Dunaway v. State

Citation919 So.2d 67
Decision Date03 May 2005
Docket NumberNo. 2003-KA-01810-COA.,2003-KA-01810-COA.
PartiesBilly Ray DUNAWAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Mississippi

Rebecca G. Taylor, attorney for appellant.

Office of the Attorney General by Scott Stuart, attorney for appellee.

Before LEE, P.J., MYERS and CHANDLER, JJ.

CHANDLER, J., for the Court.

¶ 1. Billy Ray Dunaway was found guilty of vehicular homicide. The Circuit Court of Pike County sentenced Dunaway as a habitual offender to twenty-five years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections and to pay a $10,000 fine. On appeal, Dunaway challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and avers that certain evidentiary errors occurred that entitle him to a new trial.

¶ 2. We find no error and, therefore, affirm Dunaway's conviction and sentence.

FACTS

¶ 3. On January 25, 2002, Dunaway was living with his girlfriend Becky Hux and her eighteen-year-old son Edward Lloyd Hux (Lloyd). That evening, Dunaway and Lloyd visited The Point After, a lounge where Becky worked as a bartender. Becky observed that Dunaway was drunk. Dunaway and Lloyd left the lounge at approximately 8:05 p.m. As they were leaving, Becky saw Dunaway's white Chevrolet pickup truck parked in front of the bar. She asked Dunaway to allow Lloyd to drive because Dunaway was drunk. Dunaway replied, "[T]here [isn't] no m____ f ____ driving [my] truck but [me]." Becky observed Dunaway walking to the driver's side of the truck and Lloyd walking to the passenger's side; she then went back into the bar. Though Becky did not see Dunaway and Lloyd enter the truck, she observed them three to four feet away from the truck with Dunaway approaching the driver's side and Lloyd approaching the passenger's side.

¶ 4. At approximately 8:15 or 8:20 p.m., Jeremy Roberts was driving westbound on the McComb-Holmesville Road with his girlfriend, Eva Reeves. An oncoming white truck swerved into Roberts' lane and Roberts left the roadway to avoid a collision. The truck swerved to the right, exited the roadway, brushed against trees lining the road, and flipped over. Dunaway was thrown from the truck and received minor injuries. Lloyd was pinned beneath the passenger's side door. Lloyd and Dunaway were transported to Southwest Regional Medical Center, and Lloyd was pronounced dead shortly after their arrival. Dunaway's blood alcohol level was.266.

¶ 5. At the scene, Roberts heard Dunaway state that the truck was not his and that he did not know the boy. Dunaway told Reeves that he did not want to say anything because he did not want to get into trouble. When the authorities arrived, Dunaway told Officer Davis Haygood that he had not been driving and that he was unsure who had been in the truck with him.

¶ 6. Becky Hux testified that the truck belonged to Dunaway. She stated that, because Dunaway was approximately five feet, two inches tall, in order to reach the gas pedal of the truck he customarily put the bench seat in its most forward position and sat on a pillow that he secured by partially tucking it beneath the seatback. Lloyd was six feet, three inches tall and two hundred and sixty pounds. Becky stated that, when Lloyd drove the truck, he put the bench seat in its most rearward position and did not use the pillow. Becky further testified that, the day after the accident, she retrieved her house keys from the wrecked truck. She noticed that the bench seat was in a forward position and Dunaway's pillow was in the driver's seat, partially tucked underneath the seatback. Officer Case, an accident reconstructionist, also observed that the bench seat was in a forward position close to the steering wheel. A corroborative photograph of the seat was admitted into evidence.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DUNAWAY'S MOTION FOR A JNOV OR A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS BASED ON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.

¶ 7. After the trial, Dunaway attacked both the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence by moving for a JNOV or a new trial. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Dunaway's statement of the issues cites error in the trial court's denial of his motion for a JNOV or a new trial, implicating both the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence. However, Dunaway entirely limits his appellate arguments to the trial court's denial of the motion for a JNOV. Therefore, we likewise restrict our analysis to the issue of error in the denial of Dunaway's motion for a JNOV.

¶ 8. A motion for a JNOV challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of each element of the offense. Edwards v. State, 469 So.2d 68, 70 (Miss.1985). In the instant case, the jury was instructed that, for a guilty verdict, it had to find that Dunaway caused the death of Lloyd Hux while operating a motor vehicle in a negligent manner and under the influence of intoxicating liquor. See Miss.Code Ann. § 63-11-30(5) (Rev.2004). The court deemed the case against Dunaway circumstantial and gave the jury a circumstantial evidence instruction requiring that, for a finding of guilt, it had to find each element of vehicular homicide beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. For purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that the trial court correctly subjected the State to the heightened burden of proof applicable to circumstantial evidence cases.

