U.S. v. R.L.C.

• Decision Date: 18 December 1990
• Docket Number: No. 90-5048,90-5048
• Citation: 915 F.2d 320
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. R.L.C., Juvenile Male, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 320

915 F.2d 320

UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. R.L.C., Juvenile Male, Appellant.

No. 90-5048.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 14, 1990.

Decided Sept. 12, 1990.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc

Denied Dec. 18, 1990.

Katherian D. Roe, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellant.

Jeanne J. Graham, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellee.

Before LAY, Chief Judge, and HEANEY and BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judges.

HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

R.L.C., a juvenile, appeals from the district court's finding of juvenile delinquency for involuntary manslaughter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Secs. 5031, 1112(b), and 1153. He also appeals from a sentence of three years detention in a federal juvenile correctional facility. We affirm the finding of juvenile delinquency but vacate R.L.C.'s sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing.

BACKGROUND

R.L.C., 16, was charged in a one-count information with involuntary manslaughter on the Red Lake Indian Reservation for causing the death of LaTesha Lynn Mountain while driving a car in a reckless manner while intoxicated.

Following an evening of heavy drinking, R.L.C. and another juvenile, James White, Jr., stole a car on the Red Lake Reservation. Shortly after the car was stolen, a witness saw it rear-end a car driven by Deborah Garrigan while travelling east on Highway 1 in Red Lake. Mountain, Garrigan's daughter, died from head injuries she received when she was thrown from the back seat to the front seat of Garrigan's car during the accident. The stolen car was later found in flames in the woods southwest of the accident scene.

R.L.C. and White both admitted drinking, stealing the car, and driving it at some point during the evening. Both denied having driven the car, however, at the time the accident occurred. Three witnesses, including White, placed R.L.C. behind the wheel at or immediately before the time of the accident. R.L.C. stated that he was sleeping in the passenger seat when the accident occurred, and did not awaken until the car crashed and ignited in the woods.

Following a trial to the court, the district court found that R.L.C. had been driving the car while intoxicated and in a reckless manner at the time of the accident which caused Mountain's death and that this conduct constituted involuntary manslaughter within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1112(a). The district court adjudged R.L.C. to be a juvenile delinquent under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5031.

At sentencing, the prosecution requested that R.L.C. receive the statutory maximum penalty for involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1112(b), three years. The district court acceded to the request and sentenced R.L.C. to three years detention at the Missouri River Adolescent Center in Chamberlain, South Dakota. R.L.C. appeals.

DISCUSSION

R.L.C. raises two issues on appeal. He claims that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he drove the car at the time of the accident. After carefully reviewing the record, we believe the trial testimony adequately supports the district court's finding R.L.C. also claims that the district court erred in sentencing him to the three-year maximum statutory penalty for involuntary manslaughter when an adult sentenced for the same offense under the sentencing guidelines would have received a maximum sentence of only twenty-one months.

that R.L.C. was driving the car when the accident occurred. Accordingly, R.L.C.'s sufficiency of the evidence claim is without merit.

As a juvenile delinquent, R.L.C. was sentenced under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5037. Section 5037(c) states:

The term for which official detention may be ordered for a juvenile found to be a juvenile delinquent may not extend--

(1) in the case of a juvenile who is less than eighteen years old, beyond the lesser of--

(A) the date when the juvenile becomes twenty-one years old; or

(B) the maximum term of imprisonment that would be authorized if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult[.]

18 U.S.C. Sec. 5037(c)(1) (1988).

R.L.C. argues that the phrase "maximum term of imprisonment that would be authorized if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult" means the maximum sentence an adult could receive under the sentencing guideline for the same offense. Guideline section 2A1.4(a)(2) provides a base offense level of 14 for involuntary manslaughter caused by reckless conduct. At a criminal history category of I, a base offense level of 14 yields a sentencing range of 15-21 months. R.L.C. therefore argues that his sentence of three years violates 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5037(c)(1)(B).

The government argues that "maximum term of imprisonment that would be authorized if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult" refers to the statutory maximum sentence for the particular offense committed. The maximum sentence for involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1112 is three years. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1112(b) (1988). The government argues that R.L.C.'s three-year sentence is the same as the maximum term of imprisonment an adult could have received if convicted of the same offense, and that the sentence therefore is permitted under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5037(c)(1)(B).

Section 5037 provides no definition of "maximum term of imprisonment that would be authorized if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult." In light of this failure, we must determine the intent of Congress in enacting section 5037(c)(1)(B) to resolve its ambiguity. See United States v. Jones, 811 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir.1987).

In construing a statute to ascertain its drafters' intent, we look first to the language of the statute itself, then to its legislative history. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547-48, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). As further aids in the determination of legislative intent, we may also properly consider a statute's subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, the underlying policies, and the consequences of various interpretations. Kifer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 1325, 1332 (8th Cir.1985). An examination of all these factors persuades us that Congress did not intend juvenile delinquents ordinarily to be subject to penalties harsher than those received by adults convicted of the same offense.

Section 5037(c)(1)'s language expresses a preference for juvenile sentences which are the lesser of the period of time between sentencing and the juvenile's twenty-first birthday and "the maximum term of imprisonment that would be authorized if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult." 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5037(c) (1988). The phrase "if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult" suggests that the sentencing court should focus on the actual maximum sentence the particular juvenile in question would have been subject to but for his age, considering those individualized, subjective factors that would be relevant to sentencing the same individual as an adult. Had R.L.C. been tried for and convicted of involuntary manslaughter as an adult, he would have been sentenced under the sentencing guidelines, which provide a maximum sentence of 21 months for The sentencing guidelines themselves do not apply to individuals sentenced as juveniles. See United States Sentencing Commission, Questions Most Frequently Asked About the Sentencing Guidelines 1 (Nov. 30, 1988). Section 5037 provides, however, that after a finding of juvenile delinquency, the court should consider any pertinent policy statements promulgated by the Sentencing Commission in determining the disposition appropriate to the offense. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5037(a) (1988). Using the sentencing guidelines to fix the maximum sentence a juvenile delinquent could receive would serve as a guide to courts to eliminate unwarranted disparity between juvenile and adult sentences. Using the upper limit of the applicable guideline sentencing range as the maximum sentence a juvenile could receive thus would further section 5037(c)'s goal of avoiding harsher penalties for juvenile offenders than for similarly situated adults.

an individual with R.L.C.'s criminal history. The sentencing guidelines establish the permissible maximum and minimum sentence in all cases except those in which the sentencing court finds "that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines and that should result in a sentence [above or below the guideline range]." 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(b) (1988).

Section 5037's legislative history also suggests that Congress intended the "maximum term of imprisonment" in subsection (c)(1)(B) to be the maximum term the juvenile in question actually could have received if sentenced as an adult under the guidelines, rather than the statutory maximum sentence for the offense committed.

Section 5037(c)(1)(B) was amended as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (CCCA), the same legislation that authorized the establishment of the sentencing guidelines. See Pub.L. No. 98-473, Title II, 98 Stat.1976 (1984). ¹ This legislation made sweeping reforms in the sentencing of both adult and juvenile federal offenders. The CCCA's sentencing reform policies and goals, when considered in conjunction with other changes the CCCA made in the disposition of juvenile offenders, persuade us that Congress did not intend the real time served by juvenile offenders to exceed the real time that would be served by adults convicted of similar crimes.

The CCCA sought to establish a comprehensive and consistent system of sentencing that would promote fairness by eliminating unwarranted sentence disparity. S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 50-52, reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3133-35; see also U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, Introduction 3 The Basic Approach (policy statement) (Congress' goals in sentencing reform were to...