Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC

• Decision Date: 05 January 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2283, September Term, 2005.,2283, September Term, 2005.
• Citation: 172 Md. App. 350,914 A.2d 231
• Parties: Kathleen HILL v. CROSS COUNTRY SETTLEMENTS, LLC.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

914 A.2d 231

172 Md. App. 350

Kathleen HILL v. CROSS COUNTRY SETTLEMENTS, LLC.

No. 2283, September Term, 2005.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

January 5, 2007.

Jeffrey L. Forman, Bruce E. Kauffman, Towson, for appellant.

Lewlie J. Williams, Christina Bolmarcich, Baltimore, for appellee.

Panel JAMES R. EYLER, BARBERA and SHARER, JJ.

Opinion by SHARER, J.

"The rule of law and equity is that money paid under mistake may be recovered when it is against good conscience for the recipient to retain the money." Debelius Realty Co. v. Chassagne, 260 Md. 109, 114, 271 A.2d 527 (1970). That maxim was never more appropriate than in the instant case, which involves principles of unjust enrichment.

Kathleen Hill appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, which denied her motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment, and granted summary judgment in favor of appellee, Cross Country Settlements, LLC.

Appellant raises two issues for our review, which we have distilled and recast as follows:

Whether the circuit court erred in finding unjust enrichment and in ordering restitution.¹

For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The genesis of this litigation is a mortgage lien on property purchased by appellant's mother, Mary Sasso, in March 1991.² On September 16, 1991, Ms. Sasso conveyed the property to appellant, reserving a life estate. The life estate reservation required appellant to apply the proceeds from a future sale of the property to any mortgage indebtedness existing at the time of such sale.

On April 8, 1999, Ms. Sasso obtained a home equity loan from Provident Bank ("Provident"), using the property to secure the debt. Provident properly recorded all relevant documents among the land records in Baltimore City.

Later, in October 2002, Ms. Sasso refinanced the Provident mortgage, applying the new money, in part, to satisfy the April 1999 home equity loan. Provident again recorded its security interest among the land records in Baltimore City. The dispute presented in this appeal arises from the October 2002 mortgage debt.

Ms. Sasso died in May 2003, thereby extinguishing the life estate and vesting the entire fee simple ownership of the property in appellant. Thereafter, appellant continued to make mortgage payments to Provident until, in 2004, she agreed to sell the property to Ms. Adeday Mseka.

Cross Country provided settlement services in connection with the Hill-Mseka sale, which closed in July 2004, and requested appellant to provide complete information on all outstanding liens on the property prior to conducting settlement. Discovering the outstanding mortgage, Cross Country requested payoff information from Provident.

Provident assured Cross Country several times — once in writing — that there was no outstanding lien on the property and that a certificate of satisfaction had been forwarded to the appellant. That information, as developed by the record, was incorrect, and the full responsibility for the error rests with Provident. At closing, Cross Country's representative asked appellant if she was aware of any outstanding mortgages on the property. In response, appellant submitted an affidavit denying knowledge of any encumbrances, admitting only to knowledge of the late Ms. Sasso's credit card account with Provident. Satisfied with that information, Cross Country proceeded to settlement on July 15, 2004. Net cash proceeds of the sale — $156,647.83 — was paid to appellant.

Subsequently, Provident discovered its error and, in a letter dated September 16, 2004, notified Cross Country that, contrary to its previous communications to the contrary, there was a balance of $70,261.26 due on the October 2002 Sasso mortgage. Cross Country then made demand on appellant to pay this sum to satisfy the Provident note. Appellant declined the invitation.

On December 22, 2005, Provident notified appellant's purchaser, Ms. Mseka, that it would institute foreclosure proceedings to protect its lien on the property. Upon receiving this notice, Ms. Mseka made a claim against Stewart Title Guaranty Company on her title insurance policy. Stewart Title paid the outstanding mortgage debt in exchange for a release from Provident. Stewart Title then demanded reimbursement from Cross Country, which complied by making payment in full on February 18, 2005.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Cross Country filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on November 15, 2004, seeking reimbursement from appellant in the amount it paid to Stewart Title. In its fourth amended complaint appellee asserted five counts: (I) intentional misrepresentation, (II) intentional misrepresentation — concealment or nondisclosure, (III) negligent misrepresentation, (IV)unjust enrichment, and (V) monies had and received. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss all five counts on February 22, 2005. Cross Country filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to Count IV (unjust enrichment) on March 8, 2005.

