Doe v. Alabama State Dept. of Educ., 89-7527

Citation915 F.2d 651
Decision Date24 October 1990
Docket NumberNo. 89-7527,89-7527
Parties63 Ed. Law Rep. 40 Mr. DOE and Mrs. Doe, as parents and next friend of John Doe, a Handicapped minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The ALABAMA STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; Wayne Teague, its Superintendent; Ann Ramsey, its Program for Exceptional Children Coordinator; Anita Hardin; Gerald S. Leischuck, Defendants, the Auburn City Board of Education; its Superintendent, Edward R. Richardson; its Assistant Superintendent and Special Education Coordinator Gerald W. Johnson; its Chairman, James K. Haygood, Jr.; its Vice-Chairman, Theoler Harris; its members Ila Miller; Carolyn G. Mathews; and Larry D. Ridgeway; and the Principal of Auburn High School, Robert W. Dotson, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Jonathan A. Zimring, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Robert T. Meadows, III, Walker, Hill, Adams, Umbach & Meadows, Opelika, Ala., for Auburn City Bd. of Educ., Richardson, Miller, Johnson, et al.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.

Before HATCHETT and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and DYER, Senior Circuit Judge.

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge:

This appeal involves a dispute over the appropriate educational placement for John Doe under the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), 20 U.S.C. Secs. 1401-1461 (1990) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 794 (1982 & Supp.1990). In the district court, the Does challenged a state hearing officer's determination that the defendants offered John a free appropriate public education and that placement in a private residential school was not necessary. The district court agreed with the hearing officer that the defendants offered John an educational program which met the requirements of the EHA. The court also found that the school did not violate section 504 by intentionally discriminating against John in its provision of services to him. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. OVERVIEW OF THE EHA

The EHA was enacted to encourage and assist the provision of a free and appropriate education by the states to all handicapped children. 1 The EHA provides federal aid to state and local agencies that comply with its provisions. In order to qualify for federal assistance the agency must "[have] in effect a policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1412(1). The EHA defines "free appropriate public education" as:

special education and related services which (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(a)(5) of this title.

20 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(a)(18). The Supreme Court has held that in order to satisfy its duty to provide a free appropriate public education, a state must provide "personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction." Hendrick Hudson Central School District Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3049, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982).

The "personalized instruction" required by the EHA is carried out in accordance with an "individualized educational program" (IEP), which must be developed for each handicapped child. The IEP is developed as a written statement for each child in a meeting between the teacher, parents or guardian, and local educational agency representatives. The statement must include a discussion of the child's present level of performance; annual goals and short-term instructional objectives; the specific educational services to be provided to the child; the extent to which the handicapped child is able to participate in regular educational programs; the projected date of initiation and duration of the services; and the means of determining whether the instructional objectives are being met. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(a)(19).

As this court has noted, the IEP is more than a mere exercise in public relations. It forms the basis for the handicapped child's entitlement to an individualized and appropriate education. Georgia Association of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 716 F.2d 1565, 1571 (11th Cir.1983), vacated on other grounds, 468 U.S. 1213, 104 S.Ct. 3581, 82 L.Ed.2d 880 (1984), adopted and modified on other grounds, 740 F.2d 902 (1984). As such, its development and formalization are the focus of a host of procedural requirements. 2 Such requirements regulate, among other things, the timing and methods of evaluating and classifying a child's handicap, the notification that must be given parents or guardians prior to school action regarding the child, the personnel required to be consulted in creating an IEP, and the procedures for reevaluating a child and revising an IEP.

The EHA also provides important procedural rights for the parent and child in the event a child's education deviates from a mutually arrived upon IEP. Georgia Association of Retarded Citizens, 716 F.2d at 1571. See also Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1010-11, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3467-68, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984) (noting that the EHA not only establishes an enforceable substantive right to a free appropriate public education, but it also establishes an elaborate procedural mechanism to protect the rights of handicapped children). The EHA grants handicapped children or their parents or guardians "an opportunity to present complaints with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child." 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(b)(1)(E). Thus, parents are entitled under the EHA to prior written notice whenever an educational agency proposes or refuses to initiate a change in the evaluation or educational placement of their child or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the handicapped child. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(b)(1)(C). If dissatisfied with the educational program offered by the school, parents or guardians are entitled to an impartial due process hearing, 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(b)(2); 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(c), complete with all the rights of a full trial, 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(d). Finally, parents have a right to appeal a decision of the state educational agency to a United States district court, which shall hear such additional evidence necessary to engage in a de novo resolution of the complaint. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(e)(2), (4).

The Supreme Court, in Board of Education v. Rowley, delineated the appropriate standard of review for a court faced with a challenge to state educational decisions:

[A] court's inquiry in suits brought under Sec. 1415(e)(2) is two-fold. First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the individualized educational program developed through the Act's procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits? If these two requirements are met, the State has complied with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more.

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07, 102 S.Ct. at 3051 (footnotes omitted). In this case, the plaintiffs challenge the school board's decisions regarding their son's educational program under both prongs of the Rowley standard.

II. FACTS

John Doe is currently nineteen years old and suffers from a major affective disorder, specifically manic-depressive illness. This illness has caused John substantial academic difficulty, as it creates episodes of depression and unmanageable hyperactivity, affects John's ability to concentrate, and causes him considerable stress when he is confronted by the normal educational environment.

At the age of 14, during the summer between his seventh and eighth grade years at school, John experienced severe emotional disturbances and was hospitalized for approximately three months at the Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Unit at Vanderbilt University Hospital. There, he was diagnosed as having a schizophrenic disorder, paranoid type. While he was hospitalized, John's parents moved from Johnson City, Tennessee, to Auburn, Alabama. Upon John's release from the hospital, Mrs. Doe contacted the Auburn City Schools' Special Education Coordinator seeking educational services for John. John arrived in Auburn in early October 1985.

In late October or early November of 1985, Auburn City Schools classified John as an emotionally conflicted (E/C) student. Such classification entitled John to services as a handicapped student under the EHA. At first, defendants provided John with a home tutorial program of three hours per week. Later, in January 1986, pursuant to an IEP developed by John's tutor, John began attending special education and regular academic classes at Auburn Junior High School. John's placement at the Junior High School was not entirely successful. John began to experience emotional disturbances, and he was often tardy for class and failed to turn in work assignments. Approximately one month before the end of the semester, John was placed on in-school suspension; he was later suspended for the last five days of the 1985-86 school year.

During the summer of 1986, John was hospitalized for severe depression. His diagnosis was revised from schizophrenia to manic-depressive illness. At this time, John's doctor changed his drug therapy from anti-psychotic drugs to lithium. The lithium treatment has proved somewhat successful in stabilizing John's disorder. No educational services were offered to John during this summer.

In August of 1986, Mrs. Doe contacted the Special Education Coordinator for Auburn City Schools, seeking educational services for John for the...

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