Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Taylor
| Citation | 914 F.2d 261 |
| Decision Date | 05 September 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-15539,88-15539 |
| Parties | Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY, COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Helen TAYLOR, James Taylor and Richard Beeman, Defendants-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
Before POOLE, REINHARDT and BEEZER, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff/Appellant Aetna Casualty and Surety Company ("Aetna"), appeals from a judgment entered August 3, 1988 denying its complaint for declaratory judgment. A jury found Aetna liable for injuries sustained by Defendant/Appellee Richard Beeman ("Beeman") at the hands of Appellant's insured, Defendant/Appellee James Taylor, Jr. ("Taylor"). Aetna was also required to pay costs and attorney's fees.
On October 29, 1983 Taylor went to a newspaper distribution center in Casa Grande, Arizona. He shot Ronald Vandever and Richard Beeman. Vandever was killed. Beeman survived.
Beeman and Ernie Taylor, James' brother, were distributors for the Arizona Republic newspaper. Vandever was the distribution manager for the Republic in Casa Grande. There was testimony that approximately a year before the shooting incident Taylor had mistreated Beeman on two occasions. As a result, Vandever had barred James Taylor from the distribution site. Sometime prior to the date of the shooting, the route Ernie and James Taylor shared had been cut. The new driver was to start the day of incident.
On the day of the shooting, Olivia Duran, a Republic employee, was directed by Vandever to call the Taylor home to determine how many papers Ernie Taylor had taken the night before. Ms. Duran testified that she was told that Ernie was sleeping. She told the man who answered the phone that Ron Vandever wanted to know how many papers were taken and that Vandever was at the distribution center.
Approximately thirty to forty minutes passed between the time the phone call was made and the shooting. Taylor was seen sitting in a pickup truck near the distribution center. Beeman and Vandever were in the back of the building guiding an incoming truck in. Taylor came up alongside the truck and fired three shots at Vandever and then three more at Beeman. Witnesses testified that he walked from the scene, stopped under a tree and took the shells out of his gun. He then ran towards his truck and drove off. Taylor was apprehended by the police shortly thereafter.
Taylor was found guilty of second degree murder and second degree attempted murder. Subsequent to Taylor's criminal conviction, Beeman filed a civil suit against Taylor for damages he sustained from the shooting. Aetna defended Taylor in the tort action under a reservation of rights. The court found in favor of Beeman and entered a judgment in the amount of $106,649.10. Beeman turned to Aetna to satisfy the judgment.
James Taylor, Jr. was an insured under a homeowner's policy issued by Aetna to Taylor's parents. The policy provided coverage for bodily injury and property damage caused by the insured. However, an exclusion clause in the policy stated that coverage was not provided for injury or damage which was "expected or intended by the insured." (CR 46 Exhibit C at 12). Aetna brought the instant diversity declaratory judgment action against both Taylor and Beeman, seeking a declaration that there was no coverage under the policy. 1
The question for the jury in this case was whether Taylor "expected or intended" to injure Richard Beeman. Experts testified that Taylor suffered from an organic brain disorder which superimposed by alcohol intoxication affected cognitive thinking, judgment, impulse control and aggression. Aetna's expert testified to the contrary.
Aetna objected to the court's instructions on the following grounds: (1) the instructions did not properly allocate the burden of proof on the issue of Taylor's mental derangement; (2) the instructions told the jury to look only at Taylor's intent and expectations as to Beeman and thereby ignored the evidence concerning Vandever; (3) the instructions misstated Arizona law by substituting the word "impulse" for the word "compulsion." Further, Aetna states that the district court erred in refusing to charge the jury that intentionally wrongful acts were not insurable as a matter of public policy and that there is a presumption that one intends the natural consequences of an act.
Aetna's objections to the instructions were overruled. The jury found that Taylor did not expect or intend to injure Beeman and therefore, Taylor's actions did not fall under the policy exclusion. The district court entered judgment denying Aetna's motion for declaratory judgment and awarded Beeman costs and attorney's fees. Aetna's Motion for New Trial was denied and it timely appealed.
The test in reviewing jury instructions to which timely objections have been made is "whether, viewing the jury instructions as a whole, the trial judge gave adequate instructions on each element of the case to ensure that the jury fully understood the issues." Del Madera Properties v. Rhodes and Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d 973, 978 (9th Cir.1987) (internal quotes omitted). A court's error in instructing the jury in a civil case is not reversible if it is more probably than not harmless. Id. at 979. "The trial judge has substantial latitude in tailoring the instructions, and challenges to the formulation adopted by the court are reviewed for abuse of discretion." United States v. Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d 1208, 1214 (9th Cir.1989). The test is whether the jury was misled in any way and if it had an understanding of the issues. Van Cleef v. Aeroflex Corp., 657 F.2d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir.1981).
A district court's decision concerning a motion for a new trial pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Hard v. Burlington Northern R.R., 812 F.2d 482, 483 (9th Cir.1987)
Aetna's Proposed Instruction No. 8 2 would have required Beeman to prove that Taylor lacked the capacity to act in accordance with reason. Aetna argues that a presumption of sanity existed and that this presumption required Beeman to prove to the jury that the presumption of sanity had been overcome. Beeman denies the existence of a presumption of sanity in this case, but even if it did, it was contradicted and thus ceased to exist by the close of trial.
We do not decide whether a presumption of sanity existed in light of the fact that even if a presumption did exist, it was properly refuted and therefore terminated prior to the jury instruction stage. As the court said in Seiler v. Whiting, 52 Ariz. 542, 548-549, 84 P.2d 452, 454-455 (1938) (emphasis added):
In truth there is but one type of presumption in the strict legal meaning of the word, and that is merely a general rule of law that under some circumstances, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, a jury is compelled to reach a certain conclusion of fact. But a presumption so declared by the law is only raised by the absence of any real evidence as to the existence of the ultimate fact in question. It is not in and of itself evidence, but merely an arbitrary rule imposed by the law, to be applied in the absence of evidence, and whenever evidence contradicting the presumption is offered the latter disappears entirely, and the triers of fact are bound to follow the usual rules of evidence in reaching their ultimate conclusion of fact.
Thus, it is clear under Arizona law that once a presumption is contradicted it disappears. Seiler 84 P.2d at 454-455; Sheehan v. Pima County, 135 Ariz. 235, 238, 660 P.2d 486, 489 (1982). Aetna admits that there was sufficient evidence of Taylor's mental state, not only to create a question of fact for the jury as to mental derangement negating intent but also to support a verdict in Beeman's favor. (Appellant's Opening Brief at 11, 26). Once contradictory evidence is introduced, any alleged presumption of intent disappears and the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact must be determined as if no presumption had ever existed. Sheehan, 135 Ariz. at 238, 660 P.2d at 489. Thus, even if there was a presumption that Taylor intended the consequences of his acts it disappeared from this case prior to the jury instruction phase of the trial.
The burden of proving that the loss fell within the policy exclusion is on Aetna. Vanguard Insurance Co. v. Cantrell, 18 Ariz.App. 486, 503 P.2d 962, 965 (Ariz.App.1972). ( ) Exclusionary rules are strictly construed against an insurer. Globe American Casualty Co. v. Lyons, 131 Ariz. 337, 641 P.2d 251, 253 (Ariz.App.1982). Therefore, in this case, Aetna had the burden of proving that Taylor expected or intended to harm Beeman, that is, Aetna had the burden of proving that Taylor was not mentally deranged at the time of the...
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