Batte-Holmgren v. Com'R of Public Health
Decision Date | 13 February 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 17505.,17505. |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | Diane BATTE-HOLMGREN et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HEALTH et al. |
Jan C. Trendowski, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, with whom were Perry Zinn-Rowthorn and Jane R. Rosenberg, assistant attorneys general, for the appellees (defendants).
John B. Farley, Hartford, filed a brief for the American Cancer Society, Inc., as amicus curiae.
SULLIVAN, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.*
The plaintiffs,1 who are owners of businesses affected by recently enacted legislation banning smoking in restaurants and cafés, appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered after the granting of a motion to strike the complaint filed by the defendants, the commissioner of public health and the attorney general. The plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the legislation, arguing that the smoking ban violates the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions.2 The dispositive issues on appeal are: (1) whether this court has subject matter jurisdiction over the present case despite the plaintiffs' failure to provide the notice mandated by our rules of practice to interested persons in declaratory judgment actions; and (2) whether the smoking ban legislation violates the plaintiffs' equal protection rights. We first conclude that we have subject matter jurisdiction to hear this appeal despite the plaintiffs' lack of compliance with the notice requirements. We also determine that the plaintiffs' equal protection rights have not been violated. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The procedural history of the present case is undisputed. In July, 2004, the plaintiffs filed the complaint in the present action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Public Acts 2003, No. 03-45, which amended General Statutes § 19a-3423 to prohibit smoking in restaurants and cafés and other public facilities, but not in casinos and most private clubs,4 violates the plaintiffs' right to equal protection under the state and federal constitutions. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
The defendants thereafter filed a motion to strike the complaint, arguing that the complaint had failed to set forth allegations sufficient to establish an equal protection violation.5 The trial court granted the motion to strike on equal protection grounds and, subsequently rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. This appeal followed.6
Following oral argument, we ordered the parties, sua sponte, to file supplemental briefs addressing the following questions: The parties thereafter filed supplemental briefs as ordered, both of which acknowledged that notice of the declaratory judgment action was not given to certain interested persons pursuant to Practice Book § 17-56(b).
We first consider whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to render judgment in the present case despite the lack of notice to interested persons. Although the issue has not been raised by the parties, (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Transportation v. Rocky Mountain, LLC, 277 Conn. 696, 703, 894 A.2d 259 (2006).
Our rules of practice provide that, in declaratory judgment actions, the plaintiff is required to provide notice to or seek joinder of "[a]ll persons who have an interest in the subject matter of the requested declaratory judgment that is direct, immediate and adverse to the interest of one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants in the action. . . ." Practice Book § 17-56(b). The plaintiff further is required to append to the complaint "a certificate stating that all such interested persons have been joined as parties to the action or have been given reasonable notice thereof." Practice Book § 17-56(b). In the present case, the plaintiffs acknowledge that they provided notice of their request for a declaratory judgment only to the defendants.7 They further admit that they failed to append the certificate of notice to their complaint.
This court previously has stated that the failure to provide notice to all interested parties in a declaratory judgment action deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction of the action. See, e.g., McBurney v. Cirillo, 276 Conn. 782, 793, 889 A.2d 759 (2006); Napoletano v. CIGNA Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc., 238 Conn. 216, 224-25, 680 A.2d 127 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103, 117 S.Ct. 1106, 137 L.Ed.2d 308 (1997); Hopkins v. Pac, 176 Conn. 318, 319, 407 A.2d 979 (1978). In recent years, however, the court has been willing to remand such cases to allow the defect to be cured, signaling a shift in the court's understanding of the nature of the defect. See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n. 5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) ( ); Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Raymark Corp., 215 Conn. 224, 230, 575 A.2d 693 (1990) (); cf. Gianetti v. Norwalk Hospital, 211 Conn. 51, 56, 557 A.2d 1249 (1989) ( ). The conclusion that such defects can be remedied on remand implicitly calls into question the jurisdictional nature of the defect because it conflicts with the well established principle that a judgment rendered without subject matter jurisdiction is void. See Commissioner of Transportation v. Rocky Mountain, LLC, supra, 277 Conn. at 725, 894 A.2d 259.
In addition, this court recently has questioned explicitly whether the failure to give notice of a declaratory judgment action is properly a question of subject matter jurisdiction. In Stafford Higgins Industries, Inc. v. Norwalk, supra, 245 Conn. at 577 n. 20, 715 A.2d 46, the court noted that See, e.g., General Statutes § 51-14(a) ." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)
This questioning by the court of its previous conclusion that the failure to provide notice in a declaratory judgment action is a subject matter jurisdictional defect apparently was recognized by the judges of the Superior Court in 2000, when the Practice Book provisions governing declaratory judgment actions were amended to provide that "no declaratory judgment action shall be defeated by the nonjoinder of parties or the failure to give notice to interested persons." Practice Book § 17-56(c). The commentary to this section...
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