Navarro-Colón v. Rodríguez-Mulet

• Decision Date: 28 January 2022
• Docket Number: Civil No. 21-1132 (FAB)
• Citation: 582 F.Supp.3d 5
• Parties: Marilyn NAVARRO-COLÓN, Plaintiff, v. Héctor RODRÍGUEZ-MULET, Maite Oronoz-Rodríguez, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

582 F.Supp.3d 5

Marilyn NAVARRO-COLÓN, Plaintiff,

v.Héctor RODRÍGUEZ-MULET, Maite Oronoz-Rodríguez, Defendants.

Civil No. 21-1132 (FAB)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed January 28, 2022

German J. Brau-Ramirez, Bauza Brau Irizarry Ojeda & Silva, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Elisabet Garcia-Torres, Puerto Rico Department of Justice, Isabel Torres-Sastre, McConnell Valdes, LLC, Jose R. Cintron-Rodriguez, Litigation Division Puerto Rico Electric Power Autority, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

BESOSA, District Judge.

Defendants Hector Rodríguez-Mulet ("Rodríguez") and Maite Oronoz-Rodríguez ("Rodríguez") (collectively, "defendants") move to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (" Rule 12(b)(6)"). (Docket Nos. 22 & 25.) For the reasons set forth below, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

I. Background

This litigation seeks to invalidate the Puerto Rico bar examination. Plaintiff Marilyn Navarro-Colón ("Navarro") earned a juris doctorate degree from the School of Law of the Pontifical Catholic University of Puerto Rico ("Catholic University") on May 25, 2001. (Docket No. 16 at p 1.) She subsequently failed the Puerto Rico bar examination in September 2001, September 2002, March 2003, March 2004, March 2005, and March 2006. (Docket No. 25, Ex. 1 at p. 1.)¹ Rule 5.8.1 of the Regulations for the Board of Bar Examiners ("Rule 5.8.1") provides that:

an applicant [who] has failed the General Bar Examination or the Notarial Law Examination on six (6) different occasions, after September 1983 ... will no longer be admitted to any of these examinations.

(Docket No. 16, Ex. 1 at p. 20) (emphasis added).² Consequently, Navarro is ineligible for admission by examination.

The amended complaint asserts a tripartite challenge, citing the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Docket No. 10 at p. 2.) First, Navarro maintains that Rule 5.8.1 deprives her of the right to practice law (assuming that she obtains a passing score on the examination). Id. at p. 6. Second, because applicants seeking admission in "every other profession" in Puerto Rico are afforded "an unlimited number of opportunities to take the qualifying exams," Navarro also alleges that Rule 5.8.1 is discriminatory. Id. at p. 4. Third, she contends that the "procedures used by the Board of Bar Examiners to select and grade the questions of the Bar exam" are arbitrary and capricious. Id. at p. 7. Navarro seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, requesting that this Court nullify Rule 5.8.1 (which would allow her to sit for the examination again), and order the defendants "to adopt a rational and uniform process for the selection and grading of Bar Exam Questions." Id. at p. 7.

A. Rule 5.8.1

The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico adopted Rule 5.8.1 in 1986, fifteen years before Navarro graduated from law school. (Docket No. 10 at p. 3.) Rodríguez is the Executive Director of the Puerto Rico Board of Bar Examiners, "responsible for the implementation" of Rule 5.8.1. Id. at p. 2. The Puerto Rico Supreme Court possesses the exclusive and inherent authority to "regulate the legal profession" in Puerto Rico. Rivera Schatz v. Commonwealth, 2014 RSPR 122, 191 D.P.R. 791, 2014 PR. Sup. LEXIS 122 (official translation) (2014) ; see Ex Parte Sanjurjo, 55 P.R. Dec. 54, 1939 PR Sup. LEXIS 428 (1939) (official translation) (noting that the practice of law "is a special privilege or concession, revocable at the will of [the] Supreme Court, which is empowered to require from any applicant for a license a demonstration, through the corresponding examination, of his capacity and preparation for the practice of law").³ Oronoz is the Chief Justice of the Puerto Rico Supreme Court. (Docket No. 10 at p. 32.)

