Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 88-15741
| Citation | 911 F.2d 233 |
| Decision Date | 10 August 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-15741,88-15741 |
| Parties | 140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2020, 58 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 930, 54 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,179, 116 Lab.Cas. P 10,280, 7 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 1767 Joseph Christopher COOK; Dorothy Cook, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LINDSAY OLIVE GROWERS, and Does 1 through 25, inclusive, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
Richard J. Papst, Chain, Younger, Lemucchi, Noriega, Cohn, Stiles & Rodriguez, Bakersfield, Cal., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Michael Jens F. Smith and Thomas M. Zulim, Jory, Peterson & Sagaser, Fresno, Cal., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.
Before BOOCHEVER, WIGGINS and NOONAN, Circuit Judges.
Joseph Christopher Cook (Cook) and his wife Dorothy Cook appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment to Lindsay Olive Growers (LOG). Cook argues that his claims for wrongful termination, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and employment discrimination on the basis of religion are not preempted by Sec. 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a) (1982). He also argues
that his common-law claims are not precluded by California's statutory remedy for religious discrimination, and that the district court erred in finding that LOG had reasonably accommodated his religious beliefs. We affirm.
In August of 1980, Cook began work as a boiler operator in LOG's olive processing plant. Cook was a member of General Teamsters Local 94, and a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Teamsters and LOG was in effect throughout his employment.
As a member of the Worldwide Church of God, Cook was required to observe the sabbath and abstain from working from sunset Friday to sunset Saturday. This religious observance did not present a problem during his first four years of employment. The Lindsay plant operated seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day, and Cook was able to work a Sunday through Thursday night shift. In 1984, however, LOG changed its olive processing operations, and the plant began to operate on a five-day work week. Because no Sunday work was available, Cook was assigned to a standard night shift, Monday through Friday from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. The Friday night work conflicted with his religious observance, but LOG did not require him to work that night. Two other boiler operators voluntarily covered Cook's Friday shift on a rotating basis; under the terms of the CBA, they could not receive overtime pay for the Saturday work following the Friday night shift. Cook thus worked only four shifts a week.
In September of 1986, the two other boiler operators informed LOG they were no longer willing to substitute for Cook on Friday nights. LOG responded by attempting to locate someone else at the plant qualified to operate the boiler on Cook's Friday night shift. LOG also called the Teamsters to discuss possible solutions, and contacted the California Employment Development Department (CEDD) to locate a one-day-per-week boilermaker to work Cook's Friday night shift. When these efforts failed, LOG reviewed the openings at the processing plant for cannery mechanic positions for Cook, but there were none. For economic reasons, LOG decided against paying overtime to the other boiler operators to cover Cook's Friday night shift.
Finally, LOG transferred Cook to a general laborer position, Monday through Friday, 7 a.m. to 3 p.m., a schedule allowing Cook to observe his sabbath. The pay was $.80 less per hour than what Cook had been earning. Because Cook would have worked five rather than four shifts per week, however, his gross weekly pay would have increased by about forty dollars. Cook received notice of the transfer on October 10, 1986. He took personal leave from October 14 to 26. When he failed to report to work or call in on October 27 and five consecutive days thereafter, he was fired.
Cook filed a grievance with the Teamsters. After a hearing on November 7, 1986, the grievance committee found that LOG was justified in firing Cook for refusing the work transfer and for not calling in prior to his shift for six days.
Eight months later, Cook and his wife Dorothy filed a complaint in California state court on July 9, 1987, alleging five causes of action: wrongful termination, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction of emotional distress, employment discrimination based on religious beliefs, and as to both Cook and his wife Dorothy, negligent infliction of emotional distress. LOG removed the action to federal district court, and Cook filed a first amended complaint there, deleting all references to the CBA and stating his fourth cause of action as for employment discrimination under Cal.Gov't Code Sec. 12940 (West Supp.1990). After discovery was complete, LOG filed a motion for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the district court granted the motion.
The district court held that the basis of Cook's complaint was a breach of the CBA,
and as a result all his claims were preempted by Sec. 301 of the LMRA. Summary judgment was awarded because Cook did not bring his action within the six-month federal statute of limitations governing suits against an employer for breach of a CBA. The court also ruled that even if the claims were not preempted, Cal.Gov't Code Sec. 12940 provided an exclusive remedy displacing all common law remedies. Finally, it found that LOG reasonably accommodated Cook's religious observance as a matter of law.
This court reviews de novo a grant of summary judgment, determining "whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court applied the relevant substantive law." Tzung v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 873 F.2d 1338, 1339-40 (9th Cir.1989). The district court was correct in applying a six-month statute of limitations to any of Cook's claims which were preempted by Sec. 301. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 155, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2285, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). We now analyze whether the district court properly found preemption.
Section 301 of the LMRA provides federal jurisdiction over "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization." 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a). Federal law exclusively governs a suit for breach of a CBA under Sec. 301, whose broad preemptive scope entirely displaces any state cause of action based on a CBA, as well as any state claim whose outcome depends on analysis of the terms of the agreement. Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 997 (9th Cir.1987). A claim is not preempted if it does not threaten significantly the collective bargaining process and if it furthers a state interest in protecting the public that transcends the employment relationship. Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir.1989). For preemption analysis, it is not dispositive that Cook's first amended complaint is framed without reference to the CBA. Rather, preemption is required if his claims can be resolved only by referring to the terms of the agreement. Newberry v. Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir.1988). "[E]ven suits based on torts, rather than on breach of collective bargaining agreements, are governed by federal law if their evaluation is 'inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of [a] labor contract.' " Miller v. AT & T Network Sys., 850 F.2d 543, 545 (9th Cir.1988) (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1912, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985)).
Cook's complaint alleges that he had
an oral contract of employment as modified by certain policies, practices, assurances and other statements, both oral and in writing.... for an indefinite term.... [D]ischarge, if any, would only be for good cause proven and then would be carried out only in accordance with the stated written policies of the employer.
The complaint explains Cook's sabbath observance and the accommodations made to it, and then alleges he was fired when "defendant breached its agreement with plaintiff by demanding that plaintiff report for work after dusk on Friday in direct conflict with plaintiff's religious beliefs and observances." Cook characterizes this claim as one for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, and argues that it thus escapes federal preemption.
Section 301 does not preempt [a claim] if it poses no significant threat to the collective bargaining process and furthers a state interest in protecting the public transcending the employment relationship. A claim is preempted, however, if it is not based on any genuine state public policy, or if it is bound up with interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and furthers no state policy Young, 830 F.2d at 1001-02 (citations omitted). The public policy cited by Cook is the prohibition on religious discrimination in Cal.Gov't Code Sec. 12940(a), which provides that it is an unlawful employment practice "[f]or an employer, because of the ... religious creed ... of any person, ... to bar or to discharge such person from employment ... or to discriminate against such person in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment."
independent of the employment relationship.
There is no doubt that Sec. 12940(a) establishes a California public policy against religious discrimination in the workplace. Nor would enforcement of the California statute require interpretation of the CBA. Although Sec. 17(b) of the CBA provides "[t]here shall be no discrimination based upon ... religion ... as provided in Federal and State...
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