Adams v. City of Booneville

• Decision Date: 22 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. 2003-KM-02179-COA.,2003-KM-02179-COA.
• Citation: 910 So.2d 720
• Parties: Henry ADAMS, Appellant v. CITY OF BOONEVILLE, Mississippi, Appellee.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

910 So.2d 720

Henry ADAMS, Appellant v. CITY OF BOONEVILLE, Mississippi, Appellee.

No. 2003-KM-02179-COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

March 22, 2005.

Kenneth E. Floyd, II, Booneville, attorney for appellant.

William W. Smith, Booneville, attorney for appellee.

Before BRIDGES, P.J., IRVING and MYERS, JJ.

MYERS, J., for the Court.

¶ 1. On January 1, 2003, Henry Adams was charged with driving under the influence ("DUI"), first offense. On May 8, 2003, Adams was convicted of DUI, first offense, in the municipal court of Booneville. Adams appealed that conviction to the Circuit Court of Prentiss County. On June 26, 2003, the circuit court conducted a de novo trial, and on June 27, 2003, the circuit court also found Adams guilty of DUI, first offense.

¶ 2. Aggrieved by his conviction, Adams now appeals, raising the following single issue:

DID THE CIRCUIT COURT ERR IN RULING THAT THERE WAS REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR THE STOP OF ADAMS'S VEHICLE?

FACTS

¶ 3. Officer Brad Taylor, and Reserve Officer Jeremy Pace were on patrol in Booneville on New Year's Eve and the early hours of New Year's Day. At around 2:30 a.m., Officer Taylor noticed that a vehicle, traveling northward on Hwy 145, was riding in the middle of the two northbound lanes. This particular road is a four lane road. Thus, the vehicle was riding in the middle of two lanes that were headed in the same direction, and there was no danger to any oncoming, south bound vehicles. According to Officer Taylor, there was nothing else about the vehicle or the way it was being driven to excite his suspicions other than the fact that he observed it driving down the middle of two lanes of traffic. Reserve Officer Pace, however, did testify that he saw the vehicle swerve in the road. Officer Taylor turned his patrol car around and proceeded to make a traffic stop in order to issue a citation for careless driving. By the time Officer Taylor turned his car around and made it into the northbound lane, the vehicle was in the left lane, preparing to make a left turn into a gas station.

¶ 4. At the gas station, when the stop was made, Adams, the driver of the vehicle, got out of his car and approached Officer Taylor. As Adams neared, Officer Taylor noticed the scent of alcoholic beverage about the person of Adams. In addition, Officer Taylor testified that Adams's speech was slurred and that Adams had some difficulty keeping his balance. Based upon these circumstances, Officer Taylor suspected that Adams was intoxicated. Officer Taylor then proceeded to administer three field sobriety tests, none of which Adams passed. Due to his faulty performance on the field sobriety tests, Adams was taken to the justice center and given an Intoxilyzer test. Adams's alcohol level registered as .172, well in excess of the legal limit of .08. Based upon the results of the intoxilyzer test, Adams was charged with DUI, first offense.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

DID THE CIRCUIT COURT ERR IN RULING THAT THERE WAS REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR THE STOP OF ADAMS'S VEHICLE?

¶ 5. Adams argues that the stop was illegal, because there was no objective reason for the officer to stop the vehicle, and he maintains that he did nothing more than make the legal maneuver of changing lanes. Adams argues further that, objectively, there were no facts that should have given rise to a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation or other crime had been or was being committed.

¶ 6. The City argues that, based upon what he observed, Officer Taylor had a reasonable belief that the traffic violation of careless driving had occurred and, therefore, there was probable cause for the stop of Adams's vehicle.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7. For assignments of error challenging a trial court's judgment on reasonable suspicion and probable cause we employ de novo review. Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So.2d 110, 113(¶ 11) (Miss.1999). In addition, we "should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers." Id. Thus, while we review the lower court's legal conclusions on probable cause and reasonable suspicion de novo, we must accept the fact findings that led the lower court to that legal conclusion unless there is clear error in those fact findings. Id.