Rule 5.8.1 survived constitutional scrutiny in 1999, solidifying the six-exam limitation as a legitimate prerequisite for admission to the bar. Like Navarro, Victor Velázquez-Feliciano ("Velázquez") failed "the Bar Exam on six (6) different occasions." Feliciano v. Tribunal Supremo De Puerto Rico, 78 F. Supp. 2d 4, 7 (D.P.R. 1999) (Domínguez, J.). He sued the Puerto Rico Supreme Court pursuant to the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Court dismissed both claims on the merits, rejecting the proposition that Velazquez possessed a "constitutionally protected interest in taking the Bar Examination an unlimited number of times." Id. at 18. The Puerto Rico Supreme Court "has a legitimate interest in protecting the public from incompetent lawyers and repeated failures in a Bar Examination may in itself reflect upon a person's incompetency to practice law." Id. at 19. Accordingly, Rule 5.8.1 satisfied the rational basis standard of review. Id. ⁴

The policy set forth in Rule 5.8.1 is, however, disfavored by the Puerto Rico legislature. In 2010, it adopted a more laissez-faire approach by passing Act 88. Docket No. 10 at p. 4 (citing Laws P.R. Ann. tit. 20, § 23). Pursuant to this statute, "persons who wish to take licensure examination for any profession that so requires shall have unlimited opportunities to take and pass these examinations." Laws P.R. Ann. tit. 20, § 23(a) (emphasis added). Act 88 does not "apply to the legal profession." Id. § 23(c).

In 2012, however, the Puerto Rico legislature amended Act 88, urging the Puerto Rico Supreme Court "to revise the rules and regulations of the Board of Bar Examiners, [and] to determine whether it would be prudent for candidates for the bar examination to have unlimited opportunities to take and pass the same." Id. According to Navarro, "[it] was expected by the Legislative Assembly that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico would follow suit and amend its regulation to conform to the rule." (Docket No. 10 at p. 4.) It did not. Applicants seeking admission to the bar remain subject to Rule 5.8.1.

B. The Puerto Rico Bar Examination

The amended complaint alleges that the bar examination is flawed in several respects. (Docket No. 10 at pp. 4-5.) This examination is intended to assess an applicant's "ability to analyze legal problems." Laws P.R. Ann. tit. 4A, § 4. Essay and multiple-choice questions test the applicants’ knowledge of the following subjects: administrative law, constitutional law, corporations, family law, successions [wills and estates], mortgage law, commercial law and negotiable instruments, criminal law, evidence, property law, ethics and professional responsibility, obligations and contracts, civil procedure, criminal procedure, and torts. Id.⁵

Navarro avers that: (1) the exam is not "fair," (2) "the test varies greatly from exam to exam," (3) "[q]uestions are drafted in a haphazard manner by different examiners," (4) the "[s]election of questions is subjective," (5) and that the failure rate is abnormally high. Id. at p. 4.

II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

To survive a Rule 12(b) (6) motion, the amended complaint must contain sufficient factual material "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Courts adopt a two-step approach to adjudicate motions to dismiss. First, a court "isolate[s] and ignore[s] statements in the complaint that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action elements." Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012). Second, a court "take[s] the complaint's well-pled (i.e., non-conclusory, non-speculative) facts as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor, and see[s] if they plausibly narrate a claim for relief." Id.

"The relevant question for a district court in assessing plausibility is not whether the complaint makes any particular factual allegations but rather, whether ‘the complaint warrant[s] dismissal because it failed in toto to render plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief plausible.’ " Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). An affirmative defense based on the statute of limitations "may be raised in a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." Santana-Castro v. Toledo-Dávila, 579 F.3d 109, 113 (1st Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation omitted).

A. Section 1983

The amended complaint centers on a single section 1983 cause of action. Section 1983 "provides a venue for vindicating rights elsewhere conferred." Marrero-Sáez v. Aibonito, 668 F. Supp. 2d 327, 332 (D.P.R. 2009) (Casellas, J.) (citing Graham v. M.S. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ). To prevail on her section 1983 claim, Navarro must demonstrate that: (1) the defendants deprived her of a constitutional right; (2) that a "causal connection exists between [defendants’ conduct] and the [constitutional deprivation]; and (3) that the challenged conduct is attributable to a person acting under color of state law." Sánchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ).

Section 1983 "borrow[s] the forum state's statute of limitations for personal-injury actions." Álamo- Hornedo v. Puig, 745 F.3d 578, 580 (1st Cir. 2014) ; see Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 69 (1st Cir. 2011) ("For purposes of section 1983, Puerto Rico is the functional equivalent of a state."). In Puerto Rico, personal-injury tort actions have a one-year statute of limitations. Quiñones-Irizarry v. Corporacíon del Fondo del Seguro del Estado, 257 F. Supp. 3d 206, 212 n.7 (D.P.R. 2017) (citing P.R. Laws Ann. tit 31, § 5289(2)) (Besosa, J.). Federal law, however, governs the date on which the limitations clock begins to run. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007) ("[T]he accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action...