916 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1990), 89-2070, Pride v. Venango River Corp.

Docket Nº89-2070.
Citation916 F.2d 1250
Party Name17 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1158 David L. PRIDE, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. VENANGO RIVER CORPORATION, Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company, IC Industries, Incorporated, also known as Whitman Corporation, Harry Bruce, Henry Borgsmiller, and Richard Bessette, Defendants-Appellees.
Case DateOctober 25, 1990
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Page 1250

916 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1990)

17 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1158

David L. PRIDE, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

VENANGO RIVER CORPORATION, Illinois Central Gulf Railroad

Company, IC Industries, Incorporated, also known as Whitman

Corporation, Harry Bruce, Henry Borgsmiller, and Richard

Bessette, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 89-2070.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit

October 25, 1990

Argued Dec. 13, 1989.

As Amended Nov. 5, 1990.

Page 1251

Amiel Cueto, Cueto, Daley, Williams, Moore & Cueto, Belleville, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Gregory S. Davis, Robert H. Joyce, Ronald L. Lipinski, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, Ill., for Venango River Corp.

William J. Billeaud, William A. Brasher, St. Louis, Mo., Francis D. Morrissey, Thomas A. Doyle, William Lynch Schaller, John M. McGarry, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.

Before WOOD, Jr., COFFEY and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.

HARLINGTON WOOD, Jr., Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs' first amended complaint alleged that the defendants violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1961 et seq., when they engaged in a scheme to defraud the plaintiffs of their seniority rights and other employment benefits. The district court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss on the ground that section 153 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. Secs. 151 et seq., pre-empted the plaintiffs' claims and gave the National Railway Adjustment Board exclusive jurisdiction over the parties' dispute.

Subsequent to oral argument, we observed a serious defect in the plaintiffs' notice of appeal and requested additional briefing. 1 The defective notice of appeal reads in its entirety as follows:

In the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Illinois

David L. Pride, et al., Plaintiffs,

V.

Venango River Corporation, et al., Defendants.

No. 89-5012

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Come now the plaintiffs by their attorney, Amiel Cueto, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Chapter 133, Sec. 2107 hereby notices that the plaintiffs are appealing to the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals from the judgement and order entered by the U.S. District Court, the Honorable William Beatty, on May 10, 1989, dismissing the plaintiffs' entire case with prejudice. A copy of Judge Beatty's order is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) requires that "the notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal...." The issue that concerned us was whether the identification of the appellants in the text of the notice of appeal as "the plaintiffs" and the caption's reference to "David L. Pride, et al." satisfied the specificity requirement of FED.R.APP.P. 3(c).

While none of the parties dispute the identity of the intended appellants, the Supreme Court found in Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 108 S.Ct. 2405, 101 L.Ed.2d 285 (1988), that actual confusion is not a prerequisite to...

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