¶ 9. In reviewing the denial of a JNOV, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all favorable inferences that reasonably may be drawn from the evidence. Edwards, 469 So.2d at 70. We must reverse if the evidence so considered favors the defendant on any element of the offense such that reasonable jurors could not have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and, in a circumstantial evidence case, to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. Id.; Montgomery v. State, 515 So.2d 845, 848 (Miss.1987). We will affirm if "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" and excluding every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. Edwards, 469 So.2d at 70; Montgomery, 515 So.2d at 848. Moreover, "[a] mere fanciful or farfetched or unreasonable hypothesis of innocence is not sufficient to require an acquittal." Montgomery, 515 So.2d at 848.

¶ 10. Dunaway argues that there was insufficient evidence that he was driving the truck at the time of the accident. Though no witness saw Dunaway driving, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that he was driving to support his conviction. Becky Hux testified that, several minutes before the accident, Dunaway emphatically refused to allow Lloyd to drive the truck. She then witnessed Dunaway approach the driver's side and Lloyd approach the passenger's side. Becky further testified that after the accident the truck's bench seat was in the extreme forward position favored by Dunaway and the pillow Dunaway used to reach the gas pedal was in the driver's seat. The testimony of Officer Case and a photograph corroborated the fact that the seat was in a forward position after the accident. And, Becky testified that Lloyd never used the pillow or placed the seat in a forward position due to his large size. Moreover, Lloyd sustained injuries to the right side of his body and was found pinned beneath the passenger door, inviting the inference that he was in the right passenger seat during the accident. There was medical testimony that Lloyd did not sustain a chest injury from a steering wheel, further bolstering the conclusion that he was in the passenger seat. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the jury reasonably could have inferred that Dunaway was driving at the time of the accident.

¶ 11. Dunaway also avers that there was insufficient evidence that his negligent operation of the truck caused Lloyd's death. Dunaway correctly points out that the crime of vehicular homicide requires not only that the defendant became intoxicated before the accident but also that he performed a negligent act that caused the death of another. Joiner v. State, 835 So.2d 42, 43-44(¶ 5) (Miss. 2003). The negligence need not have been caused by the alcohol consumption. Id. at 44(¶ 5). Specifically, Dunaway contends that there was insufficient evidence that the truck crashed due to his negligent driving. Taking the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the State, there certainly was sufficient evidence that Dunaway's negligent driving caused Lloyd's death. As discussed above, there was sufficient evidence that Dunaway was driving the truck during the accident. Several witnesses saw the truck traveling well in excess of the speed limit just before the accident. Roberts testified that the speeding truck swerved at his vehicle and then drove off the road and flipped over. Photographs showed trees that had been damaged when the truck left the roadway. This was sufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably could have inferred that Dunaway was negligently speeding and negligently lost control of the truck, resulting in Lloyd's death.

¶ 12. Dunaway also argues that the evidence did not exclude a reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence, specifically, that Lloyd was driving the truck "with deliberate suicidal tendencies and/or with reckless disregard for his life and lost control of the vehicle." The only evidence Dunaway cites in support of this hypothesis is Becky's testimony that Lloyd dropped out of college and moved back in with her because he did not want to commit suicide. It has been said of evidentiary sufficiency in circumstantial evidence cases:

[i]t is always insufficient where assuming all to be proved which the...

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6 cases
  • Taylor v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Mississippi
    • August 2, 2012
    ......         ¶ 51. “[T]he crime of vehicular homicide requires not only that the defendant became intoxicated before the accident but also that he performed a negligent act that caused the death of another. The negligence need not have been caused by the alcohol consumption.” Dunaway v. State, 919 So.2d 67, 71 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2005) (citing Joiner v. State, 835 So.2d 42, 43–44 (¶ 5) (Miss.2003)). Along with sufficient evidence that the accused was driving under the influence when he or she caused the death or disfigurement of another person, simple negligence is ......
  • Taylor v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Mississippi
    • April 26, 2011
    ...a negligent act that caused the death of another. The negligence need not have been caused by the alcohol consumption." Dunaway v. State, 919 So. 2d 67, 71 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Joiner v. State, 835 So. 2d 42, 43-44 (¶5) (Miss. 2003)). Along with sufficient evidence that the a......
  • Gonzalez v. State, 2016–KA–01271–COA
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Mississippi
    • November 28, 2017
    ......Id. (citing Wakefield v. Puckett , 584 So.2d 1266, 1268 (Miss. 1991) ). ¶11. Gonzalez never objected to the medical form as improper rebuttal evidence, so he is barred from raising this issue on appeal. See Dunaway v. State , 919 So.2d 67, 74 (¶ 23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). Even so, the medical form was proper rebuttal evidence. During his case-in-chief, Gonzalez testified that Andres grabbed his neck and hands and pushed him toward the wall. He also stated that Andres bit his hands. This testimony prompted ......
  • Dunaway v. State, 2017-CP-01692-COA
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Mississippi
    • March 19, 2019
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