Nabozny v. Podlesny

Decision Date31 July 1996
Docket NumberNo. 95-3634,95-3634
Citation92 F.3d 446
Parties, 111 Ed. Law Rep. 740 Jamie S. NABOZNY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mary PODLESNY, William Davis, Thomas Blauert, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Patricia M. Logue (argued), Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Chicago, IL, David Buckel, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, New York City, for Jamie S. Nabozny.

Timothy J. Yanacheck (argued), Stilp & Cotton, Madison, WI, for Mary Podlesny, William Davis, Thomas Blauert and Ashland Public School District.

Cynthia H. Hyndman, Robinson, Curley & Clayton, Chicago, IL, for National Ass'n of School Psychologists, National Ass'n of Social Workers, Horizons Community Service and Parents, Family, and Friends of Lesbians and Gays.

Before BAUER, ESCHBACH, and FLAUM, Circuit Judges.

ESCHBACH, Circuit Judge.

Jamie Nabozny was a student in the Ashland Public School District (hereinafter "the District") in Ashland, Wisconsin throughout his middle school and high school years. During that time, Nabozny was continually harassed and physically abused by fellow students because he is homosexual. Both in middle school and high school Nabozny reported the harassment to school administrators. Nabozny asked the school officials to protect him and to punish his assailants. Despite the fact that the school administrators had a policy of investigating and punishing student-on-student battery and sexual harassment, they allegedly turned a deaf ear to Nabozny's requests. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that some of the administrators themselves mocked Nabozny's predicament. Nabozny eventually filed suit against several school officials and the District pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging, among other things, that the defendants: 1) violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection by discriminating against him based on his gender; 2) violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection by discriminating against him based on his sexual orientation; 3) violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by exacerbating the risk that he would be harmed by fellow students; and, 4) violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by encouraging an environment in which he would be harmed. 1 The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted. Nabozny appeals the district court's decision. Because we agree with the district court only in part, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

I.

Before discussing the facts of this case, we must delineate the scope of the record properly before the court. The defendants argue that many of the facts relied on by Nabozny in his appellate brief were not presented to the district court. The defendants' argument is based on the district court's pretrial order dated March 24, 1995, in which the court ordered the parties to submit motions for summary judgment by August 15, in accordance with the local rule on summary judgment. The local rule requires parties filing motions for summary judgment to submit proposed findings of fact, with citations to the record. The defendants did so. The local rule requires parties responding to summary judgment motions to present evidence, with citations to the record, that establishes genuine issues of material fact for trial. Nabozny responded to the defendants' summary judgment motion by submitting a litany of conclusory statements, largely unsupported by citations to the record. 2 2 The defendants maintain that absent a more definitive response by Nabozny, the district court relied on the defendants' proposed findings of fact to grant summary judgment in the defendants' favor.

We strictly enforce local rules, such as the summary judgment rule in this case, holding that when the nonmovant fails to reply in the proper form he concedes the movant's version of the facts. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir.1994). Nabozny's failure to comply with the local rule entitled the district court to limit its inquiry to whether, viewed in the light of the facts presented by the defendants, judgment is appropriate as a matter of governing law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Glass v. Dachel, 2 F.3d 733, 739 (7th Cir.1993). It is unclear whether the district court meant to limit the record to the undisputed facts set forth in the defendants' summary judgment motion. The district court's summary judgment order made no mention of the local rule, or Nabozny's failure to comply with it.

For our purposes herein, we need not decide whether the court relied on the local rule. Regardless of what the district court intended, it is clear from the court's order that it did not limit its review to the defendants' grounds for summary judgment and proposed findings of fact. For example, the defendants sought summary judgment on Nabozny's equal protection claims on the basis that Nabozny had failed to allege that any of the defendants participated in or encouraged the harassment that Nabozny suffered. The district court, however, granted summary judgment on Nabozny's gender equal protection claim on the ground that no evidence in the record suggested that the defendants treated Nabozny differently because of his gender; a different legal basis than that offered by the defendants. The district court offered no rationale for disposing of Nabozny's sexual orientation equal protection claim. As for Nabozny's due process claims, the defendants offered no rationale for rejecting Nabozny's claim that the defendants enhanced the risk of harm to Nabozny. The district court concluded sua sponte that nothing in the record supported Nabozny's claim. What is more, throughout the district court's factual account and legal analysis, the court relied in part on Nabozny's affidavit to establish facts presented in neither party's proposed findings of fact.

Our court has previously ruled that "[i]f the district court is inclined to venture outside the moving party's grounds for summary judgment and statement of undisputed facts, the court must be careful to ensure that the record reveals no issue of material fact." Brown v. United States, 976 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir.1992). If a district court relies on either a local rule or Federal Rule 56(c) to limit the record for the purposes of summary judgment to the moving party's undisputed facts, then the court cannot look beyond the moving party's motion and selectively incorporate legal theories or facts that support the motion. If the court elects to rely on legal arguments and evidence not incorporated in, or submitted with, the summary judgment motion, the court is obligated to consider the entire record "to ensure that the record reveals no issue of material fact." Id. Because the district court elected to venture beyond the parameters of the defendants' summary judgment papers to dispose of some of Nabozny's claims, the entire record was before the district court regarding those claims, including "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, [and] affidavits...." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Therefore, Nabozny is entitled to rely on the entire record on appeal. 3 With the scope of the record delineated, we turn to a discussion of the facts. We review summary judgment awards de novo, considering the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Roger v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 21 F.3d 146, 148-49 (7th Cir.1994). Therefore, the facts are presented in the light most favorable to Nabozny.

II.

From his birth in 1975, Nabozny lived in Ashland, Wisconsin. Throughout his childhood, adolescence, and teenaged years he attended schools owned and operated by the Ashland Public School District. In elementary school, Nabozny proved to be a good student and enjoyed a positive educational experience.

When Nabozny graduated to the Ashland Middle School in 1988, his life changed. Around the time that Nabozny entered the seventh grade, Nabozny realized that he is gay. Many of Nabozny's fellow classmates soon realized it too. Nabozny decided not to "closet" his sexuality, and considerable harassment from his fellow students ensued. Nabozny's classmates regularly referred to him as "faggot," and subjected him to various forms of physical abuse, including striking and spitting on him. Nabozny spoke to the school's guidance counselor, Ms. Peterson, about the abuse, informing Peterson that he is gay. Peterson took action, ordering the offending students to stop the harassment and placing two of them in detention. However, the students' abusive behavior toward Nabozny stopped only briefly. Meanwhile, Peterson was replaced as guidance counselor by Mr. Nowakowski. Nabozny similarly informed Nowakowski that he is gay, and asked for protection from the student harassment. Nowakowski, in turn, referred the matter to school Principal Mary Podlesny; Podlesny was responsible for school discipline.

Just before the 1988 Winter holiday, Nabozny met with Nowakowski and Podlesny to discuss the harassment. During the meeting, Nabozny explained the nature of the harassment and again revealed his homosexuality. Podlesny promised to protect Nabozny, but took no action. Following the holiday season, student harassment of Nabozny worsened, especially at the hands of students Jason Welty and Roy Grande. Nabozny complained to Nowakowski, and school administrators spoke to the students. The harassment, however, only intensified. A short time later, in a science classroom, Welty grabbed Nabozny and pushed him to the floor. Welty and Grande held Nabozny down and performed a mock rape on Nabozny, exclaiming that Nabozny should enjoy it. The boys carried out the mock rape as twenty other students looked on and laughed. Nabozny escaped and fled to Podlesny's office. Podlesny's alleged response is somewhat astonishing; she said that "boys will be boys" and told...

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