US v. Davis

• Decision Date: 22 January 1996
• Docket Number: Criminal A. No. 94-381.
• Citation: 912 F. Supp. 938
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Len DAVIS, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

912 F. Supp. 938

UNITED STATES of America v. Len DAVIS, et al.

Criminal A. No. 94-381.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

January 22, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Constantine Georges, Michael McMahon, Asst. U.S. Attys., New Orleans, LA, for U.S.

Milton Massinter, Dwight Doskey, Metairie, LA, Patrick McGnity, Daniel Markey, New Orleans, LA, for defendants.

ORDER AND OPINION

BERRIGAN, District Judge.

This ruling deals with the permissible scope of nonstatutory aggravating factors in the government's case-in-chief at the penalty phase of a capital case, and the information admissible to sustain them¹. It also concerns the procedures for assuring the reliability of the information.

The government has given notice to defendants LEN DAVIS and PAUL HARDY of the nonstatutory aggravating factors it proposes to present if a penalty phase is reached. It also has listed the factual allegations to support those factors. DAVIS has moved to bar the use of nonstatutory aggravating factors in general and HARDY has moved in particular to disallow the use of information regarding unadjudicated crimes. For the following reasons, the defendants' motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

The Penalty Phase in General

If either or both of these defendants are convicted as charged, the jury must pass through several stages before a death penalty can be imposed. 18 U.S.C. § 3591, et seq. First, the jury must decide whether the defendant had the requisite "intent" in committing the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a). If the jurors unanimously conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the intent was established, they can move to the next stage. If they do not unanimously so decide, the deliberations are over and the death penalty cannot be imposed. Assuming the jury finds the requisite intent, it must then consider the specific statutory aggravating factors that the government has alleged and determine if at least one was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c); § 3593(c)². Again, if the jurors unanimously find one (or more) of the statutory factors so proven, they can move to the next stage. If not, the deliberations are over and the death penalty cannot be imposed. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d). Assuming again, the jurors find at least one of the statutory aggravating factors proven, they then must consider and weigh the statutory aggravating factors, plus "any other aggravating factor for which notice has been provided" against any mitigating factors and decide whether capital punishment is appropriate. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d) & (e)³.

Nonstatutory Aggravating Factors in General

While 18 U.S.C. § 3591, et seq., expressly defines both the "intent" requirement and the statutory aggravating factors necessary to allow consideration of the death penalty, the statute provides no specific guidance as to what constitutes an appropriate non statutory aggravating factor. For example, after specifically enumerating 15 possible statutory aggravating factors, § 3592(c) simply adds in an unnumbered paragraph: "The jury ... may consider whether any other aggravating factor for which notice has been given exists." Under § 3593(a), the government is required to give notice of its proposed aggravating factors, but other than mentioning victim impact, no boundaries are given on the scope of the nonstatutory factors. Under § 3593(c), the perimeters are likewise undefined —the jury is to hear "information" as to "any matter relevant to the sentence, including any mitigating or aggravating factor ..." and the government may present "any information relevant to an aggravating factor ..." Information is also admissible "regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials."

While the statute contains no specific guidelines for the nonstatutory factors, it does impose substantial responsibility and considerable discretion to the trial judge in deciding admissibility. The statute, as noted, requires that the proffered information be "relevant." Significantly, the statute also provides that even relevant information "may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury." In determining relevancy, probative value and unfair prejudice, it is helpful to briefly review the history of capital punishment caselaw and the purpose and scope of the penalty phase in general.

General Principles

The penalty phase of a capital case brings into direct and seemingly irreconcilable conflict two competing themes—the constitutional requirement of channeled and guided jury discretion versus the need for the jury to have as much information regarding the offender as possible in order to impose an individualized sentence.

In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,⁴ the United States Supreme Court struck down the death penalty laws as they then existed which had allowed the jury virtually "untrammeled discretion" to decide who could be sentenced to death⁵. The lack of standards resulted in death sentences that were "wantonly and ... freakishly imposed" akin to being "struck by lightening" where only a "capriciously selected random handful" received a death sentence.⁶ Such a system provided "no meaningful basis" to distinguish who should live and who should die.⁷ The lack of standards to guide the jury was held to violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

In 1976, the Supreme Court relied on the same principles in upholding a revised death penalty statute:

... (Furman) did recognize that the penalty of death is different in kind from any other punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice. Because of the uniqueness of the death penalty, Furman held that it could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner ...

* * * * * *

Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-89, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976).

On the same day as Gregg, the Supreme Court struck down a death penalty statute from North Carolina, again using the same reasoning:

... the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs from life imprisonment more than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976).

Woodson reiterated that "arbitrary and wanton jury discretion" had to be replaced by "objective standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death." Ibid.

Some months later, the Supreme Court expressly added Due Process, in addition to the Eighth Amendment, as a basis to evaluate capital sentencing procedures. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977). After acknowledging that the death penalty is "different" from all other punishments, requiring assurance that it be based "on reason rather than caprice or emotion," the court continued:

Second, it is now clear that the sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause. Even though the defendant has no substantive right to a particular sentence within the range authorized by statute, the sentencing is a critical stage of the criminal proceeding at which he is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel (citations omitted). The defendant has a legitimate interest in the character of the procedure which leads to the imposition of sentence even if he may have no right to object to a particular result of the sentencing process.

Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977).

On the other hand, the Supreme Court has also recognized the need for the jury to have ample information regarding the offense and the offender in order to make an individual decision. In Gregg, even while calling for guided discretion, the Court considered it "desirable" for the jury to have "as much information before it as possible" when deciding the penalty. 428 U.S. at 204, 96 S.Ct. at 2939. "So long as the evidence introduced and the arguments made at the presentence hearing do not prejudice a defendant, it is preferable not to impose restrictions." Ibid. Woodson struck down a mandatory death penalty statute in part because it failed to "allow the particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant ..." 428 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. at 2991. In another capital case issued the same day as Gregg and Woodson, the Court declared that it was "essential" that the jury "have before it all possible relevant information about the individual whose fate it must determine." Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 2958, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976).

Congress and the various state legislatures have attempted to reconcile these competing but equally valid principles by creating sequential procedural steps, similar to 18 U.S.C. § 3591, et seq. Under these scenarios, even though the defendant has been convicted of a capital crime, the jury cannot impose the death penalty unless each procedural step is met and completed. With respect to the statute at issue here, the first step is for the jury to find the requisite intent; the second step is for the jury to find at least one explicit statutory aggravating factor. Only then can the jury even consider the death penalty. The intent element is...