Angela L. v. Pasadena Independent School Dist., 90-2072
| Decision Date | 12 December 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-2072,90-2072 |
| Citation | 918 F.2d 1188 |
| Parties | 64 Ed. Law Rep. 350 ANGELA L. b/n/f Mrs. Zeta L., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PASADENA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Donald G. Henlsee, William M. Buechler, Austin, Tex., for defendant-appellant.
Beatrice Mladenka-Fowler, Houston, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before BROWN, POLITZ and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges.
Perhaps the fiercest legal battles emerge not from knotty questions of a plaintiff's right to justice, but rather from comparatively trivial questions of an attorney's right to compensation. When needlessly protracted, these battles squander precious judicial time and resources. In the instant case, the Pasadena Independent School District vehemently challenges the district court's award of attorney's fees under the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986 to the parents of a speech-impaired student. Unable to find that the district court committed reversible error, this Court affirms the award of attorney's fees and remands for calculation of the amount of fees that would be reasonable for this appeal.
During the 1987-88 school year, Angela L. ("Angela") attended first grade at Burnett Elementary School in the Pasadena Independent School District. After she encountered difficulty mastering her subjects, her teacher recommended that Angela receive special educational services. The school district's Admission Review and Dismissal Committee assessed Angela for disabilities. The committee found Angela eligible for speech therapy services, but concluded that she suffered no legally "handicapping" conditions. Accordingly, the committee refused to permit Angela to participate in any special educational services other than speech therapy. Angela, continuing in the regular education program, subsequently failed all of her courses and was retained in the first grade.
In January 1988, Angela's parents requested an independent assessment of their daughter's abilities from the Meyer Center for Development Pediatrics in Houston, Texas. The Meyer Center determined that Angela was mildly retarded and required special educational services. Armed with this information, the parents sought a second Admission and Dismissal Committee review. The parents, contending that Angela's mental retardation qualified as a handicapping condition, requested that their daughter receive individualized instruction and special therapy. The school district granted the parents a second review, but again concluded that Angela's condition did not justify special educational services.
Frustrated with their inability to obtain specialized services for their daughter, Angela's parents engaged legal counsel. The attorney reviewed Angela's condition and then filed the parents' request for a due process hearing before the Texas Education Agency. The state agency appointed a hearing officer and scheduled a date for the due process hearing. Meanwhile, the hearing officer conducted a pre-hearing conference in which the parties expressed their views. In this conference, the parents' attorney maintained that Angela was entitled to the following educational services from the school district: individualized instruction, a special curriculum based upon Angela's pace and ability, continued speech therapy, and occupational therapy. Subsequently, the parties entered into a settlement agreement negotiated by counsel for both sides, and the parents dismissed their request for a due process hearing. The school district in the settlement granted almost all of the parents' requested relief, with the exception that the school district declined to classify Angela as mentally retarded. Specifically, the school district agreed to the following terms:
(1) At the option of the parents, the Petitioner [Angela] will receive the modified curriculum program in a fixed-wall classroom at Stuchbury Elementary School, the modified curriculum program in an open classroom concept room with special assistance through the Pasadena Independent School District Chapter I reading program at Burnett Elementary School, or the modified curriculum program in a fixed-wall classroom with special assistance through the Pasadena Independent School District Chapter I reading program at a third elementary school to be determined later.
(2) Petitioner will not be identified as being mentally retarded or having any handicapping conditions other than her previous classification as speech impaired.
(3) Petitioner will receive core curriculum services in a classroom with an approximate student/teacher ratio of 15 to 1. If the ratio exceeds 17 to 1, parents will be contacted for a conference with administration.
(4) An occupational therapy program to be implemented by the classroom teacher and parents will be developed to improve Petitioner's motor skills. Consultation and monitoring of Petitioner's progress will be provided by the occupational therapist on a regular basis.
(5) Petitioner's progress will be monitored on a regular basis and will be reviewed in a conference with the parents after six weeks in the modified curriculum program. The matter will remain on the docket until after this conference.
Angela's parents, upon receipt of the settlement terms, agreed to waive any claims they had for reimbursement of the costs of the Meyer Center's independent assessment. The parents, however, refused to waive their claim to recovery of attorney's fees from the school district. After being informed that the school district would contest this claim, Angela's parents filed an action in federal district court for reimbursement of the amount of their attorney's fees. The district court ruled that Angela was a "prevailing party" under the terms of the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, and therefore that her parents were entitled to recover attorney's fees from the school district.
The Pasadena Independent School District challenges the district court's award of attorney's fees under the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(e)(4)-(f) (1988). Of the several issues raised by the school district, only two require serious examination: (1) whether Angela is a "prevailing party" whose parents are entitled to recover their attorney's fees from the school district, and (2) whether the amount of attorney's fees the district court awarded was unreasonable as a matter of law. 1 This Court's scope of review of the district court's decision is narrow. "A district court attorney fee award will be overturned only for abuse of discretion." Fontenot v. Louisiana Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Education, 835 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir.1988).
In 1975, Congress enacted legislation which appropriated federal funds for state special education programs on the condition the states developed a "policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1412(1) (1988). Known now as the Education of the Handicapped Act ("EHA"), the legislation required that states install "procedural safeguards" to ensure that handicapped children and their parents or guardians may effectively oppose institutional decisions affecting educational opportunity. Id. Sec. 1415(a). In particular, the legislation afforded parents or guardians of handicapped children the right to present complaints against existing educational programs in impartial administrative due process hearings in which the parties were permitted legal representation. Id. Sec. 1415(d)(1).
In its original form, the EHA did not expressly authorize the recovery of attorney's fees. Parents of handicapped children, often already burdened by the prohibitive costs of medical care and equipment, found it difficult to pursue expensive litigation against school districts. To divert some of their expenses, parents attempted to join claims under the EHA with claims based on statutes that permitted the recovery of attorney's fees. 2 The Supreme Court, however, rejected this approach. In Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984), the Court reasoned that the EHA was the exclusive statutory remedy for deprivations of the educational rights of handicapped children and, in the absence of an express provision, did not authorize the recovery of attorney's fees in actions to enforce these rights. Id. at 1021, 104 S.Ct. at 3473.
Congress sharply criticized the Court's decision in Smith and acted "swiftly, decisively, and with uncharacteristic clarity to correct what it viewed as a judicial misinterpretation of its intent." Fontenot v. Louisiana Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 805 F.2d 1222, 1223 (5th Cir.1986). In the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986 ("HCPA"), Congress amended the EHA to permit the recovery of attorney's fees:
In any action or proceeding brought under this subsection, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents or guardian of a handicapped child or youth who is the prevailing party.
20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(e)(4)(B) (emphasis added). 3 Congressional officials asserted that the legislation represented a critical tool in parents' attempts to secure an appropriate education for their handicapped children. See H.R.Rep. No. 296, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 15 (1985); 132 Cong.Rec. H4841 (daily ed. July 24, 1986) (statement of Rep. Biaggi).
Undoubtedly, the HCPA enhanced the ability of parents to challenge school districts' educational programs. As with most fee shifting legislation, however, Congress limited the availability of attorney's fees awards: the HCPA authorizes courts to award attorney's fees only to the parent or guardian of a handicapped child who has "prevailed" in an action or...
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