Hutton v. Strickland

Decision Date27 December 1990
Docket NumberNo. 90-3080,90-3080
Citation919 F.2d 1531
PartiesFloyd B. HUTTON, Anna V. Hutton, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Sheriff Thomas STRICKLAND, Individually and as Sheriff of Holmes County, Florida, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Keith C. Tischler, Parker, Skelding, Labasky & Corry, Tallahassee, Fla., for defendant-appellant.

George E. Day, Day & Meade, P.A., Fort Walton Beach, Fla., for plaintiffs-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida.

Before FAY and BIRCH, Circuit Judges and HENDERSON, Senior Circuit Judge.

BIRCH, Circuit Judge:

This case examines the qualified and absolute immunity status of Holmes County, Florida, Sheriff Thomas Strickland, defendant-appellant. Plaintiffs-appellees Floyd B. Hutton and Anna V. Hutton were arrested by local sheriff's officers when they attempted to repossess ranch property, which they contended reverted to them through recordation of a quitclaim deed because the new owners had defaulted on the terms of the land sale contract. The district court denied Strickland's motion for summary judgment on the issues of qualified and absolute immunity. Our review of the record reveals that Sheriff Strickland was entitled to qualified immunity, but that he properly was denied absolute immunity. We, therefore, reverse in part and affirm in part the district court's denial of summary judgment as to these immunity issues and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 16, 1984, Floyd and Anna Hutton, husband and wife, conveyed property known as Reedy Creek Ranch in Holmes County, Florida, to Hobie W. Laws and his wife, Kimberly G. Laws. The Laws simultaneously signed a quitclaim deed, which was held in escrow at a local bank. The land sale contract provided that the purchasers' failure to pay the balance of the down payment by December 2, 1985, or otherwise to be in default, would enable the Huttons to remove the quitclaim deed from escrow and to record it in lieu of instituting foreclosure proceedings.

On June 24, 1985, the Laws were arrested for trafficking in marijuana because they were discovered to be growing on the ranch approximately sixty acres of corn interspersed with large cannabis plants, estimated to weigh in excess of ten thousand pounds. Incident to the arrests, officers from the Holmes County Sheriff's Department (Sheriff's Department) confiscated various machinery and other personal property. The officers also plowed under the marijuana fields, displacing the topsoil. Upon learning of the arrests, the Huttons became concerned regarding possible destruction of the ranch property and the confiscated personal property in which they had an interest.

Furthermore, the Huttons were notified by the insurance company on June 27, 1985, that the Laws had not maintained insurance on the ranch, constituting a default under the land sale contract. On approximately July 1, 1985, the Florida circuit court released Kimberly Laws, a/k/a Kimberly Bowen, on bond. The circuit court directed that she return to the ranch pending trial at a time when it was aware that the Huttons claimed an interest in the property. 1 The Sheriff's Department also released most of the confiscated personal property. The Huttons removed the quitclaim deed from escrow and recorded it on July 9, 1985.

With increasing concern regarding possible damage to the ranch, the Huttons contacted the Sheriff's Department and various local officials to obtain assistance in repossession. Sheriff Strickland testified by affidavit that he informed the Huttons that the Sheriff's Department could not assist them in regaining possession of the property. Upon inquiry, the assistant state attorney, who had worked with the Sheriff's Department during the marijuana trafficking investigation, advised the investigating officer and Sheriff Strickland that the Huttons' quitclaim deed gave them a colorable claim to title. This assistant state attorney testified, however, that he had never practiced civil law, that he had no experience with foreclosure actions, and that he had little understanding of the difference between a right to title and a right to possession. 2 The Huttons' attorney advised them that their quitclaim deed did not enable them to take possession of the property and that foreclosure proceedings first must be completed.

In possession of the quitclaim deed and accompanied by two friends, the Huttons attempted to retake the ranch by self-help on July 19, 1985. They cut the chain lock on the front gate and drove past a "No Trespassing" sign on their way to the house. The Huttons told Kimberly Laws to vacate the property; she asked the Huttons to leave. When the Huttons refused to go, Kimberly Laws summoned the Sheriff's Department.

Several patrol cars were dispatched to the ranch. The officer in charge examined the cut lock on the front gate and saw a pair of bolt cutters and .22 caliber rifle in the flatbed of the Huttons' truck. After talking with the Huttons and Kimberly Laws, the officer radioed Sheriff Strickland, who instructed him to arrest the Huttons for trespass. 3

After receiving instructions from Sheriff Strickland, the officer escorted the Huttons from the ranch and arrested them for trespassing. They were taken to the station, where they were booked and their truck was searched. Approximately two hours later, the Huttons were released.

On July 23, 1985, the Huttons sued the Laws in the Florida Circuit Court for the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit. They alleged that the Laws had defaulted on the land sale contract and wrongfully were retaining possession of the property. The Huttons sought possession of the ranch and certain personal property, damages, and attorneys' fees. Pursuant to a hearing and allowing the defendants an opportunity to obtain insurance on the ranch, the state court entered an order finding that the defendants had acquired insurance and that they would be permitted to remain on the ranch pending further order of the court.

On December 4, 1985, the state court entered final judgment in favor of the Huttons, and ordered a judicial sale of the property. Without foreclosure proceedings, the court held that the quitclaim deed executed by the Laws was insufficient legally to reconvey the property to the Huttons. The court, however, permitted the Huttons to amend their complaint to include the allegation that the Laws defaulted on the land sale contract by failing to make a payment due on December 1, 1985. Based on this default, the state court entered judgment for the Huttons in the amount of $394,191.65, plus costs and interest. Thereafter, the Huttons took possession of the ranch.

Alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, the Huttons filed this suit against Sheriff Strickland in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. In his answer, Sheriff Strickland asserted qualified immunity as an affirmative defense. The district court subsequently denied Sheriff Strickland's initial motion for summary judgment because of the existence of genuine issues of material fact, but permitted leave to renew the motion at the conclusion of discovery. The district court granted in part and denied in part Sheriff Strickland's renewed motion for summary judgment, denying his motion as to the issues of qualified and absolute immunity. 4 In its one sentence devoted to denying qualified immunity to Sheriff Strickland, the district court relied on its probable cause discussion and did not identify the facts that it considered or its analysis in concluding that qualified immunity was inapplicable to Sheriff Strickland. 5 On interlocutory appeal, the only issues before this court are the district court's denial of Sheriff Strickland's qualified and absolute immunity status. This case has been stayed by the district court pending our ruling.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction

A district court's denial of a summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity is an exception to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291, establishing our review of final decisions of district courts. See Hudgins v. City of Ashburn, 890 F.2d 396, 402 (11th Cir.1989). The Supreme Court has determined "that a district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable 'final decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment." 6 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). The qualified immunity shield protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damages "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (emphasis added). The Court has created the qualified immunity exemption because public officials must have protection from damage suits in order to execute their responsibilities independently and without liability threats, provided that their conduct is not unlawful. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806, 102 S.Ct. at 2732; Hudgins, 890 F.2d at 402; see Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir.1989); Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271, 1273 (11th Cir.1989).

The particular public official's entitlement that the Court has sought to protect is an immunity from suit; as in the case of absolute immunity, this entitlement would be lost if the case were tried erroneously. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 2815; Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1560 (11th Cir.1988). "Therefore, a district court's denial of qualified immunity is immediately appealable." Hudgins, 890 F.2d at 402; Clark v. Evans, 840 F.2d 876, 879 (11th Cir.1988). As a procedural matter, qualified immunity must be pled by the defendant official as an affirmative...

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