91 N.Y. 153, New England Iron Co. v. Gilbert El. R. Co.
| Citation | 91 N.Y. 153 |
| Docket Number | . |
| Date | 23 January 1883 |
| Parties | THE NEW ENGLAND IRON COMPANY, Appellant, v. THE GILBERT (METROPOLITAN) ELEVATED RAILROAD COMPANY, Respondent. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
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Argued Nov. 11, 1882.
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COUNSEL
A. J. Vanderpoel and F. J. Fithian for appellant. If possible written instruments shall be so interpreted, ut res magis valeat quam pereat; and so that such a meaning shall be given as may carry out and effectuate to the fullest extent the intention of the parties. (Broom's Legal Maxims, 347;
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Saunders v. Clark, 29 Cal. 299.)Where it clearly appears from the acts or words of the parties, or both, that there was something contemplated to be done by one or both parties, not expressed, or imperfectly or mistakenly expressed in words, the law supplies that which is presumed to have been so inadvertently omitted by the parties and will imply that the parties have made those stipulations which as honest, fair and just men they ought to have made. (Addison on Contracts, § § 1400, 3031; Odgen v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 341; Story on Contracts, § 11; Bishop on Contracts, § § 105, 106; Elderton v. Emmans, 4 C. B. 478; In Exchequer Chamber, 6 Id . 158, 160; 4 H. of L. Cas. 624, 652; Roberts v. Marston, 20 Me. 275; Daniels v. Harris, L. R., 10 Com. Pleas, 1-8; Cherry v. Smith & Co., 3 Penn. St. 19; Grove v. Hodges, 55 Id . 504; Booth v. Cleveland R. Mill Co., 6 Hun, 591; 74 N.Y. 15; Jones v. Kent, 80 Id . 585; Warner v. Wilson, 4 Cal. 310.) If there be any thing whatever of which the law can take notice, which by reason of, or consequent upon the entering into a contract, will inure to the benefit and advantage of the covenantor or promisor, or to the burden or detriment of the covenantee or promisee (and especially the latter), it is a sufficient consideration. (2 Summary to Langdell's Selected Cases on Contracts, 1021, § 64; 1034, § 89; Disbrough v. Nelson, 3 Johns. Cas. 81; B'klyn Oil Refinery v. Brown, 38 How. Pr. 444; Story on Contracts, § 429; 1 Parsons on Contracts, 431; Conover v. Stilwell, 43 N. J. 54; Andrews v. Pantue, 24 Wend. 284; Douglas v. Howland, Id . 35; Rayns v. Kneeland, 10 Id . 218-250; 13 Id . 114-124; Phillips v. Morrison, 3 Bibb [Ky.], 105; Harrison v. Gage, 5 Mod. 411; Holt v. Ward, 2 Strange, 937; Fowler v. K. & P. R. R. Co., 31 Me. 197.) Where a party is under covenant or agreement, express or implied, to perform acts, on the happening of some future event or contingency, if such party, before the time fixed for the happening of such event or contingency (if the time be fixed), or if before it is physically or legally certain that the event or contingency never can or will happen (if the time be not fixed), either openly repudiates his conditional obligation, or does or suffers to be
