Bundrant v. Boyce
Decision Date | 03 June 1910 |
Docket Number | 6,687 |
Citation | 91 N.E. 968,47 Ind.App. 253 |
Parties | BUNDRANT, EXECUTOR, v. BOYCE ET AL |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Rehearing denied November 17, 1910. Transfer denied March 14 1911.
From Delaware Circuit Court; Joseph G. Leffler, Judge.
Action by Edward L. Bundrant, as executor of the will of Frances J Williams, deceased, against James Boyce and another. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Florea & Broaddus, for appellant.
George H. Koons, for appellees.
Action to recover on a note executed by appellees to appellant's testatrix.
The complaint is in one paragraph, to which appellees separately demurred for want of facts. Appellee Boyce withdrew his demurrer, and the demurrer of the First Universalist Church was overruled by the court and exception taken. Said church then filed a separate answer in three paragraphs, and appellee Boyce filed an answer in four paragraphs. Appellees joined in an answer in two paragraphs, the first of each of said answers being general denials and the other paragraphs special answers in bar. The answers in general denial were afterwards withdrawn. Appellant demurred separately and severally to each paragraph of the special answers, which demurrers were overruled, and, electing to stand on his exceptions to said rulings, he refused to plead further. Whereupon the court rendered judgment against him that he take nothing by this action, and for costs.
The second and third paragraphs of the appellee church's separate answer, the second, third and fourth paragraphs of appellee Boyce's separate answer, and the second paragraph of said appellees' joint answer, are founded on the following state of facts therein pleaded, viz.: That at the time of the execution of the note sued on, and as a contemporaneous part thereof, there was executed between the parties to said note a written contract, which note and contract were attached together and executed in duplicate, one copy being delivered to and kept in the possession of the church, and the other being delivered to the testatrix or her agent; that said note and contract constituted one entire and contemporaneous contract; that said contract read as follows:
etc.
Said agreement is signed by appellant's testatrix and by the president and secretary of the board of trustees of said church.
that neither received any of the consideration thereof; that said signatures were mutually understood to be the name and style of said church, and that defendant Boyce was not bound by said note or contract. All of the separate answers conclude as follows: "Wherefore and by reason of the premises said defendant says that the alleged indebtedness sued upon was, at the death of said Frances Jane Williams fully satisfied, and plaintiff is not entitled to recover."
In the joint answer of defendants it is alleged, in substance, that it was the intention of Frances Jane Williams by said transaction to donate said sum of $ 300 to said church; that, in consideration of the agreement to pay interest during her life, she delivered said $ 300 to said church as a donation and benefit.
The note and agreement constitute but one contract. Allen v. Nofsinger (1859), 13 Ind. 494; Woodward v. Mathews (1860), 15 Ind. 339; Cressey v. Webb (1861), 17 Ind. 14; Hickman v. Rayl (1877), 55 Ind. 551; Coe v. Smith (1848), 1 Ind. *267; Cunningham v. Gwinn (1837), 4 Blackf. 341; Carr v. Hays (1887), 110 Ind. 408, 11 N.E. 25; Schmueckle v. Waters (1890), 125 Ind. 265, 25 N.E. 281; Martin v. Murphy (1891), 129 Ind. 464, 28 N.E. 1118; Wood v. Ridgeville College (1888), 114 Ind. 320, 16 N.E. 619; McDonald v. Huestis (1891), 1 Ind.App. 275, 27 N.E. 509; Williams v. Markland (1896), 15 Ind.App. 669, 44 N.E. 562; Fellows v. Kress (1841), 5 Blackf. 536.
The money, the transfer of which was evidenced by the contract, was due after five years, and then only upon the personal demand of Frances Jane Williams. The meaning of the word "personal" as used is clear, as pointing out the individual by whom alone the demand was to be made. The allegations of the answers show that the condition which would have made the money payable upon this contract can never exist. The action is not for money had and received, but upon an executory contract, by the terms of which there remains nothing for appellees to do. The money, the subject of the contract, was delivered to the church, and was to be retained until the happening of a certain event. The church had a present interest in it, the right to use it as stipulated. That interest ceased or became absolute upon the doing or not doing of a certain act of the obligee. The demand stipulated for never having been made, the right to retain the money, so far as that right is to be determined upon the contract in suit, became absolute in the church.
The liability of appellees was not limited to an event which might happen after the death of the obligee. At the expiration of five years the payee of the note had the option to treat the note as a nullity or to enforce it. Her failure to exercise the right to enforce it was, in effect, a renunciation of the liability of appellees. The facts averred do not show that there was anything due upon the contract. The terms employed do not show an attempt to make a posthumous disposition of property.
The facts would warrant the finding that the transaction constituted a gift, the property passing to the donee, notwithstanding the reservation of interest. Sebrell v. Couch (1876), 55 Ind. 122; Baker v. Williams (1870), 34 Ind. 547. This opinion, however, is not based upon that theory.
Judgment affirmed.
WATSON, P. J.--I am unable to concur with the majority in the opinion in this cause.
Appellant, as executor of the will of Frances Jane Williams, instituted this action upon a note executed by appellees to appellant's testatrix.
The note is set out in the complaint as an exhibit and is in the ordinary form of a promissory note for the sum of $ 300, payable to the order of Frances Jane Williams five years after date, with six per cent interest, payable annually.
Appellees filed their joint and several answers to plaintiff's complaint, and to each of said answers appellant's separate demurrers were overruled. Appellant electing to stand on the pleadings, judgment was rendered thereon in favor of appellees.
The assignment of errors raises the question of the sufficiency of appellees' said answers, each setting out an agreement alleged to have been executed simultaneously with said note by the same parties and as the part of one entire contract.
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