The B&F Corp. v. Cavers

Citation2022 OK CIV APP 35
Decision Date23 September 2022
Docket Number120024
CourtUnited States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma
PartiesTHE B&F CORPORATION, d/b/a OK LOAN SERVICE, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. KELLIE C. CAVERS, Defendant/Appellant.

Mandate Issued: 10/19/2022

Appeal from the District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma Honorable Trent Pipes, Trial Judge

Scott K. Suchy, Corporate Counsel, the B&F Corporation Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellee

Victor R. Wandres, Paramount Law, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellant

Deborah B. Barnes, Presiding Judge

¶1 In this small claims proceeding, Kellie C. Cavers appeals from the trial court's order prohibiting her attorney-in-fact from appearing in the proceedings and from its order granting judgment to The B&F Corporation d/b/a OK Loan Service (Plaintiff). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Plaintiff filed its Affidavit of small claims on December 18 2020, in which it alleged Ms. Cavers was indebted to it in the amount of $198 because she failed to pay on a loan contract. Ms. Cavers was personally served on October 7 2021. An Alias Affidavit dated September 17, 2021, was attached to the service of process as was an order informing Ms. Cavers that the matter was set to be heard in the small claims court on October 20, 2021.

¶3 Ms. Cavers appeared at the October 20 hearing. [1] Before turning to the merits of the claim, the trial court addressed a preliminary issue: a request by a Mr. Vance Dotson "to represent [Ms. Cavers] in this proceeding under" a Limited Power of Attorney (POA) he and Ms. Cavers executed that day. The trial court accepted the POA into evidence. Through the POA, Ms. Cavers appointed Mr. Dotson as her agent and attorney-in-fact to act for her in numerous capacities including "act[ing] for [her] in any lawful way in credit and debt matters, claims and litigation," and "defend[ing] against... a legal entity" before a court. [2] Mr. Dotson informed the court he is "not an attorney" and "never represented [himself] as an attorney." After questioning Mr. Dotson further, the trial court ruled that he was misapplying the provisions of the Uniform Statutory Form Power of Attorney Act, 15 O.S. 2021 [3] §§ 1001-1020, and that pursuant to the rules governing the Oklahoma Bar Association, 5 O.S. 2021, ch.1, app.1, art. II, § 7(a), [4] it could not allow Mr. Dotson to appear and represent Ms. Cavers. The court excused Mr. Dotson.

¶4 Turning to the merits of the case, the court asked Ms. Cavers, "Do you wish to proceed? He can't act as your attorney." She answered, "Honestly, no," to which Mr. Suchy, counsel for Plaintiff, stated: "Your Honor, I move for a default. I have a contract signed by Ms. Cavers." Ms. Cavers stated: "Which that's on my credit report, if I'm not mistaken." At this point the court said:

If we're going to get into sworn testimony here, then I'll swear you in, I'll swear the parties in, and we can take testimony on it.
The reason for the requested continuance [was] because Mr. Dotson was not prepared. That is what [Mr. Dotson] alluded to. So his being prepared to proceed with this matter is of little consequence to the Court. So, anybody that is going to testify, raise your right hand.

(Parties sworn in.)

¶5 Mr. Suchy presented Ms. Cavers with a document titled "Loan Note" dated October 21, 2019. She agreed she signed that document and that it is the contract she had with Plaintiff. The following exchange occurred:

Mr. Suchy:... [A]nd in this contract do you agree to make a total amount of payment of $120, yes?
Ms. Cavers: No.
Mr. Suchy: So this is not the contract you signed?
Ms. Cavers: It wasn't for $120.
Mr. Suchy: Okay. What is your memory of it?
Ms. Cavers: I don't remember --

Ms. Cavers further testified she has made no payments on the loan because she lost her job. She testified she did not remember that she was obligated to make three payments of $40 each beginning November 2019 but did remember she would be charged a late fee of $26 if she missed a payment. Upon inquiry from the court, Ms. Cavers repeated that she was unable to make any payment because she lost her job and her house. However, in answer to the court's question, "But you don't deny the debt? I mean, it happened, you just couldn't pay it back?" she replied, "Yeah."

¶6 The court entered judgment for Plaintiff in the amount of $198 (the total of the loan amount and three late fee charges). [5] It is from the court's ruling regarding Mr. Dotson's dismissal from the proceedings and its judgment for Plaintiff that Ms. Cavers appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 To the extent this appeal concerns issues of constitutionally protected rights or of statutory interpretation, the issue is one of law that we review de novo. Troxell v. Okla. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 OK 100, ¶ 4, 318 P.3d 206. Under a de novo standard of review, "an appellate court claims for itself plenary independent and non-deferential authority to reexamine a trial court's legal rulings." Kluver v. Weatherford Hosp. Auth., 1993 OK 85, ¶ 14, 859 P.2d 1081 (citation omitted).

¶8 The trial court's factual determinations and evidentiary rulings, however, are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. "An abuse of discretion occurs when a court bases its decision on an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no rational basis in evidence for the ruling." Gowens v. Barstow, 2015 OK 85, ¶ 11, 364 P.3d 644 (citation omitted). "Under an abuse of discretion standard, the appellate court examines the evidence in the record and reverses only if the trial court's decision is clearly against the evidence or is contrary to a governing principle of law." Curry v. Streater, 2009 OK 5, ¶ 8, 213 P.3d 550 (citation omitted).

¶9 Ms. Cavers argues the trial court's findings regarding her indebtedness are erroneous because without a properly authenticated loan contract, there was no evidence in the record tending to support her indebtedness. "With respect to determinations of fact in a small claims proceeding, this Court's standard of review is that '[i]f there is any evidence tending to support the findings and judgment of the trial court..., the findings and judgment will not be disturbed, even if the record might support a conclusion different from that reached at nisi prius." Morris v. Behrens, 2021 OK CIV APP 35, ¶ 4, 499 P.3d 39 (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS
I. Trial Court's Denial of Appearance of Attorney-in-fact

¶10 Ms. Cavers argues the trial court erred as a matter of law in its interpretation of several applicable statutes, and argues, in effect, the court's concept of what conduct constitutes the practice of law was an abuse of discretion. We disagree.

¶11 Oklahoma jurisprudence has long held that pro se litigants are held to the same standard as a licensed attorney and must comply with the same rules of procedure and evidence. Funnell v. Jones, 1985 OK 73, ¶ 4, 737 P.2d 105. Thus, while a pro se litigant has the right in civil proceedings to represent himself and make legal arguments on his own behalf, he does so at his own peril. As correctly stated by Ms. Cavers, in small claims proceedings, however, the technicalities of evidentiary and procedural rules are relaxed; consequently, the simplified procedure in small claims proceedings should make the need for an attorney unnecessary, or less necessary, with regard to those issues. See Black v. Littleton, 1975 OK CIV APP 1, ¶ 6, 532 P.2d 486. See also Thayer v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 1980 OK 95, ¶ 5, 613 P.2d 1041 ("The exegesis behind the small claims court is to open the courts to the citizenry. A person does not need a lawyer to appear. The normal rules of evidence are not applied. The jurisdiction may be invoked by payment of a nominal fee. The small claims court provides redress for the ordinary person."). The peril a pro se litigant might otherwise face is thus lessened in a small claims proceeding. As noted by the Black Court:

It appears the intended purpose of the Small Claims Act was to establish an informal court, void of rigid restrictions with little or no regard to the technicalities pertaining to the rules of evidence, and the assumption by the judge of direct affirmative authority to control all aspects of a hearing with the sole object of dispensing speedy justice between the parties. This intent is evidenced by the fact that actions brought under the Small Claims Act, 12 O.S. 1971 § 1751 et seq., may be heard by any judge of the district court; the judgment is a judgment of the district court and appeals are taken directly to the Supreme Court.

1975 OK CIV APP 1, ¶ 5. The issues presented on appeal are who may appear for a party in a small claims proceeding and what action may that person take on behalf of a party.

¶12 Ms. Cavers relies on an Attorney General (AG) Opinion in which the following question was posed: "May a person holding a Power of Attorney... appear on behalf of his or her principal as a party in small claims court without the assistance of legal counsel?" Question Submitted by The Hon. Jerry L. Smith, State Senator, Dist. 39, 2003 OK AG 26. Quoting the forgoing reasoning from Black, the AG Opinion examined the provisions of the Uniform Statutory Form Power of Attorney Act, 15 O.S. 2021 §§ 1001-1020. [6] In particular, the AG Opinion notes §§ 1005 [7] and 1014 [8] of the statute. In addition, the AG Opinion acknowledges the Oklahoma Supreme Court's constitutional authority, "independent of the Legislative Department, to control and regulate the practice of law in all its forms, and to prevent the intrusion of unlicensed persons into the practice...." 2003 OK AG 26, ¶ 8 (quoting R.J. Edwards, Inc. v. Hert, 1972 OK 151, ¶ 18, 504 P.2d 407). The AG Opinion acknowledges that pursuant to that authority the Supreme Court promulgated rules creating and...

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