Armstead v. Coler
| Citation | 914 F.2d 1464 |
| Decision Date | 15 October 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-3456,89-3456 |
| Parties | Charity ARMSTEAD, Woodrow Wilson Harrison, William Sills, etc., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Gregory S. COLER, as Sec. of the Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services, State of Florida, A.H. Baldwin, as Asst. Sec. for Operations of the Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative, etc., et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit) |
Marilyn G. Rose, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., Susan C. Jamieson, Atlanta, Ga., Patricia A. Clare, James A. Heard, Jacksonville Area Legal Aid, Inc., Jacksonville, Fla., for plaintiffs-appellants.
John W. Hedrick, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Eric J. Taylor, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Fla., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before JOHNSON and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, and SMITH *, Senior Circuit Judge.
This case arises from the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion to amend final judgment.
The Northeast Florida State Hospital ("NEFSH") is a state owned and operated institution for the mentally ill. Plaintiffs, appellants in this present appeal, are mentally retarded persons who reside at NEFSH or who did so at the time this suit commenced. At the time plaintiffs originally filed this suit, NEFSH was not staffed or equipped to offer appropriate care and habilitation for the mentally retarded. Defendants, appellees in this present appeal, are the Secretary of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") of the state of Florida and other HRS officials. HRS has overall responsibility for institutions and services provided to mentally retarded and mentally ill citizens of Florida.
The ten named plaintiffs originally filed suit on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated on February 28, 1984. Plaintiffs alleged violations of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 794. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had confined them at NEFSH without providing them with appropriate care or habilitation and had denied them post-commitment review and access to judicial tribunals to challenge the legality of their confinement.
The district court originally certified the class on June 27, 1984, as all persons who are mentally retarded, not mentally ill, residing at NEFSH as of February 28, 1984, and all future mentally retarded, not mentally ill, residents of NEFSH. Upon plaintiffs' motion, the district court later amended the class definition to cover two subclasses: (1) the solely mentally retarded, and (2) those diagnosed as both mentally retarded and mentally ill. Armstead v. Pingree, 629 F.Supp. 273, 280 (M.D.Fla.1986).
On October 29, 1987, HRS filed a motion to grant judgment for plaintiffs. On January 21, 1988, the plaintiffs filed a response along with their own motion for summary judgment. On February 8, 1989, the court granted judgment for the plaintiffs and set forth extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its summary judgment order, the court denied "remedial" relief to retarded persons who had been discharged or transferred out of NEFSH during the pendency of the litigation, 1 citing the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to such relief. The court also ordered HRS to submit a compliance plan within ninety days.
While awaiting the compliance plan, the plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the judgment so that it would, among other things, include the discharged patients in the relief granted. The court, however, denied that portion of the motion. The court eventually approved a modified version of the compliance plan, but again refused to include the discharged patients in the plan, declaring that such relief would exceed the scope of the action as it was filed and would violate the Eleventh Amendment bar on retroactive relief.
The standard of review for the district court's denial of a motion to amend final judgment is abuse of discretion. Barnes v. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 611 (11th Cir.1987); Evans v. Bexley, 750 F.2d 1498, 1500 (11th Cir.1985); Thomas v. Farmville Mfg. Co., 705 F.2d 1307, 1307 (11th Cir.1983).
In its order granting summary judgment, the court set out as a finding of fact a description of the class: "Plaintiffs and class members are persons who are either solely mentally retarded or both mentally retarded and mentally ill, and who reside or were confined in NEFSH on or after February 20, 1984, or will reside or be confined therein in the future." 2 The original class certification order used similar language, defining the class as "[t]hose persons who ... were residing at [NEFSH] on February 28, 1984, and all future residents...." Armstead, 629 F.Supp. at 278. The words "were confined in NEFSH on or after February 20, 1984" and "were residing at NEFSH" contemplate the possibility that some of the plaintiffs would be discharged prior to final judgment. On a literal reading, then, the court's factual finding includes in the class those members discharged between February 28, 1984, and the date of final judgment.
In its order approving the compliance plan, however, the district court clarified its understanding of the class entitled to relief. The court stated that patients who had been transferred out of NEFSH before final judgment were not members of the class entitled to relief. The court's primary justification for this refinement in class definition was that the plaintiffs' requested relief concerned conditions at the facility itself and not the specific conditions of individual class members.
The plaintiffs disagree with the district court's characterization of the relief requested in the amended complaint. The plaintiffs view the core allegations of the complaint as concerning the denial of services and post-commitment reviews to the individual class members. They point to paragraph 73 of the complaint, which requests that the court order appropriate placement of plaintiffs in facilities designed to provide habilitation, treatment, training, care, and services for the retarded. Paragraph 75 further requests that the court enjoin HRS from confining the retarded in any inappropriate facility. A plain reading of these two paragraphs of the complaint supports the plaintiffs' position, especially in view of the class definition.
HRS argues that Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 requires that the plaintiffs' complaint give the defendants fair notice of the claim and the grounds on which it rests. See Mann v. Adams Realty Co., 556 F.2d 288, 293 (5th Cir.1977); Feldman v. Jackson Memorial Hosp., 509 F.Supp. 815, 819 (S.D.Fla.1981) aff'd 752 F.2d 647 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1029, 105 S.Ct. 3504, 87 L.Ed.2d 635 (1985). As HRS reads the complaint, there is no notice that the class or relief includes patients discharged or transferred during the pendency of the litigation. But in view of the fact that a plain reading of the complaint allows an interpretation which includes the discharged patients in the class receiving relief, HRS's argument is without merit.
(2) The Four Walls of NEFSH
The heart of the disagreement between the parties concerns whether the relief requested, and that ultimately granted, focuses upon the institution of NEFSH or the individuals affected by the institution. HRS assumes that the relief is directed toward a place rather than a group of persons. HRS therefore asserts that individuals now not within the four walls of NEFSH are not entitled to relief because the complaint does not allege constitutional violations at a place other than NEFSH and does not link the defendants to any such violations outside the walls. HRS supports this assertion by pointing out that in order to sustain a section 1983 action a plaintiff must allege a constitutional wrong committed by the named defendant. See, e.g., Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1380 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 932, 104 S.Ct. 335, 78 L.Ed.2d 305 (1983). HRS concludes that any claim for relief outside the four walls of NEFSH should have been dismissed because the plaintiffs never linked any constitutional wrongs committed outside NEFSH to the defendants.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, characterize the claim as an allegation of wrongs against a group of persons (i.e., the class) rather than NEFSH itself. As support for this position, the plaintiffs note that the relief actually granted to those residing at NEFSH on or after the date of final judgment was not limited to reform of conditions within the institution. That relief included: (1) detailed provisions as to appropriate placement of class members upon discharge from NEFSH, (2) the right to a hearing to contest the proposed placement, (3) an automatic hearing six months after discharge to any residential facility in order to evaluate the appropriateness of placement, and (4) a requirement that class members be deemed "involuntary" patients as long as they are in any state residential facility. The plaintiffs assert that ...
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