curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before REAVLEY, GARWOOD and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
The Flour Bluff Independent School District (Flour Bluff) appeals a district court's placement decision of Katherine M. (Katie), a hearing impaired student. The district court determined that Katie's 1994-95 Individualized Education Program (IEP) was not based upon her individual needs, and that her IEP violated the least restrictive environment provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 1 We reverse the judgment because the district court misconceived the proximity factor in Katie's placement decision.
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requires states to provide disabled children with a "free appropriate public education" in return for acceptance of federal funds. 2 The student's curriculum is uniquely tailored to the individual student through the annual implementation of an "individualized education program" or "IEP." 3 The IEP is produced by a qualified representative of the local education agency, the child's teacher, the child's parents or guardian, other individuals at the discretion of the agency or the parent, and where appropriate, the child. 4 In Texas, this is called the Admission, Review and Dismissal (ARD) committee. 5 In part, Congress defined the IEP as follows:
* * * * * *
(E) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such services, and
(F) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional objectives are being achieved.
In the case where a participating agency, other than the educational agency, fails to provide agreed upon services, the educational agency shall reconvene the IEP team to identify alternative strategies to meet the transition objectives. 6
Once a child's educational program is determined, the local school district must then attempt to place the student in the "Least Restrictive Environment" or "LRE." 7 For example, one of the main concerns of Congress is that the state attempt, as best it can, to mainstream the child, that is, educate the disabled child among non-disabled children. 8 Further, the public agency shall ensure that,
(a) The educational placement of each child with a disability--
(1) Is determined at least annually;
(2) Is based on his or her IEP; and
(3) Is as close as possible to the child's home.
* * * * * *
(c) Unless the IEP of a child with a disability requires some other arrangement, the child is educated in the school that he or she would attend if nondisabled.
(d) In selecting the LRE, consideration is given to any potential harmful effect on the child or on the quality of services that he or she needs. 9
Katie, a deaf student, resides on the northern end of Padre Island in the Flour Bluff Independent School District. Texas has a system of regional day schools for students with disabilities. 10 They are located at sites throughout the state and draw students from the surrounding communities. Katie began to attend the state's regional day school located in the neighboring Corpus Christi Independent School District at the age of 18 months. The regional day school has facilities attached to an elementary, middle and high school in the Corpus Christi Independent School District. The regional day school for elementary students is associated with Calk Elementary. This enables the day school to provide disabled students with a wide variety of services, ranging from completely independent classes to support services for students in mainstreamed classes.
The Admission, Review and Dismissal committee, named by the Flour Bluff district, decided Katie's IEP for the 1994-95 school year in April of 1994. The IEP provided for placement in mainstream classes with an interpreter and additional assistance for speech therapy, audiological management services, and a deaf education teacher. By two months into her third grade year (the 1994-95 school year), Katie was receiving only support services from the day school and attending fully mainstreamed classes at Calk Elementary with the assistance of a sign interpreter. 11 In addition to her regular classes at Calk, Katie was seen 90 minutes per week with a day school speech pathologist and 60 minutes per week with the Corpus Christi Independent School District speech pathologist. During her attendance at Calk, she was a straight-A honor roll student.
In December of 1994, Katie's mother requested that Katie be transferred to the school she would otherwise attend in Flour Bluff. Calk Elementary and Flour Bluff are approximately 16 and 9 miles, respectively, from Katie's home. The ARD committee determined that it would not change Katie's placement unless the transfer would bestow a greater benefit upon her. The committee identified four factors for this determination. They included:
(1) the comprehensiveness of the Regional Day School Program;
(2) unlike Flour Bluff elementary, which has no deaf students, the Regional Day School Program offers Katie the opportunity for relationships with non-hearing as well as hearing peers;
(3) the Regional Day School Program offers Katie the opportunity to use different interpreters; and
(4) a placement at Flour Bluff Elementary would not provide Katie an educational benefit superior to the benefit she receives from the Regional Day School Program.
Under the regulations governing IDEA, Katie sought review of the ARD decision by a state agency hearing officer. 12 These regulations provide for a due process hearing where the district refuses, among other things, to change the educational placement of a child. 13 The hearing officer determined that Katie's IEP was not based upon her individual needs in that the "ARD failed to consider placing Katie at the school as close as possible to her home." As a part of her analysis, the hearing officer determined that "[c]onsidering the prominent placement in the federal regulations of the close-to-home provisions, ... [that factor] is to be accorded significant weight." The hearing officer granted Katie's request for a transfer to Flour Bluff.
Flour Bluff filed a civil action in district court for review of the hearing officer's decision. 14 The district court found that the ARD violated the procedural requirements of IDEA by not considering Katie's individual needs when devising her IEP. Further, the court found that the evidence from the trial "shows that the ARD committee focussed on whether Flour Bluff could offer a program superior to the Regional Day School, rather than addressing Katie's individual needs." The court indicated that Flour Bluff's evidence concerning the cost of the transfer was minimal, only impacting the school supply funds. Finally, the court found that the school district failed to consider placing Katie close to home, as required by IDEA. 15 Therefore, the IEP was not based upon her individual needs. The court ordered that she be transferred to Flour Bluff, and that Flour Bluff hire an interpreter and contract out for Katie's remaining services. Flour Bluff appeals.
"The district court's decision that an IEP fulfills the requirements of IDEA is a mixed question of fact and law and, as such, we subject this determination to a de novo review." 16 We are mindful, however, of our appropriate role in this regard.
Congress left the choice of educational policies and methods where it properly belongs--in the hands of state and local school officials. Our task is not to second guess state and local policy decisions; rather, it is the narrow one of determining whether state and local school officials have complied with the Act. 17
We defer to the district court's underlying factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous. 18
We begin with two important clarifications. First, this case does not raise the question of whether or not Katie should be mainstreamed. The regional day school Katie attended was attached to Calk Elementary and provided for fully mainstreamed classes when appropriate. Therefore, Katie's reliance on Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir.1989), and other cases concerning mainstreaming are not controlling.
Second, the IEP governs the services a child is to be provided and following that determination, the placement of the student is...
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