Batte-Holmgren v. Com'R of Public Health

Decision Date13 February 2007
Docket NumberNo. 17505.,17505.
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesDiane BATTE-HOLMGREN et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HEALTH et al.

Jan C. Trendowski, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, with whom were Perry Zinn-Rowthorn and Jane R. Rosenberg, assistant attorneys general, for the appellees (defendants).

John B. Farley, Hartford, filed a brief for the American Cancer Society, Inc., as amicus curiae.

SULLIVAN, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.*

VERTEFEUILLE, J.

The plaintiffs,1 who are owners of businesses affected by recently enacted legislation banning smoking in restaurants and cafés, appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered after the granting of a motion to strike the complaint filed by the defendants, the commissioner of public health and the attorney general. The plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the legislation, arguing that the smoking ban violates the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions.2 The dispositive issues on appeal are: (1) whether this court has subject matter jurisdiction over the present case despite the plaintiffs' failure to provide the notice mandated by our rules of practice to interested persons in declaratory judgment actions; and (2) whether the smoking ban legislation violates the plaintiffs' equal protection rights. We first conclude that we have subject matter jurisdiction to hear this appeal despite the plaintiffs' lack of compliance with the notice requirements. We also determine that the plaintiffs' equal protection rights have not been violated. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The procedural history of the present case is undisputed. In July, 2004, the plaintiffs filed the complaint in the present action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Public Acts 2003, No. 03-45, which amended General Statutes § 19a-3423 to prohibit smoking in restaurants and cafés and other public facilities, but not in casinos and most private clubs,4 violates the plaintiffs' right to equal protection under the state and federal constitutions. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

The defendants thereafter filed a motion to strike the complaint, arguing that the complaint had failed to set forth allegations sufficient to establish an equal protection violation.5 The trial court granted the motion to strike on equal protection grounds and, subsequently rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. This appeal followed.6

Following oral argument, we ordered the parties, sua sponte, to file supplemental briefs addressing the following questions: "Did the plaintiffs at any time give notice to all interested persons of their request for a declaratory judgment pursuant to Practice Book § 17-56? If not: (1) are the interests of the other interested persons protected by the defendants and/or their counsel, the [a]ttorney [g]eneral? or (2) does the failure to give such notice deprive this court of subject matter jurisdiction of the plaintiffs' appeal? See Stafford Higgins Industries, Inc. v. Norwalk, 245 Conn. 551, 577 n. 20, 715 A.2d 46 (1998)." The parties thereafter filed supplemental briefs as ordered, both of which acknowledged that notice of the declaratory judgment action was not given to certain interested persons pursuant to Practice Book § 17-56(b).

I

We first consider whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to render judgment in the present case despite the lack of notice to interested persons. Although the issue has not been raised by the parties, "a subject matter jurisdictional defect may not be waived . . . [or jurisdiction] conferred by the parties, explicitly or implicitly. . . . [T]he question of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law . . . and, once raised, either by a party or by the court itself, the question must be answered before the court may decide the case. . . . We have long held that because [a] determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Transportation v. Rocky Mountain, LLC, 277 Conn. 696, 703, 894 A.2d 259 (2006).

Our rules of practice provide that, in declaratory judgment actions, the plaintiff is required to provide notice to or seek joinder of "[a]ll persons who have an interest in the subject matter of the requested declaratory judgment that is direct, immediate and adverse to the interest of one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants in the action. . . ." Practice Book § 17-56(b). The plaintiff further is required to append to the complaint "a certificate stating that all such interested persons have been joined as parties to the action or have been given reasonable notice thereof." Practice Book § 17-56(b). In the present case, the plaintiffs acknowledge that they provided notice of their request for a declaratory judgment only to the defendants.7 They further admit that they failed to append the certificate of notice to their complaint.

This court previously has stated that the failure to provide notice to all interested parties in a declaratory judgment action deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction of the action. See, e.g., McBurney v. Cirillo, 276 Conn. 782, 793, 889 A.2d 759 (2006); Napoletano v. CIGNA Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc., 238 Conn. 216, 224-25, 680 A.2d 127 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103, 117 S.Ct. 1106, 137 L.Ed.2d 308 (1997); Hopkins v. Pac, 176 Conn. 318, 319, 407 A.2d 979 (1978). In recent years, however, the court has been willing to remand such cases to allow the defect to be cured, signaling a shift in the court's understanding of the nature of the defect. See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n. 5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) ("[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction," failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured); Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Raymark Corp., 215 Conn. 224, 230, 575 A.2d 693 (1990) ("[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proceedings in the trial court"); cf. Gianetti v. Norwalk Hospital, 211 Conn. 51, 56, 557 A.2d 1249 (1989) (because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties). The conclusion that such defects can be remedied on remand implicitly calls into question the jurisdictional nature of the defect because it conflicts with the well established principle that a judgment rendered without subject matter jurisdiction is void. See Commissioner of Transportation v. Rocky Mountain, LLC, supra, 277 Conn. at 725, 894 A.2d 259.

In addition, this court recently has questioned explicitly whether the failure to give notice of a declaratory judgment action is properly a question of subject matter jurisdiction. In Stafford Higgins Industries, Inc. v. Norwalk, supra, 245 Conn. at 577 n. 20, 715 A.2d 46, the court noted that "[r]ecent developments in our subject matter jurisdiction jurisprudence in other areas may cast doubt on the doctrine, however well established, that a failure to give the notice required under Practice Book § [17-56(b)] is a subject matter jurisdictional defect; see, e.g., Russo v. Watertown, [184 Conn. 30, 33-35, 441 A.2d 56 (1981)]; as opposed, for example, to a defect more closely resembling the failure to cite in or give notice to a necessary or indispensable party to litigation, which is not subject matter jurisdictional. See Fong v. Planning & Zoning Board of Appeals, 212 Conn. 628, 635-36 563 A.2d 293 (1989). We have indicated that subject matter jurisdiction is, with certain constitutional exceptions not applicable here, a matter of statute, not judicial rule making. See Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 184, 640 A.2d 601 (1994). General Statutes § 52-29(a) gives the Superior Court subject matter jurisdiction to render declaratory judgments, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. Subsection (b) of § 52-29 authorizes the judges to make such orders and rules as they may deem necessary or advisable to effectuate subsection (a). Practice Book § [17-56(b)] is an example of such a rule. It may be questionable that the judges may, pursuant to their rule-making authority under subsection (b) of § 52-29, limit the subject matter jurisdiction created by subsection (a) of § 52-29. See, e.g., General Statutes § 51-14(a) (The judges of the Supreme Court, the judges of the Appellate Court, and the judges of the Superior Court shall adopt and promulgate and may from time to time modify or repeal rules and forms regulating pleading, practice and procedure in judicial proceedings in courts in which they have the constitutional authority to make rules, for the purpose of simplifying proceedings in the courts and of promoting the speedy and efficient determination of litigation upon its merits. . . . Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right nor the jurisdiction of any of the courts . . .)." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)

This questioning by the court of its previous conclusion that the failure to provide notice in a declaratory judgment action is a subject matter jurisdictional defect apparently was recognized by the judges of the Superior Court in 2000, when the Practice Book provisions governing declaratory judgment actions were amended to provide that "no declaratory judgment action shall be defeated by the nonjoinder of parties or the failure to give notice to interested persons." Practice Book § 17-56(c). The commentary to this section...

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