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done any act which puts it out of his power, or the power of the other party, or both, to perform, if the contingency or event should happen, then the liability of such party becomes at once fixed and absolute, and he may be sued as for a breach. ( McIntyre v. Belcher, 14 C. B. [N. S.] 654; Sterling v. Maitland, 5 B. & S. 840; Hochster v. Delatour, 22 L. J. [ Q. B.] 455; Short v. Stone, 8 Q. B. 358; Frost v. Knight, L. R., 7 Exch. 111; Bradley v. Benjamin, 46 L. J. [ N. S.] Q. B. 590; Cort v. Ambergate R. R. Co., 6 E. L. & Eq. 230; Price v. Williams, 1 M. & W. 6; Sardock v. Franklin, 8 Ad. & El. [ N. S.] 371; Inchbold v. West N. C. Co., 17 C. B. [ N. S.] 733; Frost v. Tilley, 6 B. & C. 325; Burtiss v. Thompson, 42 N.Y. 246; Stewart v. Keteltas, 36 Id . 388; Forbes v. Shattuck, M., 22 Barb. 568; Howell v. Gould, 3 Keyes, 422; Crocker v. Holmes, 65 Me. 195; Shaw v. Rep. Ins. Co., 69 N.Y. 292; Burrell v. Root, 40 Id . 496; Freeth v. Burr, L. R., 9 C. P. 208; Frost v. Knight, L. R., 7 Exch. 111; Cort v. Amberagte, 17 Q. B. 127; S. C., 6 Eng. Law & Eq. 230; Roper v. Thompson, L. R., 8 C. P. 167; Shaw v. Republic Ins. Co., 69 N.Y. 286; Hayner v. Am. Pop. L. Ins. Co., Id . 435). An estoppel is binding only upon parties and privies to the transaction, or act claimed as working the estoppel, and can be taken advantage of only by them. (Best's Law of Estoppel [Morgan's ed.], § 535; Murray v. Cary, 5 Wall. 795; Wooster v. Green, 2 Pick. 425; Lange v. Filton, 1 Rawle [Penn.], 141; Braintree v. Hingham, 17 Mass. 432; Mills v. Mills, 8 Watts & Serg. 135.) The evidence relied upon by defendant as tending to show inability and unreadiness on plaintiff's part should have been excluded under its objection as immaterial and incompetent. ( Howell v. Gould, 3 Keyes, 422; Turner v. Johnson, 7 Dana [Ky.], 434). One who for any cause claims a right to rescind an executory contract without consent of the other parties must give notice of his intention to do so. ( Parmelee v. Adolph, 28 Ohio, 10; Heald v. Wright, 75 Ill. 17; Skinner v. Newbury, 51 Id . 205; Carney v. Newbery, 24 Id . 203; Mullen v. Bloomer, 11 Iowa, 360.)
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A party who would rescind must do so distinctly and unequivocally. ( Skinner v. Parker, 36 N.H. 449; Wicks v. Robie, 42 Id . 316; Clarkson v. Mitchell, 3 E. D. Smith, 269; Jewett v. Pettit, 4 Mich. 679; Hendricks v. Goodrich, 15 Wis. 679.)Defendant's seal affixed to the contract raises the presumption that it was properly affixed by the proper officer, acting within the powers conferred upon him, and that the contract was the authorized agreement of defendant. ( Lovett v. Steam Saw Mill Ass'n, 6 Paige, 56, 60; Clark v. Farmers' Wool Mfg. Co., 15 Wend. 256; Whitney v. Union T. Co., 65 N.Y. 576; Parkinson v. City of Parker, 85 Penn. St. 313; Benedict v. Denton, Walker [Mich.], 336; Lovering v. Mayor, 7 Humph. [ Tenn.] 553, 558; Lansing v. The Mayor, etc., of Memphis, Id . 558; City of Memphis v. Adams, 9 Heisk [Tenn.] 518; 1 Kyd on Corporations, 268; 1 Ventner, 257; 3 Keb. 307; Lavitt v. S. S. M. Ass'n, 6 Paige, 56; Clark v. Farmers' Manuf. Co., 15 Wend. 236; Clark v. Imp. G. L. Co., 4 B. & Ad. 315; B'k of Vergennes v. Warren, 7 Hill, 51; Com. B'k of Buffalo v. Kortright, 22 Minn. 348; Miners' Ditch Co. v. Zollerback, 37 Cal. 597.) If Foster was not authorized by an express vote or by the tacit understanding and consent of all the directors to execute the contract, there should be most complete proof to the contrary. ( Whitney v. Union T. Co., 65 N.Y. 576; B'k of Middlebury v. R. R. R. Co., 30 Vt. 159; Wild v. N.Y. & A. S. M. Co., 59 N.Y. 644; Susq. B. & B'k v. Gen. Ins. Co., 3 Md. 305; Tenney v. E. Warren Lumber Co., 43 N.H. 343; N.Y. Central R. R. Co. v. Bastian, 15 Md. 494; Perry v. Simpson Waterproof Mfg. Co., 37 Conn.520.) Even if Foster's act in executing the contract was originally unauthorized, the subsequent acquiescence and failure to repudiate it for over two years bound the defendant. ( Olcott v. T. R. R., 27 N.Y. 546; Woodbridge v. Proprietors, 6 Vt. 204; Walworth Co. B'k v. F. L. & T. Co., 629; Zabriskie v. C. C. & C. R. R. Co., 23 How. [ U. S.] 381; Reuter v. Electric Tel. Co., 6 El. & Bl. 341; Bargate v. Shortridge, 5 H. L. Cas. 297, 318;