On October 6, 2005, the circuit court granted appellant's motion to dismiss counts I (intentional misrepresentation), II (intentional misrepresentation — concealment or nondisclosure), and III (negligent misrepresentation). Finding that Cross Country was entitled to relief in the nature of restitution, the circuit court denied appellant's motion to dismiss Court IV (unjust enrichment) and Count V (monies had and received). On October 14, 2005, appellant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, which was answered by Cross Country on November 21, 2005.

A hearing on the cross motions for summary judgment was held on December 2, 2005. The trial court issued a written order the same day, granting summary judgment in favor of Cross Country and ordering appellant to pay restitution to appellee in the sum of $70,261.26.

Additional facts will be set forth as they become necessary to our discussion of the issues.

STANDARD of REVIEW

Our review of a circuit court's grant of summary judgment is de novo, as it is a purely legal decision. We must determine whether there existed a dispute of material fact and, if not, whether the circuit court's ruling was legally correct. Cruickshank-Wallace v. County Banking and Trust Co., 165 Md.App. 300, 310, 885 A.2d 403 (2005).

"A material fact is a fact the resolution of which will somehow affect the outcome of the case." King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 111, 492 A.2d 608 (1985) (citing Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 273 Md. 1, 8, 327 A.2d 502 (1974)). "[A] dispute as to facts relating to grounds upon which the decision is not rested is not a dispute with respect to material fact and such dispute does not prevent the entry of summary judgment." Salisbury Beauty Schs. v. State Bd. of Cosmetologists, 268 Md. 32, 40, 300 A.2d 367 (1973). In the instant case, the parties essentially concede the lack of dispute of a material fact. In fact, both parties moved for summary judgment.

"The standard of review for a grant of summary judgment is whether the trial court was legally correct." Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 343 Md. 185, 204, 680 A.2d 1067 (1996). The trial court, in accordance with Md. Rule 2-501(f), shall grant a motion for summary judgment "if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that [the moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The purpose of summary judgment procedure is not to try the case or to decide the factual disputes, but to decide whether there is an issue of fact which is sufficiently material to be tried. See Goodwich, supra, 343 Md. at 205-06, 680 A.2d 1067; Coffey v. Derby Steel Co., 291 Md. 241, 247, 434 A.2d 564 (1981); Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 304, 413 A.2d 170 (1980). Thus, once the moving party has provided the court with sufficient grounds for summary judgment, the non-moving party must produce sufficient evidence to the trial court that a genuine dispute of a material fact exists. See, e.g., Hoffman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Washington County Nat'l Sav. Bank, 297 Md. 691, 712, 467 A.2d 758 (1983). This requires producing facts under oath, based on personal knowledge of the affiant to defeat the motion. "Bald, unsupported statements of conclusions of law are insufficient." Id. With these considerations in mind, we turn to the case sub judice.

DISCUSSION

Whether the trial court erred in finding unjust enrichment and in ordering restitution.

Within her general assignments of error, appellant points to three specific rulings of the circuit court that she claims to be legally incorrect. First, she denies that the payment of more than $70,000 to which she was entitled was a windfall that implicates concepts of unjust enrichment. Second, she argues, Cross Country has no standing to sue her. Finally, she asserts that Cross Country's complaint did not "sound in restitution for unjust enrichment or monies had and received." We shall address the latter question first.

Sufficiency of the Complaint

In support of her argument that Cross Country's fourth amended complaint "did not sound in restitution for unjust enrichment or monies had and received," appellant states that

[a] review of Counts Four and Five in Cross Country's [fourth amended] Complaint reveals that they are not claims seeking restitution for unjust enrichment or monies had and received at all. Instead, they sound in indemnification. That is, the Complaint does not allege that Ms. Hill owes anything to Provident, or that she has any assets belonging to Provident. Rather, the Complaint suggests an indemnification action, in which it is alleged that Ms. Hill owes money to Cross Country, because Cross Country paid money to Stewart.

Other than that bald assertion, appellant cites no authority to support the claim that Cross Country's complaint does not state a cause of action in unjust enrichment.³ As we look to the fourth amended complaint, we find that,...