Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2

• Citation: 918 P.2d 583,128 Idaho 714
• Decision Date: 03 June 1996
• Docket Number: D,No. 21075,No. 2,2,21075
• Parties: , 110 Ed. Law Rep. 862 Catherine SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MERIDIAN JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2; and, Karen Linder, both individually and as an agent and employee of Meridian Joint School Districtefendants-Respondents. Boise, September 1995 Term
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho

Page 583

918 P.2d 583

128 Idaho 714, 110 Ed. Law Rep. 862

Catherine SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MERIDIAN JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2; and, Karen Linder, both individually and as an agent and employee of Meridian Joint School District No. 2, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 21075.

Supreme Court of Idaho,

Boise, September 1995 Term.

June 3, 1996.

Skinner, Fawcett & Mauk, Boise, for appellant. William L. Mauk argued.

Quane, Smith, Howard & Hull, Boise, for respondent. Brian K. Julian argued.

Chief Justice McDEVITT delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII B, in which Justices JOHNSON, TROUT, SILAK, and SCHROEDER, joined. Justice JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III and VIII A, in which Justices TROUT and SILAK, joined. Chief Justice McDEVITT and Justice SCHROEDER dissented from Parts III and VIII A.

This appeal arises from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondents, Meridian Joint School District No. 2 (the School District) and Karen Linder, individually and as an agent and employee of the school district.

I.

BACKGROUND AND FACTS

The essential facts in this case are undisputed. Smith was employed by the School District for the 1990-1991 and 1991-1992 school years as a certified school counselor. Smith was employed under a non-renewable annual contract and worked at the Lake Hazel Elementary School. Smith was under the supervision and control of John Mikkelson (Mikkelson), principal of Lake Hazel Elementary School, and Karen Linder (Linder), coordinator of counseling for the School District.

According to the School District policy, teachers under an annual contract are to receive a formal written evaluation each semester. Additionally, section 33-514 of the Idaho Code requires that teachers under annual contracts are to receive at least one evaluation prior to the beginning of the second semester of the school year.

Near the end of the first semester, Mikkelson prepared Smith's semi-annual performance evaluation and reviewed the proposed Smith's evaluation showed that Smith's performance was satisfactory in some areas. However, the evaluation indicated that Smith needed to improve her performance in the areas of consulting with staff, referring students to school ancillary personnel and community agencies, establishing and maintaining rapport with others, and communicating with staff members. The evaluation also expressed nine areas where Smith's conduct was improper, including her inappropriate involvement with and referral of children to the Department of Health & Welfare, Child Protective Services (CPS), her inappropriate behavior towards employees of CPS, and her exceeding the boundaries of her counseling duties. Due to Smith's less than satisfactory evaluation, Smith was placed on an "intensified growth plan," under which Smith was to receive a program of "assistance" to resolve the areas of Smith's evaluation where improvement was needed. Smith was given goals that she was to meet under the intensified growth plan. The intensified growth plan was conducted by a growth team, consisting of Mikkelson, Linder, and Darlene Fulwood.

evaluation with Linder. Linder disagreed with the draft evaluation and proposed that Smith's evaluation be marked down. In mid-December 1991, a survey of the Lake Hazel Elementary counseling program was circulated to the faculty and staff of the Lake Hazel School, from which Linder formed the basis for Smith's revised evaluation. Smith's first semester performance evaluation was completed and given to Smith at the beginning of the second semester, on or about February 5, 1992. The first semester ended in mid-January 1992.

While Smith was under the intensified growth plan, concerns were expressed by Jim Cook, who was the Supervisor of CPS, about Smith's interviewing skills with children referred to the CPS, Smith's activities involving those children, Smith's interference with the investigations of the CPS, and Smith exceeding her authority as a counselor. Smith's growth team discussed these activities with Smith.