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Totterdell v. F. Brick Co. L. R., 1 C. P. 674; P. W. & B. R. R. Co. v. Cowell, 28 Penn. St. 329; Evans v. Smallcome, L. R., Eng. & Ir. App. Cas. 249.) The defendant is presumed to have had knowledge of the alleged unauthorized act of Foster, which it failed to repudiate. ( Fulton B'k v. Benedict, 1 Hall, 614; B'k of U.S. v. Davis, 2 Hill, 451; Union G. M. Co. v. Rocky Mt. Nat. B'k, 2 Col. 248.) The failure to annex the specifications did not render the contract incomplete. ( Cook v. Allen, 67 N.Y. 578.) The change of structure did not abrogate the contract. ( Williams v. Vanderbilt, 28 N.Y. 217; 29 Barb. 491; Harmony v. Bingham, 12 N.Y. 99; Beebe v. Johnson, 19 Wend. 500; Wheaton v. Com. M. S. Ins. Co., 82 N.Y. 543; Niblo v. Binsse, 1 Keyes, 476, 3 Abb. N. C. 301.) The objection that the transfer to trustees and the reassignment to plaintiff, each or either, terminated the contract, is untenable. ( Devlin v. Mayor, 63 N.Y. 8.) The claim that by the insolvency, assignment of property to trustees, and suspension of its operations for over a year, the company was dissolved, and consequently cannot maintain this action, is untenable. ( People v. Phenix B'k, 24 Wend. 431; Mech's' B'ldg Assn. v. Stevens, 5 Duer, 617; Tower v. Hale, 46 Barb. 361; Kincaid v. Dwinelle, 5 J. & S. 332; S. C., 59 N.Y. 548; Atty.-Gen. v. B'k of Niagara, Hopkins, 361; Brinkerhoff v. Brown, 7 Johns. Ch. 217; Briggs v. Penniman, 8 Cow. 387, 391, 395; Michles v. Roch. City B'k, 1 Paige, 125; Brandt v. Benedict, 17 N.Y. 97; Revere v. Boston Copper Co., 15 Pick. 351; Boston Manuf'y v. Langdon, 24 Id . 49; Knowlton v. Ackley, 8 Cush. 95; Hurd v. Talbot, 7 Gray, 113; Coburn v. B. P. M. Mfg. Co. 1 Gray, 243; Folger v. Col. Ins. Co., 99 Mass. 267. In re New South Meeting House, 95 Id . 504.
Francis C. Barlow for respondent. Without the plans and specifications alleged to be annexed the contracts were insensible and void for uncertainty. ( Weeks v. Maillardet, 14 East, 368; Moir v. Brown, 14 Barb. 50; Kercheis v. Schloss, 49 How. 286.) Construed in the light of the surrounding circumstances,
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the alleged contracts are clearly provisional and incomplete upon their face and by their terms inoperative; the expressed conditions not having happened and the defects not having been supplied. ( Grierson v. Mason, 60 N.Y. 397; Seymour v. Cowing, 1 Keyes, 535, 536; Dietz v. Farish, 53 How. 217; Ford v. James, 2 Abb. Ct. of App. Dec. 163; Hutchins v. Hebbard, 34 N.Y. 24; Cipperly v. Cipperly, 4 T. & C. 345; Baldwin v. Middeberger, 2 Hall's Sup. Ct. 184; Fullerton v. Dalton, 85 Barb. 236; Hughes v. Merc. Mut. Ins. Co., 55 N.Y. 268-269.) The alleged contracts were not executed by the defendant or by its authority. There was no express authority. (Laws of 1872, p. 2179; 2 R. S. [ Banks' 6th ed.], p. 391, § 6; Skinner v. Dayton, 5 Johns. Ch. 351; McCullough v. Moss, 5 Denio, 577; ...
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