DISCUSSION

¶ 8. The case of Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, cited above, very clearly states the law in Mississippi on the question of probable cause for traffic stops. The Floyd court declared:

The constitutional requirements for an investigative stop and detention are less stringent than those for an arrest. This Court has recognized that "given reasonable circumstances an officer may stop and detain a person to resolve an ambiguous situation without having sufficient knowledge to justify an arrest," that is, on less information than is constitutionally required for probable cause to arrest. Singletary v. State, 318 So.2d 873, 876 (Miss.1975). See also McCray v. State, 486 So.2d 1247, 1249 (Miss.1986). Such an investigative stop of a suspect may be made so long as an officer has "a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a felony...." McCray, 486 So.2d at 1249 (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 105 S.Ct. 675, 680, 83 L.Ed.2d 604, 612 (1985)), or as long as the officers have "some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." McCray, 486 So.2d at 1249-50 (quoting [U.S. v.] Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417, 101 S.Ct. at 695[, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)]).

The United States Supreme Court approved this investigatory procedure in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). In determining whether there exists the requisite "reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts," the court must consider whether, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, the detaining officers had a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18, 101 S.Ct. at 694-95 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2640, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979)).

Floyd, 749 So.2d at 114-15 (¶¶ 16-17). In a somewhat condensed fashion, we have also stated this standard as follows:

[T]he test for probable cause in Mississippi is the totality of the circumstances.... It arises when the facts and circumstances with an officer's knowledge, or of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to justify a man of average caution in the belief that a crime has been committed and that a particular individual committed it.'

Harrison v. State, 800 So.2d 1134, 1138(¶ 18) (Miss.2001) (quoting Conway v. State, 397 So.2d 1095, 1098 (Miss.1980)).

¶ 9. Having reviewed above the general law on probable cause for traffic stops, as stated in Floyd and Harrison, we now turn to the particulars of the present case. The statute under which Adams was stopped reads in relevant part:

Any person who drives any vehicle in a careless or imprudent manner, without due regard for the width, grade, curves, corner, traffic and use of the streets and highways and all other attendant circumstances is guilty of careless driving. Careless driving shall be considered a lesser offense than reckless driving.

Miss.Code Ann. § 63-3-1213 (Rev.2004). Adams's driving in the middle of the two northbound lanes constituted, in Officer Taylor's opinion, a violation of this statute.

¶ 10. We have previously addressed challenges to stops based on Mississippi Code Annotated § 63-3-1213. In one recent case we held that "[c]arelessness is a matter of reasonable interpretation, based on a wide range of factors." Henderson v. State, 878 So.2d 246, 247(¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2004). In the Henderson case we also noted, "As a general rule, `the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.'" Henderson, 878 So.2d at 247(¶ 7) (quoting Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)). Applying these two principles to the particular facts of that case, the Henderson court held:

The officer witnessed the vehicle that Henderson was driving approach the curb twice. This indicates that Henderson was driving without due regard for the width and use of the street. The officer's observations were enough for him to determine that careless driving had taken place.

Further, this Court has determined that failure to have regard for the width and use of the street by swerving off the side of the road or crossing the marker lines constitutes probable cause for a traffic stop.

Henderson, 878 So.2d at 247 (¶¶ 7-8). Thus, in the Henderson case, the fact that the officer observed the vehicle approached the curb twice was held to provide probable cause for a traffic stop for careless driving. The stop ultimately revealed that Henderson had a blood alcohol content above the legal limit and later led to Henderson's conviction for possession of cocaine.

¶ 11. Approaching a definition of the kind of driving that will violate the careless driving statute, our supreme court has observed, "[T]he [careless driving] statute echoes the familiar tort law standard, requiring that drivers on Mississippi roads exercise the same standard of care as a prudent person would in the same circumstances." Leuer v. City of Flowood, 744 So.2d 266, 270(¶ 14) (Miss.1999). This principle from the Leuer case sheds some light on the kind of driving that may justifiably prompt an officer to make a stop under Miss.Code Ann. § 63-3-1213.

¶ 12. The Leuer case is also helpful because of its factual similarity to the case sub judice. In Leuer the court found:

Officer...