On April 14, 1992, Smith was placed on formal probation, pursuant to I.C. Section 33-514, and was given goals similar to those contained in the intensified growth plan. The reasons for Smith's probation were based on Smith's inappropriate conduct; Smith was impeding the investigations of the CPS, was improperly "enmeshed" with students and families, and was potentially contaminating evidence in abuse or neglect cases due to her improper investigative methods. The probation period began on April 15, 1992, and was to continue until the Board of Trustees of the School District (Board of Trustees) determined whether to re-employ Smith.

After being placed on probation, Smith requested to see a written report of the concerns of the CPS, regarding Smith's handling of investigations and referrals of children to the CPS. The written reports from the CPS were received on May 4, 1992, and were given to Smith at a meeting on May 5, 1992. Although Smith did not receive the written statements until May 5, 1992, Smith was aware of the specific concerns of the CPS. Smith had met with Mr. Cook of the CPS on February 19, 1992, to discuss the CPS' concerns about Smith's referral and interviewing techniques, and Smith had received a verbal report from Mr. Cook in early April 1992, about Smith's inappropriate actions in interviewing children prior to referrals to the CPS.

On May 12, 1992, the Board of Trustees approved the recommendation of Smith's probationary team and determined that Smith would not be re-employed for the 1992-1993 school year. The Board of Trustee's reasons for not re-employing Smith were based on Smith's inappropriate conduct in interfacing with CPS, interviewing students referred for crisis intervention, and failure to recognize and respect personal boundaries of students and families in her role as school counselor. The decision not to re-employ Smith was also due to Smith's being inappropriately "enmeshed" with students and families, Smith's contamination of evidence in abuse or neglect cases, and Smith's interference with the investigations of the CPS.

Smith sought an informal review of the Board of Trustees's decision pursuant I.C. Section 33-514. On June 26 and July 7 On July 20, 1992, a Notice of Claim was filed with the School District for breach of contract and tort damages. On August 6, 1992, Smith filed a complaint against the School District and against Karen Linder, both in her individual capacity and as an agent and employee of the School District. Smith sought reinstatement of employment, damages, attorney fees, and costs. Smith sought review of her claims under the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and claimed that the School District breached its contract with Smith, terminated Smith in violation of public policy, violated Smith's civil rights under the United States and Idaho Constitutions, and intentionally interfered with Smith's employment contract.

1992, the Board of Trustees met to review its decision. At the informal review, Smith was represented by counsel, submitted evidence on her behalf, and was permitted to call witnesses. A quorum of the Board was present and testimony was given under oath subject to cross examination by the Board through the hearing officer. The hearing officer served a dual role as hearing officer and as counsel for the School District during the hearing. On July 7, 1992, the Board rendered its decision upholding its original decision not to re-employ Smith for the 1992-1993 school year.

The district court granted the School District's motion for summary judgment and entered its judgment and order on December 17, 1993. The district court concluded as a matter of law that the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (APA) does not apply to the review of personnel actions taken by school districts, that the School District substantially complied with the requirements of I.C. Section 33-514 and did not breach Smith's contract, that the School District's actions did not constitute a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and that since there was no legitimate expectation by Smith that she would be offered a new contract for the next year, there was no protected property interest in continued employment upon which Smith's claimed constitutional rights could attach. The district court reviewed Smith's procedural due process claims and concluded that there was no due process violation in the review of the Board of Trustees's decision not to re-employ Smith. The court reasoned that the meeting of the Board was an "informal review" and not an adjudicative hearing, and thus the process due Smith in this instance, notice and opportunity to respond, were both present. The court held that there was no viable claim against Linder individually, and that in her representative capacity, Linder was immune from any Section 1983 claim. The court also held that Linder was immune from any claim under the Idaho Tort Claims Act and that the circumstances failed to provide any basis for a claim of third party interference with a contract.

JOHNSON, TROUT, SILAK and SCHROEDER, JJ., concur.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When faced with an appeal from a lower court's grant of a summary judgment motion, this Court reviews the lower court's ruling by employing the same standard properly applied by the lower court when originally ruling on the motion. Featherston v. Allstate Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 840, 842, 875 P.2d 937, 939 (1994) (quoting Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 272, 869 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1994)). Summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). This Court...