Smith v. Marcantonio

• Decision Date: 06 August 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-2476,89-2476
• Citation: 910 F.2d 500
• Parties: Eclophia SMITH, Jr., Appellee, v. James MARCANTONIO, Bill Armontrout, Donald Cline, Orolee Brady, Dick Moore, Dr. Richard K. Bowers, Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 500

910 F.2d 500

Eclophia SMITH, Jr., Appellee, v. James MARCANTONIO, Bill Armontrout, Donald Cline, Orolee Brady, Dick Moore, Dr. Richard K. Bowers, Appellants.

No. 89-2476.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted April 9, 1990.

Decided Aug. 6, 1990.

Bruce Farmer, Jefferson City, Mo., for appellants.

Andrew C. Webb, Sedalia, Mo., for appellee.

Before ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge and FAGG, Circuit Judge.

FAGG, Circuit Judge.

Eclophia Smith, Jr. brought this civil rights action to recover damages for injuries he sustained as an inmate at the Missouri State Penitentiary. James Marcantonio, manager of the prison honor dormitory, Orolee Brady, correctional officer assigned to the honor dormitory, and Dr. Richard K. Bowers, chief medical officer of the prison hospital, appeal from a district court order denying their motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. We reverse the district court's denial of summary judgment.

Unknown prison inmates poured a scalding liquid on Smith as he slept in the honor dormitory, causing severe burns. Smith was transported to the University of Missouri Hospital for treatment, including skin grafts on the burned areas. After this treatment, Smith returned to the prison hospital with directions for medication, daily dressing changes for his burns, and weekly checkups at the University Hospital. For about three weeks, Smith alternated between the prison hospital and a dormitory for inmates awaiting their prison assignments, where he received outpatient treatment. When Smith complained about his outpatient care, he was readmitted to the prison hospital. Afterwards, Smith returned to the honor dormitory. Smith also received follow-up examinations at the University Hospital. Smith's wounds have healed to complete recovery.

Smith claims Marcantonio and Brady failed to take adequate precautions to protect him from harm by other inmates. Although Dr. Bowers never treated him, Smith claims Dr. Bowers acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs, because Smith did not receive the exact treatment the University Hospital prescribed and Dr. Bowers prematurely discharged him from the prison hospital while his burns were still healing.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity unless: their conduct violates a clearly established statutory or constitutional right; they knew or should have known the right was clearly established; and they knew or should have known their conduct violated the right. Tyler v. Barton, 901 F.2d 689, 690-91 (8th Cir.1990) (per curiam). Smith's right to be protected from harm by fellow inmates and his right to adequate medical care are beyond dispute. In this case, however, the summary judgment record fails to support Smith's claims that Marcantonio, Brady, and Dr. Bowers violated those rights. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).

Our inquiry into Smith's claims against Marcantonio and Brady begins and ends with his deposition testimony:

Q. To this day [do] you [ ] know [which] inmates [scalded you]?

Smith: No.

. . . . .

Q. [D]id you have any animosity towards any other inmate within the Missouri State Penitentiary?

Smith: No.

. . . . .

Q. Do you have any reason to believe [ ] anybody might want to scald you?

Smith: No.

Q. Did you give any of the [prison officials] any reason to believe that somebody might scald you?

Smith: No, because I [didn't] know. It's [ ] something that just happened.

. . . . .

Q. [Y]ou told Mr. Marcantonio that you feared for your life?

Smith: After the incident, yes.

Q. How about prior to the incident?

Smith: No, because I didn't know ... this was gonna happen.

. . . . .

Q. But you never complained to Mr. Marcantonio prior to this incident that security was inadequate?

Smith: No.

Q. Did [you feel] at any time prior to this incident [ ] that your life was in danger?

Smith: No.

. . . . .

Q. [Y]ou didn't feel there were any inmates in [the honor dormitory] that were a threat to you?

Smith: I didn't fear that at all, no.

. . . . .

Q. Did you think that Officer Brady could have done anything to prevent this?

Smith: No, I don't believe he could.

. . . . .

Q. How about Mr. Marcantonio, could he have done anything to prevent this from happening?

Smith: No, I don't think so. He wasn't there at the time ... that it happened, no.

Smith's factually impoverished claim that Marcantonio and Brady were aware of the risk of injury to Smith is frivolous. The summary judgment evidence shows Marcantonio and Brady were unaware of any immediate threat of harm to Smith. Smith himself had no inkling he was in any danger of harm before he was injured, and he never complained of specific fears for his safety. Smith sustained his injuries in the first violent episode in the honor dormitory, and the identity and origin of his attackers remain a mystery. Nor does the evidence support Smith's assertion that Brady permitted inmates to enter Smith's sleeping quarters to harm him. Indeed, in his deposition Smith testified neither Marcantonio nor Brady could have prevented the attack. Because Smith has not made a showing sufficient to establish Marcantonio and Brady failed to protect him from known dangers of attacks by fellow inmates, Miller v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 841, 105 S.Ct. 145, 83 L.Ed.2d 84 (1984), or that a pervasive risk of harm prevailed within the honor dormitory, Porm v. White, 762 F.2d 635, 637 (8th Cir.1985), Marcantonio and Brady are entitled to a summary judgment grant of qualified immunity.

Smith's claim that Dr. Bowers was deliberately indifferent to Smith's serious medical needs is equally deficient. In a nutshell, Smith merely disagrees with his medical treatment. Smith thought he ought to remain in the prison hospital instead of convalescing in nonmedical housing with outpatient care. He demanded more pain-killing medication than the prison's medical personnel were willing to dispense. He was dissatisfied with the frequency of his bandage changes. He blamed Dr. Bowers for a one-week delay in his first checkup at the University Hospital. Because Smith's complaints represent nothing more than mere disagreement with the course of his medical treatment, he has failed to state an eighth amendment claim of deliberate indifference. Lair v. Oglesby, 859 F.2d 605, 606 (8th Cir.1988) (per curiam). Further, Dr. Bowers cannot be held liable for Smith's claims of inadequate treatment by other medical personnel because respondeat superior is not a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Givens v. Jones, 900 F.2d 1229, 1233 (8th Cir.1990). Dr. Bowers is entitled to a summary judgment grant of qualified immunity.

Summary judgment is designed to remove factually unsubstantial cases like Smith's from crowded district court docket...