Herrera v. Union No. 39 School Dist.

• Decision Date: 04 August 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-204.,05-204.
• Citation: 2006 VT 83,917 A.2d 923
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: Dr. Ebaristo "Abe" HERRERA v. UNION NO. 39 SCHOOL DISTRICT and James Van Hoof.

917 A.2d 923

2006 VT 83

Dr. Ebaristo "Abe" HERRERA v. UNION NO. 39 SCHOOL DISTRICT and James Van Hoof.

No. 05-204.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

Motion for Reargument Denied December 19, 2006.

August 4, 2006.

Theresa S. DiMauro, J.

Michael Marks of Tarrant, Marks & Gillies, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Kaveh S. Shahi of Cleary Shahi & Aicher, P.C., Rutland, for Defendants-Appellees.

Present: REIBER, C.J., JOHNSON, SKOGLUND and BURGESS, JJ., and MARTIN, SUPR. J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

JOHNSON, J.

¶ 1. This appeal arises out of an employment dispute between plaintiff Dr. Ebaristo Herrera, former principal of Black River Union High School, and defendants Union No. 39 School District and Dr. James Van Hoof, the District's superintendent. Plaintiff appeals from the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff contends the court erred by concluding that the District's decision to place him on paid administrative leave for the remainder of his term of employment without a hearing did not breach plaintiff's employment contract or deprive him of a protected property or liberty interest without due process of law. We reverse in part and remand.

¶ 2. The superior court determined that the following facts are undisputed. See V.R.C.P. 56(c)(2) ("All material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served by the opposing party."). In 2000, plaintiff was hired by the District to serve as principal of Black River Union High School in Ludlow, Vermont. Plaintiff's employment contract provided for a two-year term, beginning July 1, 2000, and continuing through June 30, 2002. The contract also provided that plaintiff would be notified in writing whether his contract would be renewed for the next school year, and that "[s]hould the [District's school board] choose not to re-employ [plaintiff] for said year, or should the Board suspend or dismiss [plaintiff] during the term of this Agreement, [plaintiff] shall be entitled to appeal such action pursuant to [16 V.S.A. § 243]."

¶ 3. In February 2001, the relationship between plaintiff and Dr. Van Hoof began to deteriorate, based at least in part on accusations by Dr. Van Hoof regarding plaintiff's job performance. In the spring of 2001, Dr. Van Hoof asked the District's school board to terminate plaintiff's employment, but the board decided not to do so after members of plaintiff's staff and the community showed support for plaintiff at a public meeting.

¶ 4. In the fall of 2001, Dr. Van Hoof again began accusing plaintiff of poor job performance, issuing several negative reports on his performance. On November 9, 2001, Dr. Van Hoof compiled these reports into a single evaluation, which he provided to the board. On November 28, plaintiff met with the board to discuss this evaluation. At that meeting, the board invited plaintiff and Dr. Van Hoof into an executive session, where the board, plaintiff, and Dr. Van Hoof briefly discussed Dr. Van Hoof's evaluation of plaintiff. The board then presented plaintiff with a document entitled "Settlement and Release Agreement," along with a copy of plaintiff's employment contract and a copy of 16 V.S.A. § 243, the statute governing the employment of school principals. The board gave plaintiff the choice of resigning, pursuant to the agreement, with full pay and benefits, or facing immediate termination. Plaintiff did not respond to the request for his resignation, and the board informed him that he would be placed on administrative leave until the board received his response. The board ordered plaintiff not to talk to anyone but his immediate family, his attorney, and his financial advisor about the proposed agreement or the decision to place him on administrative leave.

¶ 5. On December 19, 2001, the board met again and voted to place plaintiff on paid administrative leave for the remainder of the 2001-02 school year. It also voted not to renew plaintiff's employment contract. Neither issue was part of the board's agenda. The board's decision appeared in an article in the December 20 edition of the Rutland Herald, under the headline, "BRHS principal is fired by the Board; Personnel evaluation is cited." The article stated that the board had made its decision on the basis of Dr. Van Hoof's evaluation of plaintiff's performance, but also based on "potentially costly and damaging reasons" that were "not fit for public review." The article quoted board member John Perry as saying that revealing the true reasons for the board's actions would be "doing a great disservice." Perry said that by doing so, he "would be putting the taxpayers in jeopardy. . . . It is incredibly frustrating not to be able to stand up and tell you why I ([voted to fire] [plaintiff]). You all would pay for it." Dr. Van Hoof was quoted in the article as saying, "For [plaintiff] to sit there and lead people to believe that he doesn't know why he's at this point, that's ridiculous."

¶ 6. On December 20, the board sent plaintiff two letters formally informing him of its actions. The first letter stated that the board had voted to place him on "a paid leave of absence for the remainder of the 2001/02 school year," during which he would be "relieved of all duties, responsibilities and authority." The second letter stated that the board had voted not to renew plaintiff's contract for the 2002-03 school year, "based upon the performance deficiencies as set forth in the Superintendent's November 9, 2001 performance evaluation." The letter continued:

As provided by your Employment Contract and state statute, you have fifteen (15) calendar days from the delivery of this letter to request a meeting with the School Board concerning the non-renewal. If you request such a meeting, you will be allowed to "present written information or oral information through statements of others and you may be represented by counsel." If you request such a meeting, it will be held in executive session unless both you and the Board agree to hold the matter in public. After such a meeting, the School Board shall decide whether or not to offer you an opportunity to renew your contract and any such decision by the Board shall be final.

Plaintiff responded with a written request for a public hearing and meeting regarding both the decision to place him on administrative leave and the decision not to renew the contract. The board agreed to schedule a hearing for January 11, 2002, on the nonrenewal of plaintiff's contract, but declined to engage in any further consideration of its decision to place plaintiff on leave, explaining that "[n]othing in your contract or 16 V.S.A. § 243 provides for a challenge to such an action. As such, we will not be dealing with this issue at the January 11 meeting."

¶ 7. On January 11, 2002, the board met with plaintiff to reconsider its nonrenewal of plaintiff's contract. The meeting was not public. At the meeting, plaintiff presented witnesses and submitted documents rebutting some of the allegations in Dr. Van Hoof's evaluation. On January 16, the board notified plaintiff in writing that his contract still would not be renewed. After receiving this letter, plaintiff sought employment with other school districts, including districts in other states, but was unsuccessful. He alleges he lost one job opportunity when a local newspaper republished a report about the board's decision to place him on administrative leave.

¶ 8. In May 2003, plaintiff brought an action in the superior court. His complaint alleged that defendants: (1) deprived him of due process under color of state law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violated his employment contract and his statutory rights as a principal; (3) committed defamation; and (4) discriminated against him on the basis of race in violation of the Vermont Fair Employment Practices Act. The complaint also contained a request for punitive damages and attorneys' fees. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all counts. The court granted defendants' motion in part, entering judgment in defendants' favor on the due process and contractual claims. It concluded that the January 11, 2002 board meeting satisfied the demands of due process, and that the District was not contractually or statutorily required to provide plaintiff with a hearing specific to its decision to place plaintiff on administrative leave. The court denied summary judgment on the defamation and discrimination claims. These claims were tried before a jury; the jury found in favor of defendants on both counts. This appeal followed.

¶ 9. On appeal, plaintiff does not challenge the jury's verdict. Instead, he contends the superior court erred by granting summary judgment on the first two counts of his complaint. We review a trial court's decision on summary judgment according to the same standard as the trial court. In re Estate of Kurrelmeyer, 2006 VT 19, ¶ 7, 179 Vt. ___ 895 A.2d 207. "Summary judgment is appropriate where the undisputed facts demonstrate either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (citing V.R.C.P. 56(c)(3)). For the reasons stated below, we agree that the court was incorrect in granting summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's breach-of-contract and § 1983 claims. We thus reverse the court's judgment in part and remand for further proceedings.

I. Breach of Contract

¶ 10. We first address plaintiff's claim that the District breached his employment contract by denying him the procedural protections of 16 V.S.A. § 243 before terminating his employment. The undisputed facts establish that the District took actions that were tantamount to a mid-year dismissal of plaintiff from his position as principal. Such a dismissal was not permitted under plaintiff's contract without a hearing and a written decision establishing just cause for the dismissal. Thus, as a matter of